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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review 
pursuant to, Utah Code Ann- §§ 78-2-2-(3)(e)(ii) and 63-46b-16 
and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
ISSUE I 
A. Issues; Whether Kennecott proved that the Tax 
Commission's method of assessing Kennecott's property was the 
same as Salt Lake County's method of assessing similar property. 
B. Standard of Review: The Tax Commission finding1 
that the assessment methods were the same will only be reversed 
if Kennecott shows that the finding is not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole. First Nat'l Bank 
v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (1990). 
ISSUE II 
A. Issue; Whether the Tax Commission properly 
refused to apply the 20% reduction found in § 59-2-304(1) under 
the facts found by the Tax Commission. 
B. Standard of Review: The Tax Commission ruling 
will only be set aside if erroneous. Savage Industries, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'nf 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). 
A copy of the Tax Commission finding is attached as 
Addendum A. 
ISSUE III 
A. Issue: Whether Kennecott proved that Utah's 
compliance with the 4R Act violates Kennecott's equal protection 
rights because the classification created by the Act is 
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose. 
B. Standard of Review; The Tax Commission's finding 
that railroads and Kennecott are not similarly situated will only 
be reversed if Kennecott shows that the finding is not supported 
by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. First Nat'l 
Bank, supra. 
ISSUE IV 
A. Issue; Whether the Tax Commission properly held 
that Utah's compliance with the 4R Act did not violate 
Kennecott's equal protection rights, under the facts found by the 
Tax Commissions. 
B. Standard of Review: The Tax Commission ruling 
will only be set aside if erroneous. Savage Industries, supra. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS 
The pertinent constitutional, statutory, and regulatory 
provisions are: 
1. United States Constitution 14th Amendment. 
2. United States Constitution Art. IV 
3* Utah Constitution Art. I § 24. 
4. Utah Constitution Art. XIII § 2. 
5. Utah Constitution Art. XIII § 3. 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987). 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304 (1987). 
8. Utah Admin. Rule R884-24-7P. 
Copies of these provisions are attached as Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT 
I* KENNECOTT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT § 304 WAS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED. 
In order to obtain relief under Amax Magnesium Corp. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1990), Kennecott had 
the burden of proving that the County and Tax Commission's 
methods of assessing Kennecott's property were the same. The Tax 
Commission found that Kennecott had not satisfied this burden. 
Conclusions of Law 5 15 (Rec. 36). This factual finding will not 
be set aside unless Kennecott shows, after marshalling all the 
evidence, that this finding is erroneous. First Nat'l Bank, 
supra, 799 P.2d at 1165. 
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Kennecott has not met its burden in this case. First, 
it cannot show that the assessment methods are the same because 
it has not established what method County would have used. 
Second, the evidence shows that the assessment methods used by 
the County generally are not the same as the method used by the 
Tax Commission to assess Kennecott's property. For these 
reasons, the Court should affirm the Tax Commission's refusal to 
give Kennecott Amax relief. 
II. UTAH'S COMPLIANCE WITH OF THE 4R ACT DOES NOT 
VIOLATE KENNECOTT'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS 
Kennecott has the burden of proving that Utah's 
compliance with the 4R Act violated Kennecott's equal protection 
rights. Kennecott's burden is particularly difficult in this 
case because of the strong presumption of constitutionality given 
to tax laws. The Tax Commission found that Kennecott was not 
similar to railroad properties which receive 4R act protection 
and that Kennecott had failed to show an equal protection 
violation. Conclusion of Law, f 18 (Rec. 18). 
Kennecott has failed to establish that Utah's 
compliance with the 4R Act violates the equal protection law. 
The 4R Acts treatment of railroads is rationally related to the 
legitimate governmental interest of protecting the financial 
stability of railroads. The Tax Commission's ruling should 
therefore be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. KENNECOTT HAS THE BURDEN OF AFFIRMATIVELY PROVING 
THE TAX COMMISSION'S ACTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
It is axiomatic "that acts of the Legislature are 
presumed constitutional, especially when dealing with economic 
matters based on factual assumptions." Rio Algom Corp. v. San 
Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 190 (Utah 1984) (emphasis supplied). 
The presumption of constitutionality applies with 
particular force to tax statutes . . . . 
No scheme of taxation . . . has yet been 
devised which is free of all discriminatory 
impact. In such a complex arena in which no 
perfect alternatives exist, the Court does 
well not to impose too rigorous a standard of 
scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become 
subjects of criticism . . . . 
Id. at 191 guoting San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez. 411 
U.S. 1 (1973). Similarly, in Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 
779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989) the Court held: 
In the tax area, as in other areas of purely 
economical regulation, we give broad 
deference to the legislature when 
scrutinizing the reasonableness of its 
classifications and their relationship to 
legitimate legislative purposes. . . .That 
broad deference leads us to sustain a 
classification if "facts can reasonably be 
conceived which would justify the 
distinctions or differences in state policy 
[expressed by the challenged legislation] as 
between different persons". . . . 
The Court therefore sustains legislative tax enactments, unless 
"[the] party attacking the constitutionality of a statute . . . 
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affirmatively demonstrate[s] its unconstitutionality," Rio 
Algom, supra, 681 P.2d at 191 (emphasis supplied). 
On this appeal, Kennecott also faces the burden of 
defeating adverse factual findings of the Tax Commission. The 
Court will only set aside such factual findings if they are not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a 
whole. Kennecott, as the appellant, has the burden of 
marshalling the evidence which supports these findings and then 
persuading the Court that the findings are erroneous. Kennecott 
has not marshalled the evidence or shown how the evidence is 
insufficient to support the Tax Commission's findings. First 
Nat'1 Bank, supra 799 P.2d at 1165. 
II. KENNECOTT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT § 304 WAS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED. 
Kennecott has the burden of affirmatively proving § 304 
unconstitutional. Rio Algom, supra
 f 681 P.2d at 191. To satisfy 
this burden, Kennecott must prove that the Tax Commission's 
method of assessing Kennecott's property was the same as the 
County's method of assessing similar property. See generally 
Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1990). 
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Kennecott however has failed to satisfy its burden of proof and 
the Tax Commission's ruling should be affirmed.2 
Kennecott's evidence is insufficient for two reasons. 
First, the record does not show how the County would have 
assessed commercial property similar to Kennecott's. Without 
such evidence, Kennecott cannot prove that the County's method is 
the same as the Tax Commission's method. Second, although the 
record does not show what method the County would have used, the 
record does show that the various assessment methods generally 
used by the County are different from those used by the Tax 
Commission to assess Kennecott's property. These differences, in 
part, arise because of the legal restrictions on the Tax 
Commission's assessment methods, restrictions which do not apply 
to the County. For these reasons, the Court should sustain the 
Tax Commission's finding that Kennecott has failed to establish 
that the Tax Commission's assessment methods and the County's 
assessment methods are the same. 
*
2
 Kennecott relies heavily on this Court's decision in 
Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Commission, 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah 
1990). There, the Court found that § 304 was unconstitutional, 
as applied to Amax, because the parties had stipulated that the 
Tax Commission's assessment methods and the County assessment 
methods were the same. I^ci- at 1260. Because of the parties' 
stipulation, the Amax Court did not have to determine whether the 
Tax Commission's finding of dissimilarity should be reversed or 
whether the taxpayer had established that the assessment methods 
were the same. These issues, which Amax did not address, are the 
central issues in this appeal. 
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A. Kennecott Has Not Established What Assessment Method 
the County Would Use In This Case. 
The record before the Tax Commission does not show 
which appraisal method the County would have used to assess 
commercial property similar to Kennecott's. The Salt Lake County 
Chief Appraiser, who testified at the hearing and by deposition, 
did not identify what method or methods Salt Lake County would 
have used to assess property such as Kennecott's. Rather, he 
merely identifies the various methodologies that the County 
generally uses to assess commercial real estate and states that 
the County has no primary method. Butterfield Deposition, p. 20-
24; Tr. 110. He was not asked nor did he testify whether or how 
these methods would be applied to Kennecott's property. Without 
such proof of how the County would assess Kennecott, Kennecott 
cannot prove that the County's method is the same as the Tax 
Commission's and that § 304 has been unconstitutionally applied. 
B. The County's Methods of Assessing Commercial Property 
Generally Are Significantly Different From the Tax 
Commission's Method of Assessing Kennecott's Property. 
Although the record does not reveal which method the 
County would have used to assess property similar to Kennecott's, 
it does refer to various methods used by the County to assess 
commercial property generally. A comparison of the County's 
methods for assessing commercial property generally and the Tax 
Commission's methods for assessing mines reveals substantial, 
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significant differences in nominally similar assessment methods. 
These differences are, in part, due to statutes and regulations 
which limit the Tax Commission's assessment methods but which do 
not apply to the County. Other differences are the result of 
fundamentally different applications of nominally similar 
assessment methods. Whatever the source of the differences, the 
record supports the Tax Commission's finding that Kennecott 
failed to establish that the Tax Commission's and County's 
methods were the same. 
1. Utah statutes and regulations restrict the Tax 
Commission's assessment of mines. 
The Utah Code sections and Tax Commission regulations 
govern the methods used by the Tax Commission in assessing mines 
such as Kennecott's. Hearing Tr. p. 45. Under this law, the Tax 
Commission assesses mines using what is called the "capitalized 
net revenue method." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(2); Utah Admin. 
Rule R884-24-7P. As discussed more fully below, the Tax 
Commission's regulations describe in detail the specific formula 
for assessing property using this method. 
The Utah Code provision governing the assessment of 
mines further provides: "In no event may the fair market value of 
the mining property be less than the fair market value of the 
land, improvements, and tangible personal property upon or 
appurtenant to the mining property." This statute requires the 
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assessment of the individual items of property with the value 
being the sum of the individual assessments, (This is sometimes 
called the "summation method.") Thus, the Tax Commission values 
mining property under the capitalized net revenue method and the 
summation method but uses the higher of the two methods for 
assessment purposes. Hearing Tr. p. 35, 50-51. 
These statutes and regulations only apply to the Tax 
Commission, they do not apply to the County. As a result, in 
some cases, Utah law requires the Tax Commission to use an 
assessment method different from the method that the County could 
use in a similar situation. Hearing Tr. p. 45, 52, 55. 
2. The Tax Commission's capitalized net revenue 
method for assessing mines is different from the 
County's income method. 
The Tax Commission regulations contain a specific 
formula for computing value under the capitalized net revenue 
method. Utah Admin. Rule R884-24-7P; Hearing Tr. p. 59. These 
regulations do not apply to the County which is free to choose 
other income methods for valuing property. A comparison of the 
Tax Commission's capitalized net revenue method and the County's 
income method reveals substantial differences in methodology. 
The Tax Commission valued Kennecott's property under 
capitalized net revenue method following the formula found in the 
Tax Commission's Rule. Under this rule, the Tax Commission 
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values mines by determining the mine's net income for the prior 
five years. Net income equals gross income less expenses 
including capital expenditures. Unused capital expenditures can 
be carried forward to reduce net income for future years. As a 
result, large capital expenditures in a year can reduce or 
eliminate net income for that year or subsequent years. Hearing 
Tr. p. 50-51. 
Once the Commission computes net income for the prior 
five years, it averages the five year net income and discounts 
the average by an appropriate capitalization rate. This method 
assumes that the average net income for the prior five years will 
not increase or decrease for the indefinite future. Hearing Tr. 
p. 66. This method also assumes that the mine owner will not get 
a return on his capital investment other than his cost of 
capital. Hearing Tr. p. 67. In other words, he will recover 
nothing for the risk of investment. This discounted five year 
income average was Kennecott's assessed value under the 
capitalized net revenue approach.3 Hearing Tr. p. 32, 35, 77; 
Eyre Deposition, p. 18-19. 
The County would not apply the capitalized net revenue 
method as defined by Tax Commission regulations. Specifically, 
This capitalized net revenue method is a "very 
primitive discounted cash flow" method. Hearing Tr. p. 62. 
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the County would not use the rolling five year income average or 
loss carry forward used by the state. Hearing Tr. p. 99. Thus, 
to the extent that the County would use an income approach, it 
would not use the method used by the Tax Commission. 
3. The Tax Commission's summation method is different 
from the County's assessment methods• 
Under the summation method, the Tax Commission 
individually assesses Kennecott's real property, improvements and 
tangible personal property. The assessed value is the sum of 
these individual values. The Tax Commission's method of valuing 
the real property component of the summation method is different 
from the County's method. 
On the surface, the Tax Commission's method of valuing 
real property appears to be the same as the County's. Both use 
what may be called the sales or market method. Using this 
method, the Tax Commission and the County assessors determine 
value by using the sales price of comparable properties. Hearing 
Tr. p. 30. 
Although using nominally similar methods, the Tax 
Commission and the County apply them in dramatically different 
ways. The Tax Commission uses as comparables commercial property 
which does not have minerals. As a result, the Tax Commission's 
summation method does not give a value to minerals located under 
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Kennecott's property/ Hearing Tr. pp. 34-35, 40, 51, 67, 74. 
The County, on the other hand, would value the minerals located 
under Kennecott's property by using mining property as 
comparables or by making adjustments to the non-mining 
comparables to reflect the value of Kennecott's minerals. 
Hearing Tr. p. 101-102. 
Thus, the Tax Commission's and the County's summation 
methods are different because the Tax Commission does not include 
a value for minerals whereas the County does.5 
III. UTAH'S COMPLIANCE WITH OF THE 4R ACT DOES NOT 
VIOLATE KENNECOTT'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS 
Kennecott claims that Utah's compliance with the 
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 ("4R 
Act") violates it equal protection rights under the 14th 
Amendment of United States Constitution6 and the uniform laws 
A
 The Tax Commission does not value minerals separately 
under the summation method because the capitalized net revenue 
approach indicated that those minerals had negligible economic 
value. 
5
 In 1988, Kennecott had gross income of $600-800 million 
from the sale of minerals mined from this property. Tr. p. 38, 
40. 
6
 Arguably, the equal protection component of the 5th 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution should govern the 
constitutionality of a federal statute such as the 4R Act, since 
the 14th Amendment only applies to the states. The Court, 
however, need not address this issue since the equal protection 
analysis under the 5th Amendment and 14th Amendment are the same. 
Compare United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 
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provision of the Utah Constitution.7 State in other words, 
Kennecott claims an equal protection right to be treated the same 
as railroads are treated under the 4R Act. Kennecott however has 
failed to prove that Utah's compliance with the 4R Act violates 
Kennecott's equal protection rights or to prove what relief the 
Court should grant ij, an equal protection violation has occurred. 
A. The 4R Act, the Union Pacific case, and Utah's 
Treatment of Railroads. 
The Congress enacted the Railroad Revitalization and 
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 ("4R Act") in an effort to restore 
the financial stability of the railway systems of the United 
States. Union Pacific Railroad Company v. State Tax Commission 
of Utah, 716 F.Supp. 543, 545 (D.Utah 1988). In order to 
accomplish this purpose, the 4R Act prohibits various types of 
State taxes which discriminate against railroads. Ogilvie v. 
State Board of Equalization, 657 F.2d 204, 206 (8th Cir. 1981). 
(The Act's goal was "to eliminate the long - standing burden on 
U.S. 166 (1980) (5th Amendment analysis) with Nordlinqer v. Hahn, 
S.Ct. Bull. (CCH) B2831 (June 18, 1992) (Attached hereto as 
Exhibit C) (14th Amendment analysis). 
7
 Under the Supremacy Clause, a federal enactment is 
supreme over conflicting state statutes or constitutional 
provisions. U.S. Const. Art. VI. Thus, Utah's compliance with 
the 4 R Act cannot violate Utah Constitutional provisions, since 
the federal enactment supersedes these state provisions. 
However, since the Tax Commission's compliance with the 4R Act is 
constitutional under both the federal and state constitutions, 
the Court need not address this issue. 
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interstate commerce . . . from discriminating . . . taxation. . . 
. " ) • Specifically, the Act prohibits a State from 
assess[ing] rail transportation property at a 
value that has a higher ratio to the true 
market value of the rail transportation 
property than the ratio that the assessed 
value of other commercial and industrial 
property in the same assessment jurisdiction 
has to the true market value of the other 
commercial and industrial property. 
49 U.S.C. § 11503(b)(1).8 Stated in hopefully simpler terms, 
Congress made railroads a special classification of taxpayer and 
required that the State assess railroads at the same ratio to 
true market value as it assesses all other commercial or 
industrial property in the State. Under the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution, this Act supersedes conflicting 
State constitutional or statutory taxing provisions but leaves 
unaffected State tax laws which do not impact railroads. Federal 
Express Corp. v. Tenn. State Board of Equalization, 717 S.W. 2d 
873, 876 (Tenn. 1986). (Attached hereto as Exhibit D.) 
The Act provides that railroads, injured by taxes 
prohibited by the Act, may obtain relief in federal court. In 
such a case, the Court must determine whether the State assessed 
the railroad property at a higher ratio to true market value than 
8
 The Act's other provisions create other types of 
prohibited discrimination. These other provisions however are not 
relevant to this appeal. 
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the State assessed all other commercial and industrial property 
in the State, If the State assesses the railroad at a higher 
ratio, the court will order the railroad's assessment reduced to 
make the railroad's ratio of assessed value to true market value 
equal to the ratio of assessed value to true market value for all 
other commercial and industrial property in the State. 
This provision of the 4R Act was at issue in Union 
Pacific v. State Tax Comm'n of Utah, supra. There, several Utah 
railroads brought an action in federal court alleging that Utah's 
treatment of railroads violated the 4R Act. The railroads 
claimed that the ratio of assessed value to fair market value for 
commercial and industrial properties was less than the ratio 
assessed value to fair market value for railroads. In ruling for 
the railroads, the Court compared the ratio for railroads and for 
all other commercial property and found that the ratio for 
railroads was higher. It therefore ordered the assessed value of 
the railroads' property reduced so that the railroads' ratio of 
assessed value to true market value equaled the ratio for all 
other commercial and industrial property. 
The Union Pacific ruling only adjusted the railroads' 
assessments for 1984 and 1985 tax years. In subsequent tax 
years, the Tax Commission has adjusted the railroads' assessment 
pursuant to the formula followed by the court in the Union 
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Pacific case and mandated by the 4R Act. Specifically, the Tax 
Commission determines for each year the ratio of assessed value 
to true market value for all commercial and industrial property 
in Utah. This computation includes both locally assessed and 
centrally assessed property and includes Kennecott's property. 
This ratio is then compared to the ratio for railroads' and the 
railroads' assessments are adjusted to equalize railroads' 
assessment ratio with the assessment ratio for all other 
industrial and commercial property in Utah. For the tax year in 
question on this appeal, the 4R Act required an adjustment of 14% 
to the railroads' assessed value. Eyre deposition p.29-34. 
B. Kennecott Has Failed to Prove That Utah's Compliance 
With the 4R Act Violates Kennecott's Equal Protection 
Rights 
Kennecott has not proven that Utah's compliance with 
the 4R Act violates Kennecott's equal protection rights. To 
prevail on its equal protection claim, Kennecott must establish 
that the difference in treatment between the railroads and other 
taxpayers including Kennecott is not reasonably related to a 
legitimate governmental purpose. Nordlinger v. Hahnf S.Ct. Bull. 
(CCH) B2831, B2840-41 (June 18, 1992). Blue Cross, supra, 779 
P.2d at 637. Under this test, the Court must consider three 
interrelated, but separate factors: (1) the classifications 
created; (2) the governmental purposes involved; (3) the 
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relationship between the classification and the governmental 
interest. Each of these is considered in turn below. 
1. The 4R Act makes railroads a special taxpayer 
classification. 
The 4R Act makes railroads a special classification of 
taxpayer and restricts how states may tax them. Since Kennecott 
is not a railroad, it does not fall within the 4R Act's 
protections. To prevail on its equal protection claim, Kennecott 
must prove that this classification and resulting difference in 
treatment is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental 
interest. 
2. Congress' purpose in enacting the 4R Act is a 
legitimate government purpose. 
The 4R Act's purpose is to "restore the financial 
stability of the railroad system of the United States." Union 
Pacific, supra, 716 F.Supp at 545. Kennecott does not contest 
the legitimacy of this governmental purpose.9 Rather, it seeks 
to incorporate the purpose of § 304 of the Utah Code into its 
analysis of the constitutionality of the 4R Act of the United 
States Code. Kennecott Brief at p.37. Section 304 of the Utah 
9
 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, in analyzing the constitutionality of the Act under the 
Commerce Clause has held: "[T]he legitimate end of Congress [in 
enacting the Act] is to revitalize the nation's railroads to 
improve the flow of interstate commerce." Arizona v. Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe, 656 F.2d 398, 407 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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Code however does not create the classification at issue here and 
cannot provide the purpose for a classification it did not 
create. Since Congress by enacting the 4R Act created the 
classification at issue here, the Congressional purpose is found 
in that Act, not in some unrelated Utah statute. 
It is important to recognize that neither the Utah 
Legislature not the Tax Commission created the railroad 
classification at issue here. Rather, the 4R Act, as interpreted 
by the United States District Court, required the Tax Commission 
to treat railroads as a special classification. As a result the 
Tax Commission's treatment of railroads is to further a federal 
governmental objective, not a Utah one. The constitutionality 
of the Tax Commission's actions must therefore be based upon 
these federal objectives rather than Utah objectives. 
3. The 4R Act's classification of railroads is 
reasonably related to the Congressional purpose of 
furthering railroad financial stability. 
The relationship between the 4R Act's treatment of 
railroads and a legitimate governmental purpose cannot be 
seriously challenged. 
Without doubt the well-being of the nation's 
railroads is essential to its economic 
health. In passing section 11503 Congress 
acted "to eliminate the long-standing burden 
on interstate commerce resulting from 
discriminatory State and local taxation of 
common and contract carrier transportation 
property." 
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Southern Railway v. State Board of Equalization, 715 F.2d 522, 
528 (11th Cir. 1983). Protecting railroads from discriminatory 
taxes improves their financial health and thereby furthers the 
legitimate governmental purposes. C£. Atchison, Topeka, supra, 
656 F.2d at 407 (Analyzing the constitutionality of the Act under 
the Commerce Clause, the Court held: "The means that Congress 
has adopted, prohibiting state from assessing railroad property 
at higher ratios than other commercial property, is 'plainly 
adapted to that end [revitalizing railroads],' by having the 
effect of diminishing the proportionate tax burden in railroads . 
. . • " ) . The Act's classification is their constitutional. 
A case factually similar to the instant case is Federal 
Express v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization, supra. There the 
Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state 
tax law partially preempted by the 4R Act. The Tennessee tax law 
in question provided that the property of public utilities, 
including railroads, be taxed at 55% of its value, and that 
commercial and industrial property be assessed at 30% of its 
value. The 4R Act however required that railroads be assessed at 
the same percentage as commercial property, notwithstanding 
Tennessee's law classifying railroad as utilities. Federal 
Express, a utilities under Tennessee's scheme, but not a 
railroad, challenged Tennessee's treatment of railroads under the 
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4R Act and claimed that Tennessee had violated the taxpayer's 
equal protection rights by assessing the railroads as commercial 
property. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court summarily rejected this 
challenge and held: 
The legislature classified railroads as 
public utilities and assessed them for ad 
valorem tax purposes at 55% of the value of 
their properties. However, the Congress of 
the United States, by . . . [the 4R Act] . . 
. preempted the state classification of 
railroads and provided that they should be 
taxed as industrial and commercial property 
are taxed. The Act, having as its purpose 
the revitalization of railroads, affected 
only that business. Thus leaving in effect 
the state classification of other businesses 
as public utilities. The assessment of each 
of the businesses classed as public utilities 
is at the same ratio to value as the 
assessment of Federal Express property; 
consequently, we find no violation of . . . 
the Tennessee Constitution or the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Federal 
Constitution. 
Id. at 876. 
Kennecott is in the same position as the taxpayer in 
Federal Express. The 4R Act has preempted Utah's tax law and 
requires that railroads be treated in a manner different from 
Kennecott and other centrally assessed taxpayers. Although the 
4R Act alters the treatment of railroads, it leaves unchanged 
Utah's taxing scheme as it applies to other businesses. 
Kennecott cannot complain of the treatment of railroads because 
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the 4R Act furthers a legitimate governmental purpose and 
Kennecott cannot challenge the Commission's treatment of its own, 
property because Kennecott is treated the same as other centrally 
assessed property. This Court should therefore find, as the 
Tennessee Supreme Court did, that Utah's compliance with the 4R 
Act does not violate the equal protection rights of the other 
taxpayers. 
Kennecott cites Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County 
Commissioner of Weber County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989) to supports its 
claim that Utah's compliance with the 4R Act violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. In Allegheny 
Pittsburgh, the county assessor for one county in West Virginia 
started assessing property at its acquisition value. As a 
result, more recently transferred property had dramatically 
higher assessed values than other similarly situated property. 
In analyzing the constitutionality of the assessor's 
acts, the Supreme Court held that a state may properly create tax 
classifications rationally related to legitimate governmental 
purposes. Id. at 344. West Virginia, however, had not created 
such a classification, but had required taxation at a uniform 
rate based on market value. Id. at 345. Instead of a formally 
recognized governmental objective, a county assessor, apparently 
acting on her own initiative, had simply adopted an "aberrational 
-22-
enforcement policy" based on acquisition value and resulting in 
wide disparities. Id., at 345. The Supreme Court therefore 
declared the assessor's practice unconstitutional because the 
practice did not further any legitimate governmental interest.10 
Allegheny Pittsburgh provides little guidelines here. 
The classification created by the unilateral actions of a county 
assessor are distinguishable from a classification created by 
Congress' enactment of the 4R Act.11 More relevant to the 
instant case is Nordlinger wherein the Court determined the 
constitutionality Proposition 13, a formal legislative enactment. 
Nordlinger is the United States Supreme Court's long 
waited decision on the constitutionality of California's 
Proposition 13 tax initiative. Proposition 13, among other 
things, adopts an "acquisition value" taxation system in which 
property is assessed at its value when acquired by the taxpayer 
rather than is assessed at its value when assessed. This system 
"created dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by persons owning 
10
 The county asserted that the assessor's practice was 
rationally related to the purpose of obtaining true value. Id. 
at 344. It did not assert that any legitimate policy was 
furthered by treating those who had purchased their property some 
time ago less favorably than those who purchased more recently. 
11
 "Allegheny Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts 
precluded any plausible inference that the reason for the unequal 
assessment practice was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition 
-value tax scheme." Id. at B2841. 
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similar pieces of property . . . . Indeed, in dollar terms, the 
difference in tax burdens are staggering." .Id. at B2835. 
Because of this disparate treatment, a California taxpayer, who 
had recently acquired her home, challenged Proposition 13 on 
equal protection grounds. 
The Court analyzed the taxpayer's equal protection 
claim under the minimum scrutiny analysis applied to economic 
legislation.12 It framed the constitutional issue as "whether 
the difference in treatment between newer and older owners 
rationally furthers a legitimate state interest." Id* a t B2840. 
Stated in other words, the issue was whether the equal protection 
clause prohibited California from denying a new owner "the 
benefits of the same assessment value that her neighbors — old 
owners — enjoy." JTd. at B2841. Notwithstanding the staggering 
differences in assessed values, the Court had "no difficulty" in 
identifying at least two reasonable grounds for denying newer 
owners the benefits of the lower assessed values given to older 
owners.13 Id. at B2841. 
12
 The Court found that the taxpayer lacked standing to 
raise the constitutional right of travel as a basis for more 
stringent review of Proposition 13. id. at B2840. 
13
 The Court described the scope of its review of the 
relationship between the classification and the governmental 
purposes as follows: 
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The equal protection analysis found in Nordlinger and 
Blue Cross compels a finding that Utah's compliance with the 4R 
Act is constitutional.1A Congress in enacting the 4R Act could 
have reasonably believed that preventing ceratin types of 
taxation of railroads would promote its legitimate governmental 
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so 
long as there is a plausible reason for the 
classification . . . the legislative facts, 
on which the classification is apparently 
based, rationally may be considered to be 
true by the governmental decision maker. . 
.and the relationship of the classification 
to its goal is not so attenuated as to render 
the distinction arbitrary or irrational . . . 
. This standard is especially deferential in 
the context of classification made by complex 
tax laws. "[I]n structuring internal 
taxation schemes 'the States have large 
leeway in making classifications and drawing 
lines which in their judgment produce 
reasonable systems of taxation . . . ." 
Id. at B2841 (emphasis supplied). The Utah Supreme Court applies 
a similar standard in assessing the constitutionality of tax laws 
under the equal protection component of the Utah Constitution. 
Blue Cross, supra, 779 P.2d at 637. 
1A
 Kennecott cites Northern Natural Gas v. Board of 
Equalization, 443 N.W.2d 249 (Neb. 1989) which held that 
Nebraska's compliance with the 4R Act violated the equal 
protection clause of the 14th Amendment. The Court's opinion, 
relies on outdated United States Supreme Court decisions and does 
not cite Allegheny Pittsburgh. More importantly, it does not 
attempt to analyze whether the classifications under the 4R Act 
further a legitimate governmental interest as required in 
Allegheny Pittsburgh and reaffirmed in Nordlinger. Thus, the 
decision is of little value in assessing the constitutionality of 
the 4R Act under the equal protection clause of the 14th 
Amendment. 
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purposes of fostering the financial stability of railroads. This 
is all the equal protection clause requires. The fact that 
Kennecott and other taxpayers thereby bear a larger tax burden 
does not make the Act unconstitutional so long as the difference 
in treatment is related to a legitimate governmental interest. 
Since the 4R Act treatment of railroads furthers a legitimate 
governmental purpose, Utah's compliance with the act does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
C. Kennecott Has Not Proven What Relief Is 
Appropriate to Remedy Any Equal Protection 
Violation 
Kennecott has not established what relief it would be 
entitled to if the Court finds that Utah's compliance with the 
Act violates it's rights equal protection rights. The 4R Act 
does not require that railroads obtain any specific reduction in 
assessed value. Instead, the 4R Act requires that a state not 
assess railroads at a higher ratio to their fair market value 
than it assesses all other industrial and commercial property in 
the state. The Tax Commission and the railroads compute this 
ratio on a yearly basis and have determined that the percent 
reduction for 1988 should be 14%. In computing this ratio, the 
assessed value of Kennecott's property was included with 
commercial property to determine the assessment ratio. 
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The record does not reflect that Kennecott is entitled 
to a 14% reduction even if it is assumed that it is entitled to 
same treatment as railroads. If Kennecott is to receive the same 
treatment as railroads under the 4R Act, Kennecott is only 
entitled not to be assessed at a higher ratio to fair market 
value than other commercial and industrial property in the state. 
The record, however, contains no evidence of what these ratios 
would be or the extent to which Kennecott would be entitled to a 
reduction to equalize its assessment with other commercial and 
industrial property in the state. For this reason, Kennecott has 
failed to establish its entitlement to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Court should affirm the Tax 
Commission's ruling. 
DATED this J£fS>y of August, 1992. 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
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PROPERTY TAX DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 88-1347 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on May 10, 1990. G. Blaine Davis, 
Commissioner, served as the Presiding Officer. In addition, 
Joe B. Pacheco, Commissioner, and Joseph G. Linford, 
Administrative Law Judge, heard the matter for and on behalf of 
the Commission. Present and representing the Petitioner were 
Maxwell A. Miller and Kent W. Winterholler, Attorneys at law, 
of Parsons, Behle and Latimer. Present and representing the 
Respondent was Lee A. Dever, Assistant Utah Attorney General. 
Present and representing Salt Lake County were Bill Thomas 
Peters, Special Deputy County Attorney, of Kinghorn, Peters, 
Styler and Probst, and Karl Hendrickson, Deputy Salt Lake 
County Attorney. 
The Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission originally mailed its Notice of Assessment to the 
Petitioner, Kennecott Corporation (Kennecott) on April 28, 
1988. The total assessed value as initially determined by the 
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Property Tax Division for all of the Centrally assessed 
property of Kennecott located in Utah on January 1, 1988, was 
$635,570,036. Kennecott timely appealed that assessment by a 
Request for Agency Action filed May 31, 1988, and a later 
Revised Request for Ager.cy Action filed September 9, 1988. 
Kennecott and the Property Tax Division entered into a 
Stipulation on December 9, 1988 in which they stipulated that 
the assessed value should be reduced to $617,771,020 as a 
preliminary assessment, but they agreed that the final 
valuation could be higher or lower following either further 
negotiations or litigation. 
The affected counties were given notice of the 
proposed reduction to Kennecott's valuation, and Salt Lake 
County (the county) objected and filed a Petition for 
Commencement of Adjudicative Proceedings on January 10, 1989. 
Salt Lake County also filed a Motion to Consolidate on January 
20, 1989. Kennecott objected to the Motion and Petition on 
February 6, 1989. 
On March 3, 1989, the Tax Commission executed and 
issued an Order of Approval in which they approved the 
preliminary determination of value at the stipulated amount of 
$617,771,020, but the Order of Approval specifically provided 
that Mthe acceptance of the assessed value in no way limits any 
other issues relating to the appeal, and such issues shall be 
left to further resolution." 
On August 7, 1989, Petitioner filed Petitioner's 
Amended Request for Agency Action. In that Amended Request, 
Kennecott raised the issues of economic and functional 
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obsolescence, imputed interest on construction work in 
progress, and equalization or equal protection of the laws. 
On February 14, 1990, the Petitioner entered into a 
Stipulation with Salt Lake County wherein the parties 
stipulated to issues relating to this case and other pending 
cases between the parties. In that stipulation, Kennecott 
agreed to "withdraw, and dismiss, with prejudice, its Amended 
Request for Agency Action, as that request for agency action 
relates to the Property Tax Division's failure to allow for 
functional obsolescence in its valuation of Kennecott's 
property, and as a result of the inclusion by the Property Tax 
Division of imputed interest in the valuation by the Property 
Tax Division of Kennecott's construction work in progress in 
1988." Kennecott did not withdraw the equal protection 
issues. In that stipulation, Salt Lake County agreed that it 
would "not contest the valuation of Kennecott's property by the 
Utah State Tax Commission, or by the Property Tax Division of 
the Utah State Tax Commission except to the extent that 
Kennecott seeks a reduction on that valuation as a result of 
the 4-R case, or related legal theories." 
The hearing was held May 10, 1990. At the hearing, 
Kennecott took the positions that: 
a. The assessed values of its real property should be 
reduced by 20% to extend to it "the same 20% reduction 
that county assessed commercial and industrial 
property owners received" because of the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304; or 
b. The assessed values of all of Kennecott's property 
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should be reduced by 14% to grant to them "the same 
percentage reduction of 14% that the state assessed 
railroads received for their taxable property" 
pursuant to the decision of the United States District 
Court in Union Pacific v, Utah State Tax Commi .on, 
716 F. Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988). 
No testimony or evidence was presented at the hearing 
to indicate that the value of Kennecott*s property was any 
amount other than the amount of $617,771,020 to which Kennecott 
and the Property Tax Division stipulated. Therefore, the only 
issues before the Commission at the time of the hearing were 
the two issues raised by Kennecott. 
At the time of the hearing there were at least two 
pending motions which had not been "ruled upon by the 
Commission. Kennecott had filed a Motion to Strike, and Salt 
Lake County had filed a Motion for Consolidation. 
Subsequent to the date of the formal hearing, but 
prior to the issuance of a final decision on this case, the 
Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Amax 
Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, 796 P2d 
1256 (Utah 1990) which held that Amax Magnesium was entitled to 
the 20% discount in the valuation of its taxable property which 
is extended to some county assessed property pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §59-2-304. That case was decided by the Utah Supreme 
Court on July 18, 1990, and on July 20, 1990, the Petitioner 
filed with the Tax Commission in this proceeding a copy of the 
Amax decision with a Submission of Decision in a Related Case 
in which they requested that the principles of the Amax case be 
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applied to this case and that Kennecott's property assessment 
be immediately reduced. 
On October 4, 1990, Kennecott filed Petitioner's 
Second Amended Request for Agency Action in which they raised 
substantially the same issues as in their first Amended 
Petition, but they added further elaboration on the 20% issue 
because of the Amax decision. 
Therefore, to clarify the current positions of each of 
the parties and to review the issues that must be decided, the 
Commission entered an order on October 28, 1991, requiring the 
parties to submit memoranda indicating what effect, if any, the 
Amax decision had on the present case. Each of the parties 
timely filed the requested memoranda. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, as well as post hearing memoranda submitted by the 
parties, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is property tax. 
2. The period in question is the lien date January 
1, 1988. 
3. For the lien date January 1, 1988, the 
Respondent, pursuant to stipulation and the Order of Approval 
entered by the Commission, has assessed the Petitioner's 
taxable centrally assessed property, exclusive of any property 
which may have been assessed by Salt Lake County, at 
$617,771,020.00, including all real property, improvements and 
personal property. That value has been approved by the 
-5-
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Commission, subject to any changes that might be made through 
this proceeding. 
4. During the period in question, locally assessed 
commercial and industrial real property located in Salt Lake 
County was assessed by the county using a combination of ne 
comparable sales method, the cost appraisal method, and the 
income approach. The value so determined for such real 
property was then reduced 20% pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. S59-2-304. The 20% reduction does not apply to 
personal property and was not applied to personal property by 
the county. 
5. As of January 1, 1988, the fair market value of 
all real and personal property of Union Pacific Railroad, 
Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, and Southern Pacific Railroad 
in Utah was valued by a combination of the cost: appraisal 
method, the income approach, and the stock and debt approach. 
The values determined by each of those approaches were then 
correlated based upon the judgment of the appraiser, and the 
final correlated value so determined by the appraiser was then 
reduced by 14%, pursuant to a decision of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Utah entered December 29, 1988. This 
reduction was applied to the railroads' state assessed unitary 
property which includes both real and personal property. 
6. The correlation process is not a precise 
mathematical process, but depends strongly upon the judgment of 
the appraiser. Different appraisers can begin with the same 
estimates of value based upon the three different approaches or 
methods of valuation, and if they have different opinions of 
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the relative importance of the different approaches to value, 
then the final determination of value of each appraiser could 
be significantly different. Nevertheless, each of those 
determinations of value may still be a fair and reasonable 
determination of the fair market value of the property. 
7. Although the methods and/or approaches for 
determining value for railroads assessed by the Property Tax 
Division of the State Tax Commission are similar in name to 
those used by the counties in determining the values of 
commercial and industrial properties, the actual methodology is 
very dissimilar. For example, the cost method for the 
railroads uses historical cost from the accounting records, 
whereas the cost method for commercial and industrial 
properties uses estimated replacement cost as estimated by an 
appraisal service such as Marshall and Swift. Thus, while the 
cost method is not normally given substantial weight in the 
final valuation of a railroad, if replacement cost is used in a 
railroad valuation, the total value under the cost method will 
be much greater than it is if the historical cost is used from 
the accounting records. Similar distinctions exist in the 
utilization of the income approach, the comparable sales 
approach, and the stock and debt approach which is utilized for 
railroad valuation instead of the comparable sales method 
because there are very few, if any, sales of railroad 
properties to use as comparables. 
8. The value of Petitioner's state assessed property 
was not reduced below its estimated fair market value for 1988. 
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9. Mining properties, such as those owned by 
Petitioner, are not in the same category of properties as 
railroad properties or most commercial and industrial 
properties. They have different characteristics and under Utah 
law they are assessed by different methodologies. Mining 
properties in Utah are valued using only one method, the 
"capitalized net revenue method" as set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§59-2-201, which method is more fully set forth by the Rules of 
the Tax Commission in Rule R884-24-7P. Under Utah law, that 
methodology is exclusive to the assessment of mines. 
10. Kennecott was valued pursuant to the same 
methodology and on a uniform and equal basis with all other 
mines in the State of Utah. 
11. Kennecott is not valued by the unit approach, and 
does not operate as a unit across state lines. 
12. The assessment of Kennecott was not made by the 
county assessor, but was made by the Property Tax Division of 
the State Tax Commission. 
13. The assessment of Kennecott was not made by using 
either the comparable sales method or the cost appraisal 
method, but was made by using the capitalized net revenue 
method. 
14. The capitalized net revenue method calculates 
fair market value without any consideration to transactional 
costs, i.e., it assumes that the fair market value is available 
to the owner without incurring transactional costs. 
15. The ratio of real property to personal property 
for Petitioner is substantially different than the ratio of 
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real property to personal property for either the railroads or 
for commercial and industrial properties assessed by the county. 
16. Petitioner has not submitted any evidence to 
establish that its property is not assessed at its fair and 
just value. In fact, they have stipulated that it is assessed 
at its fair market value. 
17. Petitioner has not submitted any evidence to 
establish that the tax burden it will pay is disproportionate 
to the amount of property it owns. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Utah State Constitution Article XIII, Section 
2(1) provides as follows: 
Section 2 
(1) All tangible property in the 
state, not exempt under the l^ ws of the 
United States, or under this Constitution, 
shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate 
in proportion to its value, to be 
ascertained as provided by law. 
2. The Utah State Constitution, Article XIII, 
Section 3(1) provides as follows: 
Section 3 
(1) The Legislature shall provide by 
law a uniform and equal rate of assessment 
on all tangible property in the state, 
according to its value in money, except as 
otherwise provided in Section 2 of this 
Article. The Legislature shall prescribe by 
law such provisions as shall secure a just 
valuation for taxation of such property, so 
that every person and corporation shall pay 
a tax in proportion to the value of his, 
her, or its tangible property, provided 
that the Legislature may determine the 
manner and extent of taxing livestock. 
3. Utah Code Ann S 59-2-201(1) provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
U000U032 
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By May 1 the following property shall be 
assessed by the commission at 100% of fair 
market value, as valued on January l, in 
accordance with this chapter: 
(a) All property which operates as a unit 
across county lines, if the values must be 
apportioned among mere than one county or 
state; . . . . 
(e) All mines and mining claims except In 
cases as determined by the commission, where 
the mining claims are used for other than 
mining purposes, in which case the value of 
mining claims used for other than mining 
purposes shall be assessed by the assessor 
of the county in which the mining claims are 
located: and. . . 
(f) All machinery used in mining, all 
property or surface improvements upon or 
appurtenant to mines or mining claims. For 
the purposes of assessment and taxation, all 
processing plants, mills, reduction works, 
and smelters which are primarily used by the 
owner of a mine or mining claim for 
processing, reducing, or smelting minerals 
taken from a mine or mining claim shall be 
considered appurtenant to that mine or 
mining claim, regardless of actual location. 
4* Utah Code Ann. §59-2-201(2) provides as follows: 
The method for determining the fair market 
value of productive mining property is the 
capitalized net revenue method or any other 
valuation method the commission believes, or 
the taxpayer demonstrates to the 
commission's satisfaction, to be reasonably 
determinative of the fair market value of 
the mining property. The rate of 
capitalization applicable to mines shall be 
determined by the commission, consistent 
with a fair rate of return expected by an 
investor in light of that industry's current 
market, financial, and economic conditions. 
In no event may the fair market value of the 
mining property be less than the fair market 
value of the land, improvements, and 
tangible personal property upon or 
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5. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304(1) provides as follows: 
If the county assessor uses the comparable 
sales or the cost appraisal method in 
determining the fair market value of taxable 
property for assessment purposes, the 
assessor is required to recognize that 
various fees, services, closing costs, and 
other expenses related to the transaction 
lessen the actual amount that may be 
received in the transaction. The county 
assessor shall, therefore, take 80% of the 
value based on comparable sales or cost 
appraisal of the property as its fair market 
value. 
6. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304(2), as of January 1, 
1988, provided that the Commission would develop and implement 
methods of appraisal which would not include as part of the 
fair market value the "intangible values" as outlined in 
Subsection (1) and that thereafter Subsection (1) would no 
longer apply. Instead, the methods developed by the Commission 
were to then be fully implemented. 
7. Under the above provisions the Legislature has 
been given the authority to provide a "uniform and equal rate 
of assessment on all tangible property in the state" and to 
"secure a just valuation for taxation of such property" in 
order for every entity to pay taxes in proportion to the value 
of that entity's property. Pursuant to that authority granted 
under the constitution, the Legislature has enacted §§59-2-201 
and 59-2-304. 
8. The Legislature has made a determination that 
when fair market value is calculated by using either the 
comparable sales method or the cost appraisal method there are 
transaction costs which have been included as part of the 
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determination that when fair market value is calculated by any 
other method, such as the capitalized net revenue method, there 
are no transaction costs which have been included as part of 
the determined value. There is a reasonable relationship 
between that legislatively determined classification and the 
purpose of §59-2-304(1), the purpose of which is to equalize 
the tax burdens imposed upon the various properties. 
9. The Legislature found no basis for intangible 
values or transaction costs for centrally assessed properties 
as is indicated by the exclusion of centrally assessed 
properties from the provisions of §59-2-304, and also by the 
express provisions of §59-2-201. The Legislature has 
determined that centrally assessed properties, including mine 
properties such as Petitioner's, are tor' be assessed by the 
Commission using methods other than the comparable sales method 
or the cost appraisal method. Those centrally assessed 
property valuation methods, including the capitalized net 
revenue method, have been determined to not include transaction 
costs in the calculation of fair market value. The Legislature 
has, therefore, specifically excluded properties such as that 
which is owned by the Petitioner from the operation of 
§59-2-304 because of the difference in methodology. 
10. The 20% reduction provided by Utah Code Ann. 
§59-2-304 applies only to real property valued by either the 
comparable sales method or the cost appraisal method. It does 
not apply to personal property. 
11. The federal "4-R" Act does not apply to mining 
properties such as the property of Petitioner. 
-12- 00000035 
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12. If the property of Petitioner had been valued by 
the county pursuant to the capitalized net revenue method, the 
values so determined would not have been reduced 20% because of 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann, §59-2-304. 
13. Utah Code Ann. §§59-2-1007 and 59-1-210(7) 
provide that the Tax Commission may equalize an assessment with 
other similarly assessed property, and ensure that assessments 
are just, equal and their burden is distributed without favor 
or discrimination. 
14. It is Petitioner's position that the Commission 
should equalize the assessment of Petitioner's property with 
property which is similarly assessed. However, the 
Petitioner's property has not been deemed by the Legislature to 
be similarly assessed with properties whi<5h do receive the 20% 
or 14% reductions. The subject property as a mine property is 
centrally assessed under the above provisions and also under 
section 4 of Article XIII of the Utah State Constitution and 
the relevant statutes and rules of the Commission. It is 
therefore in the same category as other property which is 
centrally assessed and all centrally assessed property is taxed 
at 100% of fair market value. 
15. The Petitioner has not shown that the appraisal 
methods used by the Petitioner and those used by Salt Lake 
County were the same. Therefore, the decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Amax Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1990) does not control or 
govern these proceedings. In the present case, although the 
methods used by the Respondent and the county may be referred 
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to by the same names (i.e. income appr jh, cost approach, and 
market approach) the techniques and methodologies used within 
each of those separate methods are quite different with respect 
to the subject property. 
16. In the altt ative, Petitioner asserts that it 
should be accorded the 14% reduction allowed to railroads. The 
controlling case to this issue is Union Pacific vs. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 716 F.Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988). As a result of 
that case, railroads under the federal "4-R" Act have a 14% 
reduction in the assessed values of their property. The 
subject property, however, is not a railroad property and is 
also not governed by the federal "4-RM Act. It is therefore, 
not similar to railroad properties that receive the 14% 
reduction. The subject property is required by law to be 
assessed at 100% of its full market value. 
17. The Commission finds further that the case Rio 
Alqom Corp. vs. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984) 
states the rationale and principles which are controlling in 
this case. The Rio Alqom Court found that a "certain degree of 
de facto classification is unavoidable" and the Legislature has 
a proper amount of discretion in meeting the requirements of 
uniformity mandated under the Utah Constitution. The court 
stated: 
Under Article XIII, S3, the property taxes 
paid on each property are required to be 
uniform and in proportion to the value of 
the property. Although the objective is 
easily stated, its attainment is more 
difficult. Because of the many different 
kinds of property and the various factors 
that affect their value, the determination 
of what constitutes equal "in proportion to 
the value of his, her, or its tangible 
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property/' under Article XIII, §3/ cannot be 
made by application of any single property 
formula. 
Of primary importance is the determination 
of what valuation method should be utilized, 
and that depends on the nature of the 
properties to be taxed. Residential, 
commercial, transportation, mining and 
public utilities, etc., must be treated 
differently because of the economic 
conditions that give value to such 
properties. Rio Algom at 188. 
18. Petitioner claims that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution does, not allow 
Petitioner to be treated differently than those properties 
which are accorded the 20% and 14% reductions. However, 
Petitioner does not fall within the classifications of these 
other properties, so Petitioner has not shown that it is 
unlawfully treated differently than otjaer mines or others 
within its classification. Therefore, the equal protection 
clause does not mandate a reduction of the value of 
Petitioner's property. 
19. The distinctions between property such as that 
owned by Petitioner and other properties in the state is a 
reasonable one which has been made by the Legislature in the 
exercise of its proper discretion and is neither arbitrary nor 
capricious. The distinctions and classifications established 
by the Legislature do not result in an intentional or 
systematic overvaluation of the Petitioner's property from the 
valuation of the property of other taxpayers within the same 
class. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company vs. Webster 




20. Valuations of different types of properties 
cannot be determined by the application of a single or uniform 
formula. The value of a mine is not determined by the 
application of the same formula or rneth- :>logy as is used to 
determ ae the value of a home. Likewi neither a mine nor a 
home can be determined by the application of the same formula 
or methodology as is used to determine the value of a railroad. 
21. The valuation of property is not subject to 
mathematical precision. Different appraisers can use the same 
general methodology such as the income approach, but by making 
slightly different assumptions, such as capitalization rate, 
they may arrive at substantially diverse conclusions of fair 
market value. However, each of those determinations of value 
may still be a fair and reasonable determination of the fair 
market value of the property. 
22. "Market Value" is a term that cannot be applied 
in an overly rigid fashion, and is not subject to mathematical 
precision. It cannot be determined to the nearest dollar. It 
is a term which is at best a reasonable approximation based 
upon the best evidence available and the judgment and 
experience of the person making the determination of value. 
While the term has a precise meaning, an appraisal is not a 
wholly fixed, precise, or exact number. 
23. The factual premise of the Legislature was that 
properties valued by either the comparable sales method or the 
cost appraisal method had elements of transaction costs 
included in those values, and that since those costs were not 
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transaction costs should not be required to bear a portion of 
the tax burdens. It was the Legislature's way of equalizing 
taxes as required by the constitution. There was no evidence 
presented at the hearing that the premise assumed by the 
Legislature was not correct. 
24. In Amax, supra, the valuation methods of the 
Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission were 
identical in all respects to the valuation methods of the 
county. In this proceeding, the property of Petitioner is 
valued using a different method than was used for residences or 
railroads. 
25. The Utah Supreme Court in Amax, supra, did not 
hold Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304(1), unconstitutional, but it held 
that the 20% reduction required by the statue must be applied 
to the property of AMAX because it had been valued by exactly 
the same methodology used by the county in valuing county 
assessed property. 
26. Based on the above, the Commission determines 
that the relief sought by Petitioner cannot be granted. The 
assessment of Petitioner's property at 100% of its fair market 
value pursuant to the capitalized net revenue method is proper, 
fair, reasonable, and required by the constitution and laws of 
the state of Utah, and does not contravene any provision of 
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federal law or violate any provisions or requirements of the 
United States Constitution. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order 
of the Utah State Tax Commission that: 
1. The Motion to Consolidate filed by the County, 
and the Motion to Strike filed by Petitioner are hereby 
denied. Any other pending motions are also denied. 
2. The request for a reduction in the value of 
Petitioner's property is hereby denied, and the value of 
Petitioner's property for the lien date of January 1, 1988, is 
affirmed at $617,771,020. It is so ordered. 
DATED this X day of y?&A* JLs * ^ 2 . 
/ 




S. Blaine Willes* 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(l), 
63-46b-14(2)(a). 
*Since the hearing on this case, Commissioner G. Blaine Davis 
has been replaced by Commissioner S. Blaine Willes. 
Commissioner Willes has been duly advised of the £^^^fT?§£ 
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of poor — Intangible property 
- l e g i s l a t u r e to provide an 
nual tax for Hlate I 
3 (Assessment and taxation of tangible prop 
erty - Livestock — I .and used 
for agricultural pur|M»aeH | 
4 |Mines and c la ims to l»e asaesMed IIHHIH 
and mult iple What to be at* 
seased aa tangible property | 
5 | luteal authorit ies to levy local taxes -
Sharing lax and revenues by 
political subdivisions I 
6 |Annual s ta tement to lie published | 
7 | Repealed I 
8 |Officer not to make profit out of public 
moneyH | 
Section 
9 I State expenditure to lie kept within reve-
nues | 
10 |All property taxable where s i tuated | 
11 (Creation of State Tax Commission — 
Membership Oovernor to ap 
point Terms Duties 
County Itoards Duties | 
12 (Stamp, income, occupation, l icense or 
franchttto lux prrmtHHible ~ 
hVfereme to United SlateH laws 
in imposition of income taxes 
Income or intangible property 
taxes allocated to public school 
system | 
I Revenue from highway user and motor 
fuel laxes to lie used for high 
way purposes I 




Section 1. (Fiscal year.I 
The fiscal year shall begin on the first day of January , unless changed by 
the l eg i s l a tu re 
l l i a tory: C o n s t . I 8 M . 
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . ~ l>aws 1980, Senate 
Joint Resolution No 6, proposed to amend Ar-
ticle XIII The promised amendment was sub 
milted to the electors at the general election in 
1980 and failed to pass because it did not re 
ceive the necessary majority 
C r o a s - R e f e r e n c e s . Fiscal year of Htale to 
commence on first ol July , <* tiJ I.I I 
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R E V E N U E A N D T A X A I I O N Art. XIII. § 2 
N I N E S TO l>E< ISIONS 
f l o n d i s s u e invalid as attempting to lix list a I year other 
City ordinance authorising tmnd itxtue for than that provided by this uectton Fjeldsted v 
improvement ol waterworks and specifying Ogden City H l U t a h 2 7 M 2H I* 2d 144(19.131, 
that for purpose ol Hervutng IMIIUIH fiwul year Wadswotth v Santmjuin City, 8.1 Utah .121, 28 
should continue same as t alendar year was not I* 2d lt»l 119 t i l 
COLLATERAL KErERENCES 
C I S . H4 ( M S Taxation t 357 
Key N u m b e r s . 'taxation « - JIM 
Sec. 2. ITangible property to be taxed — Value ascer-
tained — Exemptions — Remittance or abate-
ment of taxes of poor — Intangible property — 
Legislature to provide annual tax for state. | 
(I) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the 
United Sta tes , or under this Constitution, shall he taxed a t a uniform and 
equal ra te in proportion to its value, to lie ascertained as provided by law 
C2) The following are property tax exemptions 
(a) The property of the s tate , school districts, and public l ibraries, 
(bl The property of counties, cities, towns, special distr icts , and all 
other political subdivisions ol the s tate , except tha t to the extent and in 
the manner provided by the l eg i s la tu re the property of a county, city, 
town, special district or other political subdivision ol the s ta te located 
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject to 
the ad valorem property tax, 
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit enti ty which is used exclusively for 
religious, chari table or educational purposes, 
(d) Places ol burial not held or used lor private or corporate !>enefit, and 
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined by s t a tu t e This 
exemption shall be implemented over a period ol t ime as provided by 
s ta tu te 
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on J a n u a r y I, m , which is 
held for sale or processing and which is shipped to final dest inat ion outside 
this s ta te within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no 
s i tus in Utah for purposes of ad valorem property taxat ion and may be ex-
empted by law Irom such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or pro-
duced or otherwise originating within or without the s ta te 
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on J a n u a r y 1, m , held for 
sale in the ordinary course ol business and which consti tutes the inventory of 
any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may 
be deemed for purposes of *n\ valorem property taxation to In* exempted 
<5> Water r ights , ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants , pumping plants, 
t ransmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corpo-
rations for i rr igat ing land within the s ta te owned by such individuals or 
corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from taxa 
tion to the extent tha t they shall be owned and used for such purposes 
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other property used for 
generat ing and dehveung electrical powei, a poition ol which is used for 
22«J 
furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purpofles on lands in the 
atate of U tah , may be exempted from taxation to the extent that such property 
ia uaed for auch purposes These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the 
users of water so pumped under such re#ulati<m.q as the legislature may 
prescribe. 
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in 
such manner as nn< , 1 ' d by law. 
(8) The Legislature i»« . , le by law for the exemption from taxation of 
not to exceed 45% of the fair market value of residential property as defined 
Hy law; and all household furnishings, furniture, and equipment uned exclu-
sively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining a home for 
himself and family. 
(9) Property owned by disabled persona who served in any war in the mi l i -
tary service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried 
widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of persons who while 
serving in the mi l i tary service of the Uni ted States or the state of U tah were 
kil led in action or died as a result of such service may be exempted as the 
legis lature may provide. 
(10) Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as property or it 
may be taxed as property in such manner and to such extent as the Legisla-
ture may provide, but if taxed as property the income therefrom shall not also 
be taxed Provided that i f intangible property is taxed as property the rate 
thereof shall not exceed five mil ls on each dollar of valuation. 
< 11) The legis lature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, wi th 
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the 
state for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, i f any there 
lie, the legis lature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay 
the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, within twenty years 
from the final passage of the law creating the debt. 
Hiatory: Const. IMM; U 1930 (Spec. deam.K 
S..I R. 2; 1945. H J R. 3; 1967. H J R 7; IMI, 
S J R. 6: 1963, 8.J.R. 5; 1967, 8. J R . I; 1962, 
8 J R . 3; 1986, H J R . 18. 
Compiler's Notes. — l.aws 1959, Senate 
Joint Resolution No 5 proponed a constitu-
tional amendment to be voted ot> h\ the elec 
torn at the general election in » i •• The pro-
posed amendment failed to paaa because it did 
iMit receive I he necessary majority 
The 1979 proposed amendments to thin sec-
tion hy House Joint Resolutions Nos 23 snd 25 
were repealed and withdrawn by Senate Joint 
Resolution No 6. Laws l<>8» 
lawn 1986, Senate Joiel H* H lution No 4, 
proposed to smend Subsection 12 • ) of this sec-
tion The proposed amendment was submitted 
to the electors st the general election in 1986 
snd fsiled to pass because it did not receive the 
necessary majority 
Cross-References. — Armories exempt 
from taxstion. ft 39 2-1 
Civil Air Patrol equipment exempt, ( 2 1 4 1 
County service ana property exempt. 
I 1 7 A 2 429 
Disabled veteran's exemption, ftft 59 2-1104, 
59 2 1105 
Exemptions generally, ft 59 2 1101 et seq , 
Chapter 23 of Title 78 
Indigent persons, abatement or deferral of 
taxes. I * 59 2-1107 to 59 2 1109 
Industrial facilities development property 
exempt. I 11-17 10 
Mine and mining claim improvements, ma-
chinery or structures not exempt. 9 59 5 64 
Privilege tax on possession and use of tax-
exempt properties. ft 51 4-101 
Property of higher education institutions ex-
empt, f 53 fl 20 106 
Property tax relief, ft 59-2 1201 et seq 
Rate of assessment of property, ft 59-2 103 
School property exempt from taxation, 
i 53A 3 408 
Tangible persons! property held for saie on 
January I exempt, ft 59 2 1114 
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In general 
Banks 
Boundaries of taxing districts 
Charitable organization s property 
Charitable purport? 
Charitable use exemption 
Government subsidies 
Hospital under construction 
-Material reciprocity test 
- Operating expenses 
Church property 
City property 
Cooperative corporation property 
Corporations for irrigating land 
County improvement district contingent lax 
Disparity in state and county assessment 
Excess revenue refunds 
l*abor union property 
Mining claims 
Property of United States or its instrumental 
ity 
Remission of taxes of indigent or insane per 
sons 
Roll hack of assessed volue 
Scientific research institute 





Transfer of property to tax exempt corporation 
True market value 
Intentional discrimination 
Utah State Retirement Fund property 
Value determination by classification 
Cited 
In general . 
State's power of taxation is not within appli 
cation of. and is not limited by. Art I Sec 22. 
providing that private property shall not lie 
taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation Kiinhitli v (irantsville t it v. 19 
Utah 3«>8, 57 P I. 45 L It A 628 H8«i«i| 
Unless tax laws tonflitt wil l . Home constito 
tional provision, either expiesnly or by implica 
tion. courts have no authority to prevent their 
execution Kimball v tJranlsville City. 19 
Utah 368, 57 P I, 45 L i t A t>28 <I8«W> 
Banks. 
All noneaempt h»cal property of national 
bunk located in aisle is wilhin stale s power 
of taxation Commercial N a t l Hank v Cham 
Iters. 21 Utah 324 61 P 560. 56 I. R A '116 
< 19001, alTd 182 U S 556, 21 S CI Ho I 15 I. 
Kd 1227 (19011 
Boundaries of taxing districts 
Fixing of Itoumlartes of taxing district and 
its area IH wholly matter of legislative discre-
tion, and exercise of mil h discretion is not sub 
ject of judicial investigation or revision 
Kimball v <irantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P 
I. 45 | ,R A 628 »I899> 
Char i table organizat ion** property . 
Housing lac ihty operated by nonprofit corpo-
ration WIIH not exempt from taxation as a char-
ity where senior citizen resident** were paying 
lor all the services thev received and rental of 
apartments was deteimined not by need but by 
what was recpured to pay mortgage and opera 
tional expenses Friendship Manor Corp v 
Tax Column. 26 Utah 2d 227. 487 P 2d 1272 
H 9 7 l i 
If charitable organization does not use its 
real property and building thereon exclusively 
for charitable purposes such property is not ex-
empt but that oigamzation is exempt from 
federal taxation is not determinative, nonprofit 
character of organization is essential hut not 
determinative Friendship Manor Corp v Tax 
C.m.mn, 26 Utah 2d 227. 487 P 2d 1272 
H«»7I> 
Where plaint iff" applied for exemption from 
ad vuluMin taxation as a nonpiofit organ mi 
lion with charitable purpose, and where plain 
till earned on various chanlable activities 
lM>lh in building and awav from premised for 
which exemption was sought exclusive use" 
of lot with building thereon did not require all 
chailiable activity take place in that building, 
and lax Commission'* refusal of exemption 
was reversed Benevolent & Protective Order 
of ttlka No 85 v Tax Comm n. 536 P 2d 1214 
(Utah I975I 
Fraternal organization's lot. and the lodge 
building thereon were not entitled to a tax ex-
emption on the basis of charitable use where 
the activities conducted in the lodge consisted 
chieflv of drinking c .ticl playing, dancing and 
other social rather tb.in fraternal, functions, 
.incl the ordain/.it ion's expenditures on charila 
hie ohieds amounted to only slightly more 
than l"< ol totnl expenditures Maker v One 
Piece of Improved Re.il Pioperty. 570 P 2d 
102 1(Utah 19/7) 
It is the use to which the real property is put, 
not the natuie of the owning organization, 
which is determinative of whether or not the 
proticrty is exempt as being used exclusively 
for cb.inl.ible purposes Yorgason v County 
ltd oi ripuili/ . itmii. / I t P2d l»r»t (Utah 1986) 
An .ip.iitment building h»r needy elderly and 
handle .ip|s»<i families and individuals IH ex 
empt from real propeitv lax where it is used 
exclusively for charitable purposes Yorgason 
v County Bd of Fcpialization. 714 P 2d 653 
(Utah IM86I 
x\\ 
Art XIII, 0 2 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sc ient i f i c r e s e a r c h ins t i tu te . 
Exemption IB the exception to the rule, and 
properly owner has burden of demonstrating 
rleiirlv and unequivi>cally that he falls within 
the exempt ion, scientific research inst itute 
failed lo m« el I his hurdeu where evidence wan 
that almost half of IIH efforts were expended for 
the IIS Defen.se Ihpartmei i t , its effoits were 
t m uniw nhed hy individual employment ton-
tratls , and it occasionally restricted disclosure 
of its findni|{s at request of a non governmen-
tal ihent , all of which combined to indicate 
that the inst itute was benefiting the public-
only incidentally and was therefore not s chsr 
liable institution Eyring Research Inst , Inc 
v Tax C o l u m n , 698 F i d 1348 t U l a h 19791 
Sewer charges against city school hoard 
property. 
( ' lunges by city levied against board of edu-
cation for connections to city sewer sys tem and 
services thereof were mere payments for ser-
vices enjoyed hy the board and were not 
"taxes" or "assessments" from which board of 
education was exempt and a result ing hen 
from del inquent payment of such charges was 
not an exercise of the city tax ing power Mur-
ray City v Itoard of Educ . 16 Utah 2d 115, 396 
P 2 d H28 «I«H>4> 
Special assessments. 
Provision of this section that all property not 
exempt under laws of United S ta tes or under 
jj state Constitution shall he taxed refers lo gen-
f eral taxes and not to special assessments , and 
&\ hence does not invalidate a statutory provi 
Sion, which provides that property held by 
Itoard of eduiat ion shall l»e exempt from IIMUI 
aHHessments Wey v Salt Lake City. .15 I Huh 
504. IOI I' 3HI (19091 
This section does not apply to special assess 
ments S ta le ex rel Lundberg v Green River 
Irrigation D i s t , 4 0 Utah 8 3 , 119 P 1U39 
11911) 
S t a t e c o l l e g e s . 
A bond issue by Itoard of trustees of state 
agricultural college in accordance with legists 
l ive enactment for purpose of f inancing con 
struction of student union building would not 
violate this section by creating debt against 
s late , where bonds showed on their face that 
they were special obligations payable solely 
from revenue to be derived from operation of 
union, including proceeds of s tudent fee, and 
not obligations of the state Spence v Utah 
S la te Agi l College, 119 Utah 104, 225 V 2d 18 
(19501 
"Property of" a s tate university means prop-
erty owned hy it, where university possessed 
equipment leased from corporation which re 
tamed title to it, the equipment was not ex 
empt from county property taxation, and under 
the t e i m s of the lease, university was l»ouitd to 
pay taxes due University of Utah v Salt Lake 
County, 547 P 2d 207 (Utah I97bi 
S t a t e p r o p e r t y . 
Where the stale holds title to land in its gov 
ernmental capacity, the properly is exempt 
from taxation under the constitutional man 
dale Duchesne County v State Tax C o l u m n , 
MM Utah 3b5. NO p 2d 3.15 <l<M.ii 
Under this section lands, title to which is 
acquired by the s late hy foreclosure of mort 
gage or atnveyance for the ext inguishment of a 
debt for money loaned from the s tate school 
fund, are exempt from taxation This is partly 
due to the reason that the property is owned hy 
the state in its governmental capacity, but ac-
cording to some of the judges is due solely to 
the fact that such lands come within the mean 
ing of the term "property" in constitutional 
provision Ihichesue County v S ta le ' lax 
Comm'n. 104 Utah 3I>5, 140 P 2d 335 (1943) 
T r a n s f e r o f p r o p e r t y t o t a x e x e m p t c o r p o -
rat ion . 
Where a private corporation conveyed prop 
erty to a tax exempt municipal corporation 
prior to assessment and levy of taxes , the ad 
valorem lax on the property was erroneously 
and illegally levied and collected by the county 
even though the corporation owned the prop 
erty on January I when the hen for tax at-
tached, and the corporation's application for a 
refund was proper Utah Parks Co v Iron 
County. 14 Utah 2d 178. 3 8 0 P 2d 924 (1963) 
T r u e m a r k e t v a l u e 
— I n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 
A federal district court is precluded from 
probing into the assessment process lo deter 
mine whether the s ta le has accurately deter 
mined the "true market value" of a railroad's 
property absent a strong showing by the rail 
road that the state has purposefully overval 
ued its property with discriminatory intent 
Union Pac R K v State Tax Comm'n. 635 V 
Supp 1060 (I) Utah 1986) 
To the extent that railroads a l lege that the 
state has intentionally discriminated against 
them, they may introduce evidence of their 
true market value, as well a s other probative 
evidence, to establish their prima facie case of 
intentional discrimination Union Pac R R v 
State Tax Comm'n, 6 3 5 F Supp lObOil) Utah 
1986) 
U t a h S t a t e R e t i r e m e n t F u n d p r o p e r t y . 
Real property of the Utah S la te Retirement 
Kund was "properly of the s late" within the 
meaning of this section, snd was therefore tax 
exempt Utah Stale Retirement Office v Salt 
Lake County, 780 P 2d 813 (Utah I989i 
V a l u e d e t e r m i n a t i o n b y i laes i f i c a t i o n . 
County hoard of equalization was not autho 
rued to determine value by classification of 
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R E V E N U E A N D TAXATION Art XIII. fc 3 
property, and assessment based thereon w s s in 
violation of this section l larmer v S late Tax 
Comm'n, 22 Ulah 2d 324. 452 P 2d 87b 11969) 
C i t e d in Salt l>ake County v Tax Comm'n 
ex rel Ulah Transit Auth . 780 P 2d 1231 
U t a h U w R e v i e w . — Note, Financing 
Modernized and Unmodermzed Local Govern 
menl in the Age of Aquarius, 1971 Utah L 
Rev 30 
Housing in Salt l*ake County — A Place lo 
Live for the Poor?. 1972 Utah L Rev 193 
B r i g b a m Y o u n g I J I W R e v i e w . A Munic-
ipality's Interest in an Electrical Power ( lener 
ating fac i l i ty Some Tax Considerations. 1979 
H Y U L Rev 125 
A m . J u r . 2d - 71 Am Jur 2d State and 
Ixical Taxation 51 194 e l seq . 307 e l seq 
C J . 8 . - 84 C J S Taxation I t 52 . 57 e l 
seq , 215 e t seq 
H i s t o r y : C o n s t . 1896; N o v . 6 . 1900; N o v 6, 
1006; L. 1930 (S .S ). 8 J . R . 2; 1046 (1st S S >, 
H J . R . 2; 1987, 8 .J .H . 2; 1962, S .J .R. 3 . 
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — The 1979 proposed 
amendment of this section by House Joint Res 
ANALYSIS 
In genersl 
"According lo value in money" construed 
Charitable association 
Co operative corporation property 
County c l e r k s probate fees 
County improvement district contingent tax 
Disparity in state and county assessment 
Double taxation 
Drainage assessments 
n (Utah 1989), Salt l^ike County ex rel County 
x Hd of Equalization v S la te Tax Comm'n ex 
> rel Kennecolt ( orp . 779 P 2d 1131 (Ulah 
 1989) 
A.L R. Oil and gas royalty as real or per 
sonal property, 5b A L R 4th 539 
Properly lax effect of tax exempt lessor's re-
versionary interest on valuation of nonexempl 
lessee's interest, 57 A L R 4 lh 9 5 0 
Exemption from reel property taxation of 
residential facilities maintained by hospital for 
patients , stall , or others, 61 A L R 4th 1106 
Propriety of federal court's ordering s late or 
local lax increase to effectuate civil rights de 
tree , 7b A L R Eed 504 
Key N u m b e r s . 1 axat ion • » 49. 57 et seq , 
191 e l seq 
I, olution No 23 was repealed and withdrawn by 
, Senate Joint Resolution N o 6. I^iws 1980 
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Uniform School 
Fund, taxes allocated to. § 53A 16 101 
Occupation and license taxes 
Remission of taxes of indigent or insane per-
sons 
Road poll taxes 
Roll hack of assessed value 
Special assessments 
State properly 
Telephone license tax 
Uniformity and equality 
Util ity rates 
( i ted 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Sec. 3. (Assessment and taxation of tangible property — 
Livestock — Land used for agricultural pur-
poses.] 
(1) The legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assess-
ment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money, 
except as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article The legislature shall 
prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxation 
of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in 
proportion to the value of his, her. or its tangible property, provided that the 
legislature may determine the manner and extent ol taxing livestock 
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the legislature prescribes, 
be assessed according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the 
value it may have for other purposes 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Sec. 4. |Mines and claims to be assessed — Basis and mul-
tiple — Wluit to hv assessed as tangible property.| 
All metalliferous mines or mining c Inims, both placer and rock in place, 
shall be assessed as the legislature shall provide, but the basis and mult iple 
now used in determining the value of metalliferous mines for taxation pur-
poses and the addition.il • • ssed value of $5 00 per acre thereof shall not be 
changed before Januiuy I, 1935, nor thereafter unti l otherwise provided by 
law Al l other mines or mining claims and other vafuable mineral deposits, 
including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons and all machinery used in 
mining and all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to 
mines or mining claims, and the value of any surface use made of mining 
claims, or mining property for other than mining purposes, shall be assessed 
as other tangible property 
History Const 1896; Nov 8. 1908; L. 1930 
I S S ) , S J R 5. 1982. S J R 3. 
ANAI V8I8 
Construction and operation of wtt ion 
Drain tunnels 
Nol i*e 
Unpatented mining claim* 
Waler right* 
Construction and operat ion of aection. 
Classification under thin section a* it for 
merly read WHH not intended to limit phrase 
or other valuable mineral deposit* hut em 
tinned all mineral deposit* including gypsum 
and net annual profit* from produH* inanufar 
lured therefrom were taxable Nephi Plaster A 
Mfg ( o v Juab < ounty t l Utah 114 91 P 
51 , 14 I R A m m 11)41 »!**».' 
Under this section a* it once M i l • blanket 
assessment of all coal land* in county could not 
he made at a Hat or uniform rate Ririe v Ran 
dolph 51 Utah 274 169 P 941 <l<JI7l 
Under this *ection as it formerly read, it was 
held that for purpose of taxing net proceed* of 
mines the tost of mining incurred in any one 
year must lie considered independently from 
the tost int tirred in any other year, and only 
auih tost* as were incurred during year in 
which net proceed* were obtained could lie con 
aidered Mammoth Mining Co v Juab County. 
51 Utah .l ib I/O I ' 78 (1918) 
Croaa-References. - Statutory provision*. 
I 59 2 201 
D r a i n tunnels. 
Under thi* section, drain tunnel* used to 
drain a mine, may not he separately taxed 
where it appear* that they have no separate 
and independent value, hut are inseparably 
connected with the operation of the mine 
Ontario Silver Mining Co v llixon 49 Utah 
359 164 I' 498 (1917) 
Notice 
Assessment of mine* wan not defective 
where notice described property with reason 
able certainly a* to locality and identity Con 
aolidatcd Uranium Mine* Inc v Moflilt. 257 
r 2d .196 (10th O r 1958) 
Unpatented mining claim*. 
A lax imposed under stale law upon the pos 
sensory right to explore and develop nuiu H lo 
rated upon unpatented claims located upon 
land belonging to the unappropriated public 
domain of the United States is not open to chal 
lenge upon the ground that it constitute* a tax 
againnt property belonging to the United 
States Consolidated Uranium Mine* Inc v 
MofTlU. 257 r 2d .196 (10th O r 1*158 > 
Water r ight* 
Water right* are taxable whether considered 
appurtenant to mine or independent properly 
Utah Metal & Tunnel Co v (iroesheck, 62 
Utah 251. 219 l> 248 < 192)1 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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C O I . L A I K K A I . RfcrhRhNChS 
A m J u r 2d 71 Am .fur 2d State and 
l/ocal Taxation * 218 
V .1 S 84 C .1 S Taxation M 68. 73. 170 
Key Numbers taxation *•=» 61 lr»H 
Sec. 5. (Local authorities to levy local taxes — Sharing tax 
and revenues by political subdivisions.! 
The legislature Hhall not impose t«ixes lor the purpose of any county, city, 
town or other municipal corporation, hut may. hy law, vest in the corporate 
authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all 
purposes of such corporation Notwithstanding anything to the contrary con-
tained in this Constitution, political suhdivisions may share their tax and 
other revenues with other political suhdi visions as provided hy statute 
l l iatory Conat 1896; L 1982. S J R 3 
Croaa Referencea Appropriation* and 
tax limitation, t 59 17a 101 et neq 
City taxing power, Utah Conat Art X I , sec 
5 
County taxing power, <l 17 4 3 
Kevt nue sharing l>etween political HUIKJIVI 
HIOIIS t) I I 1 I Mi 5 
N O I r S I t ) D M ISIONS 
A N A I Y.HIH 
Agricultural extension work 
Allocation of future tax 




r.xcess revenue refund* 
License feea 
Purpose of taxation 
Utah Neighl>orhond Developmi nt Art 
Water district 
Agricultural extension work 
Statute it omp Laws I Ml 7 Q 52921 authoriz 
ing contracts Itetween trustees of stat< n^rt< til 
tural tollege and tounty <ouimisHion< rs with 
respect to agin ultural cxt« onion woik and nu 
thorizing commiHHioners lo provide funds net 
essnry for the work in their resi»ettive cotin 
ties, was not invalid as imposing a tax for 
county purposes hy the legislature Hailey v 
Vun Dyke M> Utah IH4 240 P 4r>4 il*)2rn 
Allocation of future tax 
I he law is w« II s< tiled that in ex« r< istng the 
powers of the stale the legislature may rupnie 
the revenue of a I I IUUM ipalily to Is applnd lo 
uses other than that for whith the taxes wi re 
levied thus th< re was no constitutional trans 
gressmn in the a I lot at ion of certain expt<t«d 
tax increments I generated hy new construction 
in an area of urhan hlighll for itpavuuut of 
Redcvelopnn ut Agency Imnds Itdtc V Sail 
l,ake ( ity ( orp r>40 I* 2d 4*14 (Utah l«»7r»i 
"Corporate authori t ies" construed 
( or|Mirat« authorities as used in this sec 
lion iiM those rmuiM ipal off iters who either 
are directly elected hy munn ipahly K inhabit 
ants or are appoint* d in some mode lo whith 
su« h inhahilanf s have given their assent Slate 
e x n l Wright v Siandford 24 Utah 148 t.6 V 
KH.I (I 'MHi 
1 ourt feea 
I he provisions of this section were contra 
v< ned hy statute whuh attt mpted lo fix soiled 
ule of county clerks le< s for services in prohate 
matters hascd on sliding scale where ft es in 
creased as values of estates increased since 
sti< h attempt was an im|>osition of taxes with 
out uniformity for counties use and !>eiiefit 
Smith v t artioii t ounty <M> Utah *>!»<» h i V 2d 
2r»S I0H A I It r>l I <l<Hl»i 
Dependent mothers 
1 hi phras< foi all purposeN of su« h (orpora 
tion is svnonvuious with the phrase puhhc 
piir|M»s«s and t haptt r I I of t i t l e 17 I Puhhc 
Aid for D« |H'ii«lf nt MolheiNl would he upheld 
as puhhi pur|M»se Denver & K t i K K v 
Crand (ouuiv r»l Utah 294 170 P 74 I 
A I It 1221 i l ' * l / i 
Di«< r iminatory tax 
A t ilv Im using ordiiiiintt whit h was a reve 
nui raising ui« astin ind put some of I In liusi 
n« ss« s afT«(l«d on i flat h< ha sis wilh only 
ahoul om twtl l lh is ninth lax as nlhtr husi 
in HS« M whu h p.nd on .i suli s (ax hasis was un 
(onsliititionallv dimnminalory O i i m t ity v 
Pynt lt> Ut ih 2d IV> 401 l»2d IHI imti'ii 
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59-2 104 REVENUE A N D TAXATION 
H i s t o r y : C\ 1953, 5 9 2 104, e n a c t e d by L. 
I0H7, c h . 4, « 6 1 . 
C o m p i l e r ' * N o t e s . - Former 4 59 4 I. as 
last amended by Laws 1935. t h HI. *> I, ton 
ttuned provisions Himilur to IIIIH He*lion 
E f f e c t i v e Oate* . I MWH I9M7 i h 4. * 308 
mokes the m I c-flcctlvc on re lo i i iuy fi, |9H7 
R e t r o s p e c t i v e O p e r a t i o n . Law8 19H7, 
ch 4. $ .'107 provides "This HC! has relrosf>ec-
tive operation to January 1, 1987, except for 
Sections 59 2 201 . 59 2 205. and 59 2 207, 
whuh take ellec I . lanuary 1 I9HH" 
CroNN R e f e r e n c e s . Pio|N-rly taxable 
w h i l e Militated I Mull Const Ait XIII, <) 10 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANAI Y3IS 
Boundaries of taxing district 
I .oca t ion of property 
Property of foreign corporationa 
Rolling alock of railroads 
Uni ty of use doctrine 
Waler rights 
B o u n d a r i e s o f t a x i n g d i s t r i c t . 
Fixing of boundaries of taxing district and 
its area is wholly matter of legislative discre 
l ion, and exertiHe ofauch discretion IH not HUI» 
ject of judicial inventigation or revision 
Kimball v Crantsv i l le City, 19 Utah 3b8. 57 V 
1, 45 L K A 6 2 8 118991 
I vocation of property . 
Term "owned," as used in Utah Const Art 
XIII ft 10. which provides that all pernon* in 
tJj s tate HIIHII IH* Muloott to tshcttion on real and 
I perMontil properly "owned** or uaed by them 
0 0 within territorial l imits of authority levying 
tax IIUH reference to plate w h e i e properly is, 
and not to where owner may reside theiefote, 
sheep were not assessable in certain city where 
none of them had been within territorial l imits 
of citv at any t ime during period for which 
taxes were assessed Murdock v Murdock, 38 
Utah 373. i l l P :i:)o <i9io> 
With reaped to personal property of a langi 
ble and corporeal nature and capable of having 
a s i tus of its own, residence of owner is gener-
allv immateria l , and property is taxable where 
it is found Hamilton At Oleason Co v Finery 
County, 75 Utah 40«. 2 8 5 P 1006 (1930) See 
Union Refrigerator Transit Co v Lynch, IH 
Utah .178, 55 P «39, 48 L R A 790 118981, 
aird. 177 U S 149. 20 S Ct 6.11. 44 I, Kd 708 
llfHMM 
P r o p e r t y o f f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n s . 
Neither tangible nor intangible prn|N*rty 
owned nod used bv foreign corporation in 
HtateN other than Utah was taxable in Utah 
totintv in w h u h corporation s pnncipiil ollice 
wiiH Nil lulled Utah Idaho Suitor Co v Suit 
l..ike < niinlv tU) t Hitli 491 . J i l l I' MM.. 27 
A I. f( M/l HM22I 
Rolling stock of rai lroads. 
As against contention of foreign corporation 
that taxation of its refrigerator cars in Utah 
was forbidden by U S Constitution Itecause 
such cars had no s i lus in Ut<ih for pur|M>ae of 
taxation and tax on them would impoae burden 
on interstate commerce, held that cars were 
taxable in Utah on basis of average number 
thereof used and employed by their owner in 
Ulan during year for which sssetisnienl was 
made Union Refrigeratoi Transit Co v 
Lynch. 177 US 149. 20 S ( I b. l l . 44 L Fd 
708 (I900I 
Unity of u se d o c t r i n e 
The dot trine of unity of use for purpose of 
determining assessment for taxation cannot he 
applied to manufacturing or other s imilar 
plants or industries w h u h may be under com-
mon ownership but used or o|ieraled in differ-
ent atates Utah Idaho Sugar Co v Sal t l-ake 
County. 60 Utah 4 9 1 . 210 P 106. 27 A L K 874 
11922) 
Water rights. 
Where flow of percolating waters was devel 
oped in process of mining operations, which 
water was piped and wild to another company 
w h u h took such waler in another county and 
through its own pipeH (onducted it HO ita own 
mine, wuter righlH we ie pro|ierly MHsessed 
against mining tompany aclinic* suth w.iter in 
county in whuh its i»|x*rulions were conducted 
and in county where water was transferred and 
tax apportioned between HIKII counties Utah 
Melul & i iu ine l Co v Cioenhetk. 62 Utah 251 , 
219 P JIM i l92t» 
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PROPERTY TAX ACT 592-201 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A m . J u r . 2d - 7 1 Am Jur 2d State and imposing income tax or l icense upon n on rest 
laical Taxation 1*t 648 to 651 dents employed in taxing jurisdiction tcoin-
C.J .S . 84 C J S Taxation 5* 113. 115 muter laxi. 48 A L R .Id 343 
A.L.K. Validity of municipal ordinance Kev N u m b e r s . Tuxatioii • - 98 
59-2-105. Situs of public utilities, bridges, ferries, and ca-
nals. 
Public util i t ies, and bridges and ferries not public uti l i t ies, when operated 
wholly in one county, and electric light lines and similar improvements, ca-
nals , ditches, and Humes when separately taxable, shall be listed and assessed 
in the county in which the property is locuted 
H i s t o r y : C. 1053, 59 2 I Oft, e n a c t e d by L. R e t r o s p e c t i v e O p e r a t i o n . - Laws 1987. 
1867, c h . 4, I 52 . ch 4, 4 307 provides "This act has retrospec-
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . - Former 8 59 4 2, as l ive operation to January I, 1987, except for 
last amended by U w i 1931, ch 53 . S 1. con Sections 59 2 201, 59 2 205. ami 59 2 207. 
tamed provisions s imilar to this section which take eflect January I. 1 9 8 8 " 
E f f e c t i v e D a t e s . - Laws 1987, ch 4, ft 308 C r o s s R e f e r e n c e s Property taxable 
makes the act effective on February 6, 1987 where situated, Utah Const Art XIII, 9 10 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
R a i l r o a d r o l l i n g s t o c k . taxable in Utah on basis of average number 
As against contention of foreign corporation thereof used and employed by their owner in 
that taxation of its refrigerator cars in Utah IJtuh during year for which assessment was 
was forbidden by U S Constitution because made Union Refrigerator Transit Co v 
such cars had no Hit us in Utah for purpose of Lynch. 177 II S 149. 20 S Ct 6 3 1 . 44 L Kd 
taxation and tax on them would impose burden 7 ^
 (190O) 
on interstate commerce, held that cars were 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A m . J u r . 2d . — 71 Am Jur 2d S t s t e and C.J .S . 84 C J S Taxat ion M 339 to 348 
Local Taxation 9 652 Key N u m b e r s . Taxation «-* 98 
PART 2 
ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY 
59-2-201. Assessment by commission — Determination of 
value of mining property — Notification of as-
sessment — Property assessed by the unitary 
method which is locally assessed. 
(I) By May 1 the following property shall he assessed by the commission at 
100% of fair marke t value, as valued on Junua iy I, in accordance with this 
chapter: 
(aI all propelty which operates a.s a unit acio*s county lutes, if the 
values must be apportioned among more than one county or s tate , 
(b) all property of public utilities, 
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59 2 201 R r V F N U r AND I AAA m MM 
(c) al l mines and mining claims and other valuable mineral deposits, 
(d) al l machinery used in mining, all property or surface improvements 
upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims and the value of any 
Rurface use made of mining claims or mining properly for other than 
mining purpose s For the purposes of assessment and taxation, al l pro 
cessmg pi i il ls, redtn ti in works, and smelters which are primari ly 
used by 11 i r of a » or mining claim for processing, reducing, or 
smelting minerals taken i n a mine or mining claim, shall be considered 
appurtenant to that mine or mining claim, regardless of actual location, 
and 
<e) in all cases where the surface of lands is owned by one person and 
the mineral underlying thou© lands is owned by another, the property 
rights shall be separately assessed to the respec tive owners If the surface 
is used for other than mining purposes, the value of the surface shall be 
assessed by the assessor of the county in which the property is located 
(2) The method for determining the fair market value of productive mining 
property is the capitalized net revenue method or any other valuation method 
the commission believes, or the taxpayer demonstrates to the commission s 
satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative of the fair market value of the 
mining property The rate of capitalization applicable to mines shall be deter 
mined by the commission, consistent with a fair rate of return expected by an 
investor in l ight of that industry's current market, financial, and economic 
conditions In no event may the fair market value of the mining property be 
less than the fair market value of the land, improvements, and tangible per 
sonal property upon or appurtenant to the mining property 
(3) Immediately following the assessment, the owner or operator of the 
assessed property shall be notified of the assessment The assessor of the 
county in which the property is located shall also be immediately notified of 
the assessment 
(4) Property assessed by the unitary method, which is not necessary to the 
W conduct and does not contribute to the income of the business as determined 
' by the lommisHion, Hhall lie as»eH»ed Heparatelv by the local county assessor 
tf iatory 1 I0&.1, 59 2 201. enacted by L Retroapettive Operat ion U w n I9S7 
IV87, r h 4 ft 53 ch 4 ft 107 provides Thin net haa retroapec 
< ompiler 'a Not** Former ft 59 2 52 na live operation to lanuary 1 1987 except for 
amended hy U w a 1981 ch 75 ft 1 contained Sectiona V» 2 201 S9 2 205 and r>9 2 207 
provision* similar to thia aection which take effect January 1 1988 
Fffecttve Da te * Lawa 1987 ch 4 ft 108 1 roaa Reference* luxation of minea 
makes the act effective on February 6 1987 Utah Const Art X I I I * 4 
NO ITS ro DF< ISIONS 
A N A I V8IH 
< hallc nging asaeaamc nt 
Hv c<»untv 
lnl< ntiomil dint riintnalieut 
( out lands 
Out* ol assessment 
I ife tenant and r» mninderman 




Notice of assessment 
Public utilities 
Separate assessment 
C hallenging aaaeaament 
—By county 
Since undcraaseRsment of mining projxrty 
can cause a distinct and palpable uumv to u 
county hy limiting I IH tax base a county has 
standing to «u< tht tax commissiem on the 
ground that sue h prei|N»rty WIIR und« DIHW ased 
Ke nnecott ( orp v Suit I ake < ounty 702 P 2d 
4SI t l l tah 19Hr>> 
—Intent ional cliacriminatlnn 
A federal diHtrirl court IR precluded from 
probing into the assessment process to deter 
mine whether the state haa accurately deter 
mined the true market value of a railroad a 
property absent a atrnng allowing by the rail 
road that the state haa purposefully nverval 
ued ita properly with diacriminatnry intent 
Union Pat I I H v State Tax < omm n 6 lr> r 
Supp 1060 (I) Utah 19H6» 
Coal l a n d * 
A blanket assessment of all toal land* in 
county could not be made nt a flat or uniform 
rate Rine v Randolph r»l Utah 274 169 P 
941 11917) 
Date of aaaeaament 
Property not within city on January I»l IR 
not liable for payment of city taxes for thoae 
yeara Plutua Mining ( o v Orme 76 Utah 
286 289 P I 12 (19 (<H 
I ife tenant and remainderman 
A life tenant should be assessed as owner 
during the continuume of th*> lib (state 
Sheppiek v Sheppiek 41 Utiid M l I IN I' 
1169 U 9 I 4 I 
l o c a t i o n of pro|>erty 
Property of electric company operating in 
only one county WUH assessable in county in 
which property waa lorated although electric 
company waa owned by company o|>er»ting in 
aeveral countiea l"c lluride Power ( n v dates 
61 Utah U 7 i l l I* I7S i l92l> 
Minera l land 
Unti l there IR proof that land has IOR( its 
character aa mineral or mining property it IR 
assessable by State lax ( mniniHMi n < r\stal 
I ime Si I ernent t o v Hohhins I M> Utah 111 
209 P2d 7J9 (|949i 
Where title to land IR derived from federal 
government tbi« ugh ISHUIIIHC of n pute nt is 
mining |>TO|M 11 v (lore IH n pie Huuipti n tbnt it 
IM pro|arty of tbnt chmmter cfntil it is piovtd 
othowiHC < r>Mlnl I ime & < em« ut t » v It b 
hma 116 Utah I I4 209 P 2d 7 t9 i|949i 
"Minea " 
I he ternia mines anil mineral nre not 
limited to mere Htible mine an « xe nvationa or 
workings or to the me tals or metallife retua de 
posits whether (untuned in veina that have 
w« II ele fined walls or in beds or deports that 
are irregular ami are found at or near the aur 
hue en « tberwis* Nc phi Plaater At Mfg ( o v 
lu ib tenuity U Utah 114 9 I P 5 t 14 1 K A 
( I I s > Hit t t | 9 0 / i 
Nettle e of asse Hamei nt 
ANS« SHine nt of mine H WHH not defective 
where notice dewnbed preiperlv with reason 
able certainty OH to locality and identity ( on 
aohdated Uranium Minea Inc v Moffitt 257 
r 2d 196 (11Mb ( ir I9r>8l 
Public utilftiea 
IhiR section confera no authority upon tax 
roinmiRsion In IIHHIHR car ceimpamea which are 
ne»t public utilitieR < ryatal ( ar I me v State 
lax ( o i n m n 110 Utah 426 174 P 2d 984 
f19461 
Separate aaaeaament 
A person in adverse poaaeaaton of the aurface 
ground of a mining c bum who haa t»een aa 
sesse d with aue h surface area ami haa paid 
taxeN thereon may claim adve rae possession to 
audi surface1 although owner of mining claim 
haa paiel the taxes thereon Utah ( op|>er ( o v 
rckman 47 Utah 16ri 152 P 178 114151 
Where the re IH common nwnerahip of both 
the surface and mineral rights in land uaed for 
mining purpoaeH and no recpieat is made that 
the surface IK* taxed on its valuation separately 
fr tin the mine s an I mim nil rights if IH pro|H r 
f i the e ouiil v « tin I I I IH l« •u^u^ule lb* valine 
lions e f both Hiuface and mine nil righlM in up 
plvmg the tax le vy and m all prenec dings nub 
seepie nt thereto I e Ion is v Stale y 104 Utah 
M 7 144 P2d 51 I ( I 9 4 t i 
When the Rurface and mine nil estates of a 
mining claim are owned hy the same peraon 
only eme tax is asHeHsed on I be claim Phia is 
because (be statute provides for separate aa 
M «tsme nt of the surfaee «»nly whe n the aurface 
and mini nil est«t«s are owned by different 
owners I be statute make H HI olhci provision 
f >r separate assessment of the two eatatea 
Ihercfm separate taxation of surface and 
mine r il interest <l >< s not constitute double 
taxation bee IUW the separate taxes would he 
on difle ie nt pnpcitv inte re (« United Park 
t it v Mutest o v r slat. ( ( l M K 7 t / I 2d 17 I 
<Ut ill I9H/) 
I be a^si Nteme nt of the value of the suifiice 
use it | i pe itv list d for milling is in addition to 
ib« (Mr acre IISS« ssme nl of tin mining claim 
and the additional asseHsme ut is required 
whether the suiface is owned by the same 
r)r» 
59-2.104 REVENUE AND IAXAIION 
NOTES lO DE< ISIONS 
Constitutionality 
Dll lM'S Ol IINHCMMOl .111*1 I It K|>ll V«*» » 
Efl l ' t t ol (TIOIM'OOM JINN4'NHIItl I I I 
N i t t t lM- Ol l i lk <|« l»t 
Noiir«*Hi<l«'iil H prop* rly 
O W I H T ' N obligation In pay lux 
TrtiiiHft-r ol property to Ian exempt corporation 
C 'onstltutionality. 
Seclion IH nol HO vague and uniertum an to 
l>e unconstitutional Norville v Stale Tax 
< oniiu . 98 I Hah 170, 97 I' 2d 9.17. I2l> A I . K 
i:tlH <I940) 
Duties of assessor and taxpayers. 
It IH duly of asseHsor to assess all properly at 
lit* value, and it IH I ike wine duty ol every per 
Hon and cnr|»orulioii having taxable pro|»erty to 
I Ml name for taxation Utah Idabo Sugar Co v 
Salt l^ke County. tM) Utah -I'M. 210 |» |1N» 27 
A I . H 874 H922I 
Eff«»«*t of erroneous assessment. 
Kulure lo UHM-HH taxes lo owner did not in 
validate assessment Jonea v llox Elder 
< ounly. 52 r 2d MOHOthCir 19.11». tert den 
285 U S 555. 52 S C| 45li. 78 I. Ed 944 
< 19.121 
Where property IH ni»t assessed to I be leal 
owner, and it IH Hold under «ut b iiSMefesinenl a 
tax deed issued in purnuaiue tbereol lias no 
binding effect an against real owner Salt Lake 
Inv Co v Oregon Short Line It It , 4b I Hah 
2 0 I . 148 I* 4 . l 9 ( l 9 i 5 i . alTd 24h U S 44b .IH 
S ( I 34H. f>2 L Ed 82.1 <I9IH» 
Nature of tax debt. 
Thia section aeeiiiH to make the tax a d« bt 
agaiiiHt the individual owning the propetty 
and a lien on bin pioperly. father than a 
charge iigainHl the pto|»eily alone HayeH v 
Clh l * . I l l l Utah 54, Ib9 l»2d 7H|. H . H A M t 
51.1 1194b) 
Nonresident's property. 
l*r<»perty brought into I bin Htate by a nonres 
idenl company and um.il in coiiHtruction woik 
for an indefinite period IH nubject to taxation in 
county where uwd, unth r Utah CODHI Art 
X I I I , * HI Hamilton & UhiiMon Co v Emeiy 
County. 75 Utah 40b, 28ft I ' lOOh (19.10) 
Owner's obligation to pay tax 
M« «onl owners ol it al prn|iertv on .laimarv I . 
IIMil. were obll^att d to pay the l!M>4 pro|M-rty 
lax. il January I record ownet transfers bin 
interest in the piopcrty and does not want to be 
held liable lor the tax it is I I IH obligation to 
make arrangement lor payment by I I IH I runs 
feree Uillman v rottlei. bfm I '2d 974 (Utah 
I9H2) 
Transfer of property to tax-exempt corpo-
ration. 
Where a private coronation conveyed prop 
erty lo a tax exempt muuuipal lorporation 
prior to aHHeHHineiit and levy ol taxen under 
thia Hection, the ad valorem tax on the properly 
wan erroneouHly and illegally levied and col 
let led by the county Utah P. I IHH CO V Iron 
4'ounly. 14 Utab 2d 178. .IHO I* 2d 924 (I9t>.l) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah I-aw Keview. IVrnonal ()bhgalu>n 
to I'ay Heal Property Taxes in Utah Uilim.in 
v rotter. I9H.1 Utah L Kev H45 
C.JS. 84 C J S Taxation * 378 
Key Numbers. 'I.txatinu a-* 110 t t ne«| 
59-2-304. Recognition of expenses in using comparable 
sales or cost appraisal method — Implementat ion 
of new program. 
(11 I f the county assessor uses (he comparable sales or tost appraisal 
method in valuing; taxable property foi assessment purposes, the assessoi ts 
ie«|tnr«*d to reio^ni /e that various lees, services, closing tosls, «ind other ex 
penses rehited lo the tt.insat lion lessen the uitu.il amount th.it may he re 
i eived in the 11 .IIIS<K I ion The count y assessor shall I her t hue, take HiVl of the 
<>8 
PROPHUY TAX A(T 59 2 305 
value based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the property for purposes 
of assessment under Subsection 59 2 103(1) 
(2) (a) Prior to January 1, 1989, the commission shall develop and imple-
ment comparable sales or cost appraisal methods in valuing taxable prop-
erty for assessment purposes which provide that the various fees, ser-
vices, closing costs, and oilier expenses related to the sales transaction 
and other intangible values are not included as part ol the fair market 
value lor purposes of taxation 
(b) Beginning January I , 1989, the provisions ol Subsection (1) do not 
apply Beginning January 1, 1989, the commission shal l , by rule, order 
county assessors to use the comparable sales or cost appraisal methods 
which are required to be developed and implemented in Subsection (2)(a) 
in place of the requirement of Subsection (1) 
History: C 1953, 50 2 304, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 4. « 72; 1087, ch. 160. I I . 
Amendment Notes — The 1987 amend 
ment by Chapter 150. effective April 27, 1987, 
substituted "1989" for "1988" in Subsections 
<2><al and (2Mb) 
Compiler 's Notes. Former I 59 5 4 5, as 
amended by LMWH 1986, ch 115, ft I , ton turned 
provisions Hinulitr to this section 
Constitutionality. 
The proviHion tluil reduces by 20'X the value 
of county assessed properly by comparable 
sales or cosl materials is constitutional under 
Article X I I I of the Utah Constitution snd does 
Utah IMW Hevlew. - Recent Developments 
in Utah Law. 1986 Utah L Kev M l . 207 
History C 1953. 59-2-3M. enacted by l~ 
1987. r h 4. ft 73 
Compiler's Notes. Former t 59 5 5. as 
amended by LMWH 1982. ch 71 . § 2.1. contained 
provisions similar to this section 
Effective Hates Laws 1987. ch 4 ft 308 
makes the ait efttctive on February <> 19H7 
Effective Dates. 1 aws 1987, ch 4, ft 308 
makes the act ellective on February 6. 1987 
Itetrespective Opera t ion . - Laws 1987. 
ch 4, ft 307 provides "This act has retrospec-
tive operation lo January I , 1987, except for 
Sections 5 9 2 2 0 1 . 5 9 2 2 0 5 . and 5 9 2 2 0 7 . 
which lake effect January I . 1988" 
not violate the equal protection proviHlons of 
the Utah or United Stales Constitutions Kio 
Algom Corp v San Juan County. hSI I* 2d 184 
(Utah 19841 
Retrospective Operat ion LMWH 1987. 
ch 4, ft 307 provides " I his act has retroapec 
live operation to Junuary I , 1987. except for 
Sections 59 2 201 59 2 205. snd 59 2 207. 
which tMke effect January I . 1988" 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
59-2-305. Listing property in taxing districts. 
The county assessor shall list all property in each taxing district in the 
county by identifier and value The commission may prescribe procedures and 
formats, after consultation with affected state agencies and county assessors, 
which wil l provide reasonable uniformity and reduced costs in listing prop-
erty 
69 
63-46h-16 STATE AFEAIKS IN (JKNKKAL 
(b) The U tah RuleH of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C 1953, 63-46b-l5, en t ided l»y I,. uccnrdiiiK to tbe standard* of Subsection 
1987, ch. 101, ft 271; 1988, ch 72. « 25. 63 4hh I f e J l ' ul tbe end in Subsection ( I Mai 
Amendment Notes. Tbe 1988 amend- and made minor stylistic c h a n t s 
ment, e lect ive Apr i l 25, 1988. deleted "except Effective I)»tea. Laws 1987. ch I b l . 
Hint rmal agency action Iron, in formal adjudi |
 : < |5 nm^VH tbe a« I efle<five on . lut iuarv I . 
ta t ive proceedings based on a leconl tdtall Iw \*JHH 
reviewed by tbe d i s l i i c l courts on tbe record 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court. tbe district court w i l l no longer funct ion as in 
Section 61) 46b 16(11 provides tbat all f ina l termediale appellate court except to review in 
agency decisions Ibrougb formal adjudicative formal adjudi ta l ive proceedings de novo puraii-
proceedinga w i l l be reviewed by tbe U lab Su- anl to Subsection ( I Mai of this section In re 
pieme Cotir< or Court of Append* Tberefore, Topik, 761 I '2d 32 l l l t a b Cl App ll»MH» 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
( I I As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review al l f inal agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action wi th the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court 
(hi The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate coin I. 
(31 The contents, I . < i l ta l , and fi l ing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjutlu w proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
( i i l according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only ii, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a |>erson seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following. 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on Ms face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat 
ute; 
(c> the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring lesoluhon, 
id) tbe agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(el the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or dec-.sion-mak-
ing pmcess, oi has failed to follow preset ibed proceduie, 
7:ifi 
ADMINISTHATIVK I'liOf KIHJKKS ACT 63 46b 17 
(0 the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification, 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h> the agency action is. 
( i l an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
( i l l contrary to a rule of I be agency; 
(ni) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbi trary or capricious 
History: C. 11153, 63 46b 16, enacted by I.. appellate court" in Subsection (2»(al, and tiub 
1987, c h . 161. ft 272; 1988. c h . 72, ft 26. st i tu led "ap|x l la tc rules of tbe appropriate ap 
Amendment Notes. - Tbe I9HH amend peltate cou i t " (or "U lab Rules of Appellate Pro 
i m n l , e lhc l i ve A p n l 25, 1988, substi tuted As n d u r e " in Subsections (2»(al and I 2 M I I I 
provided by Mtatulr, tbe Supreme Coutt or tbe Effective Da tea Lawn 1987. ch Mi l , 
Court of Appeals" for T b e Supieme Court or $
 n s tUu^H n, t . m l H l e i l i v e on January I. 
other appellate court designated by statute" in | , m M 
Subjection ( I ) , inserted "w i tb tbe appropnate 
NOTKS TO DECISIONS 
Function o f district court. t r ic t court wi l t no longer function at) inlermedi-
Subsection ( I l provides tha i al l f inal agency ate appellate court except to review informal 
decisions through formal adjudicative proceed adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to 
ings wi l l be reviewed by tbe Utah Supreme II 63 46b 15(1 Mai In re Topik . 761 I* 2d 32 
Court or Court of Appeals Theiefore. the dis (Dt.tb Ct App I9S8I 
63-46b-17. Judic ia l review — Type of relief. 
(1) (aI In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
( i l order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(ii i) set aside oi modify agency action, 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action, or 
(vl remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are re-
viewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute 
His to r y : C. 1953, 63 46b 17. enac ted by I.. ^ 315 makes tbe a i l el lcct ive on January I. 
1987, ch. 161, ft 273. I9SM 
Ef fec t ive Dates. Laws 1987, ch 161. 
7;*7 
78 2-1 5 JUDICIAL CODE 
History: L. 1951, ch. 66, I I; C. 1643, 
Supp , 104 2 1; L. IM9. ch. 247, | I; 1666, ch. 
47. I 40; IMS. ch 148, • 4; I WO. ch. 00. I 4. 
Amendment Nairn*. The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 26. 1988. in Subsection 
(2». rewrote the second sentence which read 
'Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the 
Supreme Court is ten years and until his suc-
cessor is sppointed and spproved in accordance 
with Section 20 17 1" and. in Subsection (A), 
substituted "determines" for decides" at the 
end of the fourth sentence 
Hie 1990 Amendment, effective April 23. 
1990. deleted "next" after "January" and made 
punctuation changes in Subsection (2l, deleted 
"not following "chief justice may' in the third 
sentence of Subsection 1.11. deleted 'additional** 
before "duties" tn Subsection (5). deleted 
"where not inconsistent with the law" follow-
ing "chief justice** and added "as consistent 
with the law" at the end of Subsection (6) 
Cross-References. — Chief justice. Utah 
Const. Art VIII. Sec 2 
Disqualification in particular case. Utah 
Const. Art VIII. Sec 2 
Judicial nomination and selection. 
I 20 I 7 1 et seq 
Membership on stale law library hoard, 
f 37-1 1 
Proceedings unaffected by vacancy. 
I 78 7 21 
Qualifications of justices. Utah Const . Art 
VIII. Sac 7 
Retirement. Utah Const. Art VIII. Sec 15, 
I 49 6 101 et seq . If 78 7 29. 78 7 30 
Salary. Utah Const. Art VIII. Sec 14 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am Jur. 2d. - 20 Am Jur 2d Courts 
ft 67. 68 
C.J 8. 21 C I S Courts f 111 et seq ; 48A 
CMS Judges ff .1. 7. 8. 21 to 25. 85 
Key Numbers. — Courts 
Judges e* I, 7 to 12 
101. 248. 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
It* peals - Section 78 2 I 5 (L 1969. ch 
225 f 21. relating tn salaries of Supreme Court 
juftlirt'R. was repealed by l*aws 1971, ch 182, 
ft 4 
Section 78 2 I 6 (L 1979, ch 134. f 1, 1981. 
ch 156, f II, relating to salaries of justices, 
was repealed by Laws 1981.ch 267. f 2. effec-
tive July 1, 1982 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
ils orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction 
(31 The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(aI a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(hi cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c> discipline of lawyers; 
(d> final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
tii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(ivl the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
<v) the state engineer; 
l 0 final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e), 
8 
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tgl a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of tecord involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony, 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony, and 
(j> orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate junsdiction, 
except 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge ol a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c> reapportionment of election districts, 
(dl retention or removal of public officers, 
(el general water adjudication, 
(0 taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection t.'lHa) through (0 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection ClHbl 
(6> The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings 
History: ( 195.1, 78 2 2. enacted h v L 
I WW, ch 47, ft 41; 1987. ch 161. I .10.1; 1988. 
ch 248. • ft. 1989, rh 67. I I 
Itepeala and Iteenactmenta I .AWN 1986, 
rh 47, ^ 41 repeals former *. 78 2 2 AH enacted 
bv Lawn 1051 ch 58. ft I, relating to original 
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and 
euattR the above neclion 
Amendment Note*. - The 1*188 amend 
merit, ellective April 25. 1988, ftuhshttited "for 
mal adjudicative proceeding*" for "raaen" in 
Subsection i.lMel, added Subaeclioii llMfi. re 
denignated former Suh*e« tionn (.'IMO to i.lMil ac 
cnrdingly. aultfttilutcd "(it" for "(b»" al the end 
of Subjection (4 rig I. and made minor slyliHlic 
cbangca 
The 1981 amendment, effective April 24 
1989. added 'anil r or entry at the end of Sub 
flection (.'iHeMuit. rewrote Subjection (4Hal 
which read first degree and capital felony ton 
vithonK". nobs! it ill cd '(ft" for ' (i)" at (be end of 
Subsection (4t(gl. and mode minor slylislic 
cbangen 
Croat Reference*. Appeals from juvc 
rule courtft. <) 78 '.\a 51 
Appeals in iriminal caseft. IJRCYI* 26 
Chief just ice to preaide over impeucliment of 
governor. ^ 77 5 2 
Election contest appeals. (*<i 20 [\ .15. 
20 15 14 
Kxtraordinary writs. Utah Conat Art VIII, 
Sec .'I U U C P 65 H 
Industrial tommissinn orders, review ol 
« .15 I 16 
Jurisdiction I Mull Collet Art VIII. Sec I 
Stale bar promulgation of rubs, review of 
disoptinar) orders. M 78 51 14 78 51 19 
Unemployment compensation dcunions, te 
view of. * 35 4 10 
9 
ot an order of occupancy or the execution of a right 
of entry agreement, bears to the taxable year m? 
Article 2. Assessment by County Assessor 
S9-S-4 General duties of cooniy assessor • Assessing 
mientaie cnmers. 
59-S-4 5 RrcofMUoa of expenses in using compatible 
sales or con appraisal meinod 
59-S-S Usuat property ta cities, tow** school districts 
sod special taxjag districts 
59 $-4 Repon of viJuatioa of property to coaat* 
sudttor • TraasiBittal by auditor to governiag bodies • 
Certified tax rate 
59-5-7 Usuat property brought into couaty sfltr 
Jaauary I Duties of assessor 
59-5-7 ! Traasitory persoaal property brought froni 
outside sistr 4sses&nent * Proratioa of tax • 
Property tax ta saother state • Claims for rebates a i d 
adjust meats 
S t - M Statemeats by taxpayers. 
59-5-9 Power of assessors respectiog statements • 
Debet of taxpayer • Penalty 
59-5- I t Assessor to estimate vtloe where taxpayer 
refuses to give statement 
59-5-11 Assessor to repon information gained to other 
counties. 
59-5-12 In aame of owner, mandatory, if known • If 
unknown. 
59-5-13 Assessmeat ta aame of representative -
Designation. 
59-5-14 Assessment of property of decedents. 
59-5- IS \ssessmeat of property in litigation. 
59-5-16 Assessmeat of concealed property • Peaalty 
59-5-17 Property escaping assessment - Five-year 
limitation penod on assessment • Duties of assessor 
59-5- IS Assessment in aame of claimaat as well as 
owner. 
59-5-4. General duties of county assessor • 
Assessing interstate earners. 
The countv assessor shall, before May 15 of each 
year ascertain the names of ail taxable inhabitants 
and all propeny in the county subject to taxation 
except that assessed by the State Tax Commission 
and shall assess the propeny to the person by whom 
it was owned or claimed, or in whose possession or 
control it was, at 12 o'clock m of January 1 next 
preceding, and at its value on that date, unless a 
subsequent conveyance of ownership of the real 
propeny has been duly recorded in the office of the 
county recorder more than 14 calendar days before 
the date of mailing of the tax notice, in which case 
the tax notice mav be mailed to the new owner No 
mistake in the name of the owner or supposed 
owner of property renders the assessment invalid 
Assessors shall become fully acquainted with all 
propeny in their respective counties, and. either in 
person or by deputy, shall annually visit each sepa-
rate district and establish the values of the propeny 
they are required to assess When assessing contract, 
private, and exempt earners covering interstate 
routes, the county assessor shall apportion the ass-
essment for the rolling stock used in interstate 
commerce at the same percentage ratio that has been 
filed with the Prorate Depanment of the Motor 
Vehicle Division of the tax commission for determ-
ining the proration of registration fees 19* 
59*5-4 J . Recognition of expenses in using 
comparable sales or cost appraisal method. 
(1) When the county assessor uses the comparable 
sales or cost appraisal method in valuing taxable 
propeny for assessment purposes, the assessor is 
requtred to recognize that various fees, services, 
closing costs, and other expenses related to the tra-
nsaction lessen the actual amount that may be rec-
eived m the transaction The county assessor shall, 
therefore take 8 0 ^ of the value based on compar-
able sales or cost appraisal of the propeny as its 
reasonable fair cash value for purposes of assess-
ment 
(2Ka) Prior to January 1 1988 the State Tax 
Commission shall develop and implement compar-
able sales or cost appraisal methods in valuing 
taxable propeny for assessment purposes which 
provide that the various fees, services, closing costs, 
and other expenses related to the sales transaction 
and other intangible values arc not included as part 
of the reasonable fair cash value for purposes of 
assessment 
(b) Beginning January 1 1988 the provisions 
of Subsection 0 ) do not apply to county assessors 
using the sales or cost appraisal method in valuing 
taxable propeny for assessment purposes For ass-
essments beginning January I, 1988, the State Tax 
Commission shall by rule order county assessors to 
use the comparable sales or cost appraisal methods 
which are required to be developed and implemented 
in Subsection <2Xa) tn place of the requirement of 
Subsection (1) ttt* 
59-5-5. Listing propeny in cities, towns, scfeool 
districts and special taxing districts 
The list of the propeny in each city, town, school 
district and special taxing district m his county, and 
the valuation thereof, shall be so made b> the 
county assessor that the propeny in each and the 
valuation thereof can be separately shown inn 
59-54. Repon of valuation of propeny to county 
auditor • Transmittal by auditor to governing 
bodies • Certified tax rate. 
(1) Before June 1 of each year, the county asse 
ssor of each countv shall deliver to the county 
auditor a statement showing the aggregate valuation 
of all taxable propeny in each taxing distm, toge 
ther with a statement showing the assessed valuation 
of any additional personal propeny estimated by the 
county assessor to be subject to taxation m the 
current tax year The county auditor shall, on or 
before June I transmit this statement together with 
the certified tax rate and all forms necessary to 
submit a tax levy request, to the governing body of 
each taxing district 
(2Xa) The 'certified tax rate* means a tax rate 
that will provide the same ad valorem propeny tax 
revenue for each taxing distnet as was charged for 
the pnor year by that taxing entity, except in the 
case of the minimum school levy established under 
Section 53-7-18 and any debt service voted on by 
the public under Section 53-7-8 1, in which case 
the cemfied tax rate shall be the actual levy imposed 
by those sections The certified tax rate shall be 
established in accordance with Section 59-9-8 
For new taxing districts, the certified tax rate shall 
be zero 
(b) For the purpose of calculating the certified! 
tax rate the county auditor shall use the taxable roll 
exclusive of new growth New growth is the increase 
in value of the taxing district from the previous 
calendar year to the current year less the amount of 
increase to locally assessed real propeny values res-
ulting from factoring, reappraisal, or any other 
adjustments 
(c) As used in this chapter, 'taxing district 
means any county, city, town, school district, 
special taxing district, or any other political subdi-
vision of the state with the authonty to levy a tax 
on propeny 
Code • Co Foe ANNOTATIONS, consult tne UTAH ADVANCE RETORTS 167 
B-13 
*y 9 I I : H J 4 INTfcJUftTATE COMMEJtCK Ch. IIS 
chapter" arc omitted M unnecessary in "shall be brought In Issue" for clarity 
view of the restatement. T h « w o r d * "in The words "made or imposed by" are 
the enforcement or administrat ion of omit ted aa surplus. The words "dispos-
any provision of this chapter" In i n g o f are substituted for "proceeding to 
49 :305(0 «re ©rottled • • unnecessary in hear mnd dispose o T for clarity and ai 
view of the restatement. The words ^ m - m o ^ inclusive 
"and safety" in 49:305(0 are omitted as 
being transferred to list Secretary of I n subsection (c) . the words "subchsp-
Transportai ion. icr I I I of chapter 105" arc used to 
I n subsection (b ) . the words - W h e n an • * • * « , h * subsection apply to waief 
Investigation under this subtitle" arc sub- carr iers since the words "under the pro-
stituted for "Whenever In any Invest Iga visions of this section" require that re 
l ion under the provision* of this chapter. • " ' • in view of 49:1 J O ) The words "in 
or in mny Investigation Instituted upon cases pending before the Commission" 
peti t ion of* for clarity. The words "pro- are omit ted as unnecessary in view of 
vidlng transportation or service subject the restatement The words "may be 
to the Jurisdiction of the Commission a iven" are substituted for "shall receive" 
under subchapter I or I V of chapter 105 lor clari ty The words "may determine" 
of this tit le" are inserted for clarity. The are substituted for "shall provide" for 
words "is about a" are substituted for clarity. 
$ 1 1 5 0 3 . Tsui sliacHsnlnallon against rai l transportation prop-
erty 
(a) In this section— 
(1) "assessment** means valuation for a property tax levied by 
a taxing district. 
(2) "assessment Jurisdiction** means a geographical area in a 
State used in determining the assessed value of property for ad 
valorem taxation. 
(3) "rail transportation property" means property, as defined 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, owned or used by a 
rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Commission under subchapter I of chapter 105 of this 
title. \ 
(4) "commercial and industrial property" means property, 
other than transportation property and land used primarily for 
agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to a commer-
cial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy. 
(b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or 
authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any 
of them: 
(1) assess rail transportation property at a value that has a 
higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation 
property than the ratio that the assessed value of other com-
mercial and industrial property in the same assessment juris-
diction has to the true market value of the other commercial 
and industrial property. 
(2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be 
made under clause ( I ) of this subsection. 
730 
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(3) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail trans-
portation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate 
applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same 
assessment jurisdiction. 
(4) impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carri-
er providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission under subchapter 1 of chapter 105 of this title. 
(c) Notwithstanding section 1341 of title 28 and without regard to 
the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties, a district 
court of the United States has jurisdiction, concurrent with other 
jurisdiction of courts of the United States and the States, to prevent 
a violation of subsection (b) of this section. Relief may be granted 
under this subsection only if the ratio of assessed value to true 
market value of rail transportation property exceeds by at least 5 
percent, the ratio of assessed value to true market value of other 
commercial and industrial property in the same assessment juris-
diction. The burden of proof in determining assessed value and 
true market value is governed by State law. If the ratio of the 
assessed value of other commercial and industrial propeity in the 
assessment jurisdiction to the true market value of all other com-
mercial and industrial property cannot be determined to the satis-
faction of the district court through the random sampling method 
known as a sales assessment ratio study (to be carried out under 
statistical principles applicable to such a study), the court shall find, 
as a violation of this section— 
(1) an assessment of the rail transpoitation properly at a 
value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail 
transportation properly than the assessed value of all other 
property subject to a property tax levy in the assessment juris-
diction has to the true market value of all other commercial 
and industrial property; and 
(2) the collection of an ad valoiein pi ope My tax on the rail 
transportation property at a lax rale that exceeds the tax ralio 
rate applicable to taxable property in the taxing district. 
(Pub L. 95-473. Oct. 17. 1978. 92 Slat 1445 ) 
HlatortcaJ and Statutory Notes 
Revised Section Source (U.S.Code) Source (Sialuies al Large) 
11503 49.26c Feb 4. 1887. ch 104. 24 Slat 379. 
§ 28. added Feb 5. 1976. 
Pub I 94-210. § 306. 90 Stal. 
54; Oct 19. 1976. Pub L 
94 S55. § 22(K». 90 Stal 2630 
731 
7 Motor vehicle salesman: 
(a) application for license; 
(b) salesman bond as prescribed in Utah Code 
win. Section 41-3-17; 
(c) picture of the applicant; and 
(d) the fee required by law. 
8 Distributor factory branch, distributor branch 
representative: 
(a) application for ucense; and 
(b) the fee required by law. 
9. New applicants may also be required to attend 
in orientation class on motor vehicle laws and motor 
,eh)de business laws before their license is issued. 
|PJ7 41-1-4, 41-M. 41-J-U, 410-27. 41-1-21, 4I-J-
tf. 41.J4. 41-M, 41-3-12 
R884. Property Tax 
RSS4-24. Property To 
R884-24. Property Tax 
RSS4-24-SF. Abateaaeat or Deferral of Properly Taut 
of ladlgeat Penou Parsaaat to Utah Code Aaa. 
SectSow 59.2-1107 taroagh 59-2-1109 
RW4-24-TP. Asstsnaeat of Miaiat Properties P i n m i 
to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-201 
Rg*4-244P. Property Tax Wltaookiiag For Uraaiaai 
aod Vaaadiuai MJoes Panaaat to Utah Code Aaa. 
Sectioo 59-2-210 aod 59-2-211 
RSS4-24-10P. Ttxatfoo of Uederfroead Rifits !• Laad 
Tail Coataias Deposits of (XI or Gas Parsaaat to Utah 
CooV Aaa. Sectfoas 5*2-2*1, 59-2-21«, tod 59-
2-211 
RSU-24-14P. Hlstork Pmerradoa Easeaaeats Parsaaat 
to Utah Codt Aaa. SecOoas 4MIA-1 throaeh 4 
Rtt4.24-14P. Asatsuaeat of laiertoeai Cooperadoa Act 
Proiect Eatity Properties Parsaaat to Utah Code Aaa. 
Sectioa U-U-2S(4> 
Rtt4.24-i7P. Reappraisal of Real Property by Coaafy 
Assessors Parsaaat to Utah Coastftvttoa, Artiest XIII, 
Sabsectioas 2 aod 11, aod Utaa Code Aaa. SocHooa 59-
Mt3, $9-2002, aad 59-2.79)4. 
Rtt4-24-19P. Appraiser Ctnifleadaa Profraai Parsaaat 
to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioas S9-2-701 aad 59-2-7t2 
RU4-24-20P. Coastrorttoa Work ia Progress Panaaal 
lo Utah Coast. Art. XIII. Sectioa 2; Utafe Code Aaa. 
Seetioe 59-1-1; aad Utai Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-S-
1. 
Rtt4-24-24P. Forai for Nofkt of Property VaJaatioo 
aad Tax Caaaaes Pirsaaai to Utaa Codt Aaa. Sectioa 
59*2-919 
Rta4.24.25P. pTocedart for Aaeyaaet of 19* Properly 
Tax Cxcaipdoa Heariaas For Nooproflt Hospitals aad 
Nirriog Hotaca Panaaat to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioa 
59-1-219 
Rtt4-24-2dP. lUaaarttaeats of the Fanalaad Aaatataaeat 
Act of 1949 Panaaat to Utah Codt Aaa. SeetSoaa 59* 
2-541 taroagh 59-2-515 
Rtt4.24.27P. Staadards far Asaesssaeat Lrrd 
Perfonaaace Panaaat la Utai Code Aaa. Sectioa 59* 
RtS4.24.2tP. Reporilat lUqairesaeats For Ltaaed or 
Rtated Penoaal Property, Panaaat to Utah Code Aaa. 
Sectioa 59-1.219 
Rtt4-24-29P. TaxaMt Hoaseaotd Ftraisaiop Panaaal 
to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-113 
Rtt4-2402P. Leaseaold (Teaaati laiproveaaeats 
Panaaat to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-lfl 
Rtt4-24-UP. Penoaal Property Vahiatioa Gaides aad 
Schedules Panaaat to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-1-
210 
Rtt4-24-34P. Use of Appraisal laformaOoo Gathered ia 
Coejsactioe Whh Asaessaeat/Saks Ratio Stadia* 
Panaaat to Utah Codt Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-704 
CoocaCo 
Prrr*. Uua 
RSS4-24-5P. Abateaaeat or Deferral af Property 
Taxes of ladlgeat Persoas Panaaat to Utah Code 
Aaa. Sectioas 59-M107 (hroaga 59-2-1109 
A. All sources of cash income shall be included in 
amvint at annual gross income, inducting net rents, 
interest, retirement income, welfare, social security, 
etc. 
B. Absence from the residence due to vacation, 
confinement to hospital, or other similar temporary 
situation shall not be deducted from the time requi-
rement of ten-month's residency. 
C. Written notification shall be given to any app-
licant whose application for abatement or deferral is 
denied. 
Rtt4.24.7P. Assessment of Miaiat Properties 
Parsaaat to Utah Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-2SM 
A. Definitions. 
1. ' Mining property* means all taxable interests in 
real property, improvements, and tangible penoaal 
property owned or used in mixunt, processing, or 
transportation of the product to the customary point 
of sale or to the implied point of sale in the case of a 
self-consumed mineral for both metalliferous and 
nonmetalliferous mines. 
2. 'Gross income* means actual receipts, plus the 
fair value of self consumed minerals. 
a. The fair value of self-consumed minerals is 
determined annually by the Property Tax Division to 
be either: 
(1) allowable costs, plus an amount equal to allo-
wable costs times the capitalization rate. Where the 
taxpayer has outside sales and self-consumed, 
minerals, the allowable costs shall be allocated 
between the two on the oasts of the respective units 
of measure in each category; or 
Jfi value based upon representative sales pnee per 
ton or other standard unit of measure of a like 
mineral. 
b. The method approved cannot be changed from 
year to year unless approved by the Tax Commis-
sion. 
3. "Allowable costs" means costs deductible in the 
respective year, limited to the following: 
a. management salaries; 
b. labor; 
c. payroll taxes and benefits; 
d. workers' compensation insurance; 
e. general insurance; 
f. taxes; 
g. supplies and tools; 
h. power; 
i. maintenance and repairs; 
j . office and accounuat; 
k. engineering; 
1. sampling and assaying; 
m. treatment; 
n. letal fees; 
o. royalties; 
p. development expense; 
q. transporuuoo; 
r. miscellaneous; and 
s. capital expenditures. 
(1) No deduction ts allowed for interest or mine 
exploration costs. 
4. 'Net revenue' means gross income minus allo-
wable costs. 
5. 'Capital expenditure" means the total cost of 
purchasing an asset used in the mining operation and 
includes: 
a. purchase price, 
b. transportation costs, 
— ^ 
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c transportation costs, 
d. installation charges, and 
e sales tax 
6. "Nonproductng mine" means a mine that has 
been closed for a continuous 12-month period, or 
land held in reserve under a ounerai lease not reaso-
nably necessary, indispensable, or needed in the 
actual mining and extraction process in the current 
tax year. 
B. The capitalization rate shall be determined by 
the Tax Commission using methods such as: 
1. the summation method; 
2 the weighted cost of capital 
a. The cost of debt should consider current market 
yields. 
b. The cost of equity shall be determined by the 
capital asset pricing model, nsk premium model, 
discounted cash flow, or a combination thereof or 
any other accepted methodology. 
C. The income indicator of value shall be comp-
uted as follows: 
1. annual net revenue, both net losses and net 
gams, from the mining property for each of the 
immediate past five years (or years in operation if 
less than five years), shall be adjusted by an appro-
priate index of inflation; 
2. average annual net revenue is the sum of the 
values obtained above divided by the number of 
years; i.e., five or less; 
3. the average annual net revenue is divided by the 
capitalization rate. 
D. Reporting shall be on a calendar or fiscal year 
basis consistently followed, with Tax Commission 
approval. 
RSS4-244P. Property Tax WithhoMisg For 
Ina iua aid Vaaadiuai Miaes Pursuant to Utah 
Code A M . Section 5*-2-210 sad 5*-2-211 
A. A list of mine owners and operators who have 
made lump sum security deposits with the Tax 
Commission will be furnished annually by the Com-
mission to any person, mill, buying station, or other 
legal entity receiving uranium or vanadium ore 
mined, produced, or received from within Utah. 
B. If not on the Tax Commission's original, or 
subsequently updated list, the security deposit shall 
be obtained through withholding as provided below: 
1. Any person, mill, buying station, or other legal 
entity receiving uranium or vanadium ore mined, 
produced, or received from within Utah shall with-
held 4 percent (or such higher amount as determined 
by the Tax Commission) of the gross proceeds due to 
the mine operators or owners. 
2. All amounts withheld shall be remitted to the 
Tax Commission by the last days of April, July, 
October, and January for the immediately preceding 
calendar quarter, on forms and in a manner as set 
forth by the Tax Commission. 
3. Not later than the last day of February, the 
owners, or operators of each uranium and vanadium 
mine shall be provided with a statement from the 
Tax Commission showing all security deposit 
amounts withheld from their gross proceeds during 
the previous calendar year. 
4. The Tax Commission shall provide the county 
treasurers with a list of all uranium and vanadium 
producers who have had security deposit amounts 
withheld. The county treasurers shall then forward to 
the Tax Commission an accounting of the amount of 
taxes due from each taxpayer on the Tax Commis-
sioa'slist. 
5. Once all county treasurers have responded, the 
800 
Tax Commission shall forward to each county trea-
surer the taxes due, or the pro rata portion thereof, 
to the extent said taxes have been withheld and 
remitted to the Tax Commission 
a. Any amount withheld in excess of the total taxes 
due to ail counties shall be refunded to the approp-
riate producer by the Tax Commission. 
b If the amount withheld is not sufficient to pav 
the full amount of taxes due. the countv treasurers 
shall collect the balance of said taxes directly from 
the producers. 
RSS4-24-10P. Taxation of Underground Rights Is 
Land That Contains Deposits of Oil or Gas 
Pursuant to t u b Code Aaa. Sections 59-2-201. 
5*-2-210, aad 59-2-211 
A. Definitions. 
1. "Person" as defined in Utah Code Ann. Section 
6S-3-12. 
2. "Unit" as defined in Utah Code Ann. Section 59-
2-210(3KF). 
3. "Working interest owner" as defined in Utah 
Code Ann. Section 59-2-210. 
4. "Unit operator* means a person who operates 
all of the producing wells in a unit. 
5. "Independent operator" means a person opera-
ting an oil or gas producing property not in a unit. 
6. One person can, at the same tune, be a unit 
operator, a working interest owner, and an indepe-
ndent operator and must comply with ail requirem-
ents of this rule based upon his status in the various 
situations. 
B. Assessment Procedures. 
1. Underground rights in lands containing deposits 
of oil or gas and tangible property used in the oper-
ation of such rights, are subject to assessment by the 
Tax Commission. 
2. These rights and the tangible property used 
therewith shall be assessed in the name of the unit 
operator, the independent operator or other person 
as the facts may warrant. 
3. The taxable value of the underground oil rights 
shall be 400 percent of the proceeds from the sale of 
oil production from each such property during the 
calendar year prior to the date of assessment, less 
applicable exempt federal, state, Indian royalties, and 
windfall profits tax. 
4. The taxable value of the underground gas rights 
shall be 400 percent of the proceeds from the sale of 
gas production from each such property during the 
calendar year prior to the date of assessment, less 
applicable exempt federal, state, and Indian royalties. 
5. The reasonable taxable value of productive 
underground oil and gas rights shall be determined 
by the method described in Subsections B.l. or B.2. 
of this rule or such other valuation method that the 
Tax Commission believes to be reasonably determi-
native of the property's fair market value. 
6. All other tangible property shall be valued at 
fair market value as determined by the Tax Commi-
ssion. 
C. Assessment Credits Greater Altamont/Bluebell 
Field 
1. Oil properties in the Greater Altamont/Bluebell 
field shall receive a credit of 20 percent. All qualified 
property shall therefore be valued at 80 percent of 
the taxable value. This credit does not apply to gas 
production. 
2. The Greater Altamont/Bluebefl field is actually 
comprised of three separate fields. These include 
Altamont field. Bluebell field, and Cedar Rim field 
as recorded by the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and 
CoocCo 
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[Assumption of public debt — Supreme Law — Oath of of-
fice — Religious tests prohibited-] 
[1.] All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adop-
tion of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under 
this Constitution, as under the Confederation. 
[2.] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
[3.] The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members 
of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both 
of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or 
Affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be 




[Ratification — Attestation.] 
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the 
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same. 
Done in Convention by the unanimous consent of the states present the seven-
teenth day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred 
and eighty seven, and of the independence of the United States of America the 
twelfth. In Witness Whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names, 
Attest: Go. WASHINGTON — Presidt. 
W7ILLIAM JACKSON, Secretary and deputy from Virginia 
New Hampshire JOHN LANGDON, 
NICHOLAS GILMAN. 
Massachusetts NATHANIEL GORHAM, 
RUFUS KING. 
Connecticut WM. SAML. JOHNSON, 
ROGER SHERMAN. 
New York ALEXANDER HAMILTON. 





AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec, 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec* 3- [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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Amend. XIV, § 4 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
History: Proposed by Congress on June 16, 
1866, declared to have been ratified by three-
fourths of all the states on July 28, 1868 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not 2 [Power to enforce amendment ] 
to disqualify.] 
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to 
disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion. 
History: Proposed by Congress on February more than three-fourths of all the states on 
27, 1869, declared to have been ratified by March 30, 1870 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax.] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Cited 52 CCH S. Ct. Bull. p. B2831 
NOTE Where it u feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
NORDLINGER v. HAHN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS TAX 
ASSESSOR FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY, ET AL. 
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, 
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
No. 90-1912. Argued February 25, 1992—Decided June 18, 1992 
In response to rapidly rising real property taxes, California voters 
approved a statewide ballot initiative, Proposition 13, which added 
Article XIIIA to the State Constitution. Among other things, Article 
XIIIA embodies an "acquisition value" system of taxation, whereby 
property is reassessed up to current appraised value upon new 
construction or a change in ownership. Exemptions from this reas-
sessment provision exist for two types of transfers: exchanges of 
principal residences by persons over the age of 55 and transfers 
between parents and children. Over time, the acquisition-value 
system has created dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by persons 
owning similar pieces of property. Longer-term owners pay lower 
taxes reflecting historic property values, while newer owners pay 
higher taxes reflecting more recent values. Faced with such a 
disparity, petitioner, a former Los Angeles apartment renter who had 
recently purchased a house in Los Angeles County, filed suit against 
respondents, the county and its tax assessor, claiming that Article 
XIIIA's reassessment scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The County Superior Court dismissed 
the complaint without leave to amend, and the State Court of Appeal 
affirmed. 
Held: Article XIIIA's acquisition-value assessment scheme does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 7-15. 
(a) Unless a state-imposed classification warrants some form of 
heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental 
right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteris-
tic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification 
rationally further a legitimate state interest. Pp. 7-8. 
B2832 Cited 52 CCH S. Ct. Bull. p. 
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Syllabus 
(b) Petitioner may not assert the constitutional right to travel as 
a basis for heightened review of Article XIIIA. Her complaint does 
not allege that she herself has been impeded from traveling or from 
settling in California because, before purchasing her home, she 
already lived in Los Angeles. Prudential standing principles prohibit-
ing a litigant's raising another person's legal rights may not be 
overlooked in this case, since petitioner has not identified any 
obstacle preventing others who wish to travel or settle in California 
from asserting claims on their own, nor shown any special relation-
ship with those whose rights she seeks to assert. P. 8. 
(c) In permitting longer-term owners to pay less in taxes than 
newer owners of comparable property, Article XIIIA's assessment 
scheme rationally furthers at least two legitimate state interests. 
First, because the State has a legitimate interest in local neighbor-
hood preservation, continuity, and stability, it legitimately can decide 
to structure its tax system to discourage rapid turnover in ownership 
of homes and businesses. Second, the State legitimately can conclude 
that a new owner, at the point of purchasing his property, does not 
have the same reliance interest warranting protection against higher 
taxes as does an existing owner, who is already saddled with his 
purchase and does not have the option of deciding not to buy his 
home if taxes become prohibitively high. Pp. 8-12. 
(d) Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster, 488 U. S. 336, is not 
controlling here, since the facts of that case precluded any plausible 
inference that the purpose of the tax assessment practice there 
invalidated was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax 
scheme. Pp. 12-14. 
(e) Article XIIIA's two reassessment exemptions rationally further 
legitimate purposes. The people of California reasonably could have 
concluded that older persons in general should not be discouraged 
from exchanging their residences for ones more suitable to their 
changing family sizes or incomes, and that the interests of family and 
neighborhood continuity and stability are furthered by and warrant 
an exemption for transfers between parents and children. Pp. 14-15. 
(f) Because Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, this Court must 
decline petitioner's request to invalidate it, even if it may appear to 
be improvident and unwise yet unlikely ever to be reconsidered or 
repealed by ordinary democratic processes. P. 15. 
225 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684, affirmed. 
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHN-
QUIST, C. J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, 
JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Part II-A. THOMAS, 
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
Cited 52 CCH S. Ct. Bull, p^ B2833 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 90-1912 
STEPHANIE NORDLINGER, PETITIONER v. 
KENNETH HAHN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS TAX 
ASSESSOR FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF 
CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[June 18, 1992] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In 1978, California voters staged what has been described 
as a property tax revolt1 by approving a statewide ballot 
initiative known as Proposition 13. The adoption of 
Proposition 13 served to amend the California Constitution 
to impose strict limits on the rate at which real property is 
taxed and on the rate at which real property assessments 
are increased from year to year. In this litigation, we 
consider a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the manner in which real 
property now is assessed under the California Constitution. 
I 
A 
Proposition 13 followed many years of rapidly rising real 
property taxes in California. From fiscal years 1967-1968 
to 1971-1972, revenues from these taxes increased on an 
average of 11.5 percent per year. See Report of the Senate 
Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue to the 
California State Senate 23 (1991). In response, the Califor-
*See N.Y. Times, June 8,1978, p. 23, col. 1; Washington Post, June 11, 
1978, p. Hi. 
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nia Legislature enacted several property tax relief mea-
sures, including a cap on tax rates in 1972. Id.y at 23-24. 
The boom in the State's real estate market persevered, 
however, and the median price of an existing home doubled 
from $31,530 in 1973 to $62,430 in 1977. As a result, tax 
levies continued to rise because of sharply increasing 
assessment values. Id., at 23. Some homeowners saw their 
tax bills double or triple during this period, well outpacing 
any growth in their income and ability to pay. Id., at 25. 
See also Oakland, Proposition 13—Genesis and Conse-
quences, 32 Nat. Tax J. 387, 392 (Supp. June 1979). 
By 1978, property tax relief had emerged as a major 
political issue in California. In only one month's time, tax 
relief advocates collected over 1.2 million signatures to 
qualify Proposition 13 for the June 1978 ballot. See Lefcoe 
& Allison, The Legal Aspects of Proposition 13: The Amador 
Valley Case, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 173,174 (1978). On election 
day, Proposition 13 received a favorable vote of 64.8 percent 
and carried 55 of the State's 58 counties. California 
Secretary of State, Statement of Vote and Supplement, 
Primary Election, June 6,1978, p. 39. California thus had 
a novel constitutional amendment that led to a property tax 
cut of approximately $7 billion in the first year. Senate 
Commission Report, at 28. A California homeowner with a 
$50,000 home enjoyed an immediate reduction of about 
$750 per year in property taxes. Id., at 26. 
As enacted by Proposition 13, Article XIIIA of the 
California Constitution caps real property taxes at 1% of a 
property's afull cash value." § 1(a). <Tull cash value" is 
defined as the assessed valuation as of the 1975-1976 tax 
year or, "thereafter, the appraised value of real property 
when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in owner-
ship has occurred after the 1975 assessment." §2(a). The 
assessment "may reflect from year to year the inflationary 
rate not to exceed 2 percent for any given year." §2(b). 
Article XIIIA also contains several exemptions from this 
reassessment provision. One exemption authorizes the 
Cited 52 CCH S. Ct. Bull. p. B2835 
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legislature to allow homeowners over the age of 55 who sell 
their principal residences to carry their previous base-year 
assessments with them to replacement residences of equal 
or lesser value. §2(a). A second exemption applies to 
transfers of a principal residence (and up to $1 million of 
other real property) between parents and children. § 2(h). 
In short, Article XIIIA combines a 1% ceiling on the 
property tax rate with a 2% cap on annual increases in 
assessed valuations. The assessment limitation, however, 
is subject to the exception that new construction or a 
change of ownership triggers a reassessment up to current 
appraised value. Thus, the assessment provisions of Article 
XIIIA essentially embody an "acquisition value" system of 
taxation rather than the more commonplace "current value" 
taxation. Real property is assessed at values related to the 
value of the property at the time it is acquired by the 
taxpayer rather than to the value it has in the current real 
estate market. 
Over time, this acquisition-value system has created 
dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by persons owning 
similar pieces of property. Property values in California 
have inflated far in excess of the allowed 2% cap on 
increases in assessments for property that is not newly 
constructed or that has not changed hands. See Senate 
Commission Report, at 31-32. As a result, longer-term 
property owners pay lower property taxes reflecting historic 
property values, while newer owners pay higher property 
taxes reflecting more recent values. For that reason, 
Proposition 13 has been labeled by some as a "welcome 
stranger" system—the newcomer to an established commu-
nity is "welcome" in anticipation that he will contribute a 
larger percentage of support for local government than his 
settled neighbor who owns a comparable home. Indeed, in 
dollar terms, the differences in tax burdens are staggering. 
By 1989, the 44% of California home owners who have 
owned their homes since enactment of Proposition 13 in 
1978 shouldered only 25% of the more than $4 billion in 
B2836 Cited 52 CCH S. Ct. Bull. p. 
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residential property taxes paid by homeowners statewide. 
Id., at 33. If property values continue to rise more than the 
annual 2% inflationary cap, this disparity will continue to 
grow. 
8 
According to her amended complaint, petitioner Stephanie 
Nordlinger in November 1988 purchased a house in the 
Baldwin Hills neighborhood of Los Angeles County for 
$170,000. App. 5. The prior owners bought the home just 
two years before for $121,500. Id., at 6. Before her 
purchase, petitioner had lived in a rented apartment in Los 
Angeles and had not owned any real property in California. 
Id., at 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 12. 
In early 1989, petitioner received a notice from the Los 
Angeles County Tax Assessor, who is a respondent here, 
informing her that her home had been reassessed upward 
to $170,100 on account of its change in ownership. App. 7. 
She learned that the reassessment resulted in a property 
tax increase of $453.60, up 36% to $1,701, for the 
1988-1989 fiscal year. Ibid. 
Petitioner later discovered she was paying about five 
times more in taxes than some of her neighbors who owned 
comparable homes since 1975 within the same residential 
development. For example, one block away, a house of 
identical size on a lot slightly larger than petitioner's was 
subject to a general tax levy of only $358.20 (based on an 
assessed valuation of $35,820, which reflected the home's 
value in 1975 plus the up-to-2% per year inflation factor). 
Id., at 9-10.2 According to petitioner, her total property 
Petitioner proffered to the trial court additional evidence suggesting 
that the disparities in residential tax burdens were greater in other Los 
Angeles County neighborhoods. For example, a small 2-bedroom house 
in Santa Monica that was previously assessed at $27,000 and that was 
sold for $465,000 in 1989 would be subject to a tax levy of $4,650, a bill 
17 times more than the $270 paid the year before by the previous owner. 
Cited 52 CCH S. Ct. Bull. p. B2837 
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taxes over the first 10 years in her home will approach 
$19,000, while any neighbor who bought a comparable 
home in 1975 stands to pay just $4,100. Brief for Petitioner 
3. The general tax levied against her modest home is only 
a few dollars short of that paid by a pre-1976 owner of a 
$2.1 million Malibu beachfront home. App. 24. 
After exhausting administrative remedies, petitioner 
brought suit against respondents in Los Angeles Coimty 
Superior Court. She sought a tax refund and a declaration 
that her tax was unconstitutional.3 In her amended 
complaint, she alleged: "Article XIIIA has created an 
arbitrary system which assigns disparate real property tax 
burdens on owners of generally comparable and similarly 
situated properties without regard to the use of the real 
property taxed, the burden the property places on govern-
ment, the actual value of the property or the financial 
capability of the property owner." Id., at 12. Respondents 
demurred. Jd.,atl4. By minute order, the Superior Court 
sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint 
without leave to amend. App. to Pet. for Cert. D2. 
The California Court of Appeal affirmed. Nordlinger v. 
Lynch, 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1990). It 
App. 76-77. Petitioner also proffered evidence suggesting that similar 
disparities obtained with respect to apartment buildings and commercial 
and industrial income-producing properties. Id., at 68-69, 82-85. 
^California by statute grants a cause of action to a taxpayer "where the 
alleged illegal or unconstitutional assessment or collection occurs as the 
direct result of a change in administrative regulations or statutory or 
constitutional law that became effective not more than 12 months prior 
to the date the action is initiated by the taxpayer." Cal. Rev. & Tax. 
Code Ann. § 4808 (West 1987). Although Proposition 13 was enacted 11 
years before she filed her complaint, petitioner contended that the 
relevant change in law was this Court's decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh 
Coal Co. v. Webster County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989), decided 9 months 
before petitioner filed her amended complaint. Because the California 
courts did not discuss whether petitioner's action was timely under 
§ 4808, we do not do so. 
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noted that the Supreme Court of California already had 
rejected a constitutional challenge to the disparities in 
taxation resulting from Article XIIIA. See Amador Valley 
Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 
22 Cal.3d 208,583 P.2d 1281 (1978). Characterizing Article 
XIIIA as an "acquisition value" system, the Court of Appeal 
found it survived equal protection review, because it was 
supported by at least two rational bases: first, it prevented 
property taxes from reflecting unduly inflated and unfore-
seen current values, and, second, it allowed property owners 
to estimate future liability with substantial certainty. 225 
Cal.App.3d, at 1273, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 691-692 (citing 
Amador, 22 Cal.3d, at 235, 583 R2d, at 1293). 
The Court of Appeal also concluded that this Court's more 
recent decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster 
County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989), did not warrant a different 
result. At issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh was the practice of 
a West Virginia county tax assessor of assessing recently 
purchased property on the basis of its purchase price, while 
making only minor modifications in the assessments of 
property that had not recently been sold. Properties that 
had been sold recently were reassessed and taxed at values 
between 8 and 35 times that of properties that had not been 
sold. Id., at 341. This Court determined that the unequal 
assessment practice violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
The Court of Appeal distinguished Allegheny Pittsburgh 
on grounds that "California has opted for an assessment 
method based on each individual owner's acquisition cost," 
while, a[i]n marked contrast, the West Virginia Constitution 
requires property to be taxed at a uniform rate statewide 
according to its estimated current market value* (emphasis 
in original). 225 Cal.App.3d, at 1277-1278, 275 Cal. Rptr., 
at 695. Thus, the Court of Appeal found: "Allegheny does 
not prohibit the states from adopting an acquisition value 
assessment method. That decision merely prohibits the 
arbitrary enforcement of a current value assessment 
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method" (emphasis omitted). Id., at 1265, 275 Cal. Rptr., 
at 686. 
The Court of Appeal also rejected petitioner's argument 
that the effect of Article XIIIA on the constitutional right to 
travel warranted heightened equal protection review. The 
court determined that the right to travel was not infringed, 
because Article XIIIA "bases each property owner's assess-
ment on acquisition value, irrespective of the owner's status 
as a California resident or the owner's length of residence 
in the state." Id.9 at 1281, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 697. Any 
benefit to longtime California residents was deemed 
"incidental" to an acquisition-value approach. Finally, the 
Court of Appeal found its conclusion was unchanged by the 
exemptions in Article XIIIA. Ibid., 275 Cal. Rptr., at 697. 
The Supreme Court of California denied review. App. to 
Pet. for Cert. Bl. We granted certiorari. U. S. 
(1991). 
II 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, §1, commands that no State shall "deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." Of course, most laws differentiate in some fashion 
between classes of persons. The Equal Protection Clause 
does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmen-
tal decisionmakers from treating differently persons who 
are in all relevant respects alike. F.S. Royster Guano Co. 
v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). 
As a general rule, "legislatures are presumed to have 
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact 
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality." 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961). 
Accordingly, this Court's cases are clear that, unless a 
classification warrants some form of heightened review 
because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or 
categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect character-
istic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the 
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classification rationally further a legitimate state interest. 
See, e. g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 
432, 439-441 (1985); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 
303 (1976). 
A 
At the outset, petitioner suggests that her challenge to 
Article XIIIA qualifies for heightened scrutiny because it 
infringes upon the constitutional right to travel. See, e.g., 
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 60, n. 6 (1982); Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 254-256 
(1976). In particular, petitioner alleges that the exemptions 
to reassessment for transfers by owners over 55 and for 
transfers between parents and children run afoul of the 
right to travel, because they classify directly on the basis of 
California residency. But the complaint does not allege 
that petitioner herself has been impeded from traveling or 
from settling in California because, as has been noted, prior 
to purchasing her home, petitioner lived in an apartment in 
Los Angeles. This Court's prudential standing principles 
impose a "general prohibition on a litigant's raising another 
person's legal rights." Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 
(1984). See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 
163, 166 (1972). Petitioner has not identified any obstacle 
preventing others who wish to travel or settle in California 
from asserting claims on their own behalf, nor has she 
shown any special relationship with those whose rights she 
seeks to assert, such that we might overlook this prudential 
limitation. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 
617, 623, n. 3 (1989). Accordingly, petitioner may not 
assert the constitutional right to travel as a basis for 
heightened review. 
B 
The appropriate standard of review is whether the 
difference in treatment between newer and older owners 
rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. In general, 
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the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is 
a plausible policy reason for the classification, see United 
States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166,174, 
179 (1980), the legislative facts on which the classification 
is apparently based rationally may have been considered to 
be true by the governmental decisionmaker, see Minnesota 
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456,464 (1981), and 
the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so 
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irratio-
nal, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S., 
at 446. This standard is especially deferential in the 
context of classifications made by complex tax laws. *[I]n 
structuring internal taxation schemes 'the States have large 
leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which 
in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation." 
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14, 22 (1985), quoting 
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 
359 (1973). See also Regan v. Taxation with Representation 
of Washington, 461 U. S. 540, 547 (1983) ("Legislatures 
have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and 
distinctions in tax statutes"). 
As between newer and older owners, Article XIIIA does 
not discriminate with respect to either the tax rate or the 
annual rate of adjustment in assessments. Newer and older 
owners alike benefit in both the short and long run from 
the protections of a 1% tax rate ceiling and no more than a 
2% increase in assessment value per year. New owners and 
old owners are treated differently with respect to one factor 
only—the basis on which their property is initially assessed. 
Petitioner's true complaint is that the State has denied 
her—a new owner—the benefit of the same assessment 
value that her neighbors—older owners—enjoy. 
We have no difficulty in ascertaining at least two rational 
or reasonable considerations of difference or policy that 
justify denying petitioner the benefits of her neighbors' 
lower assessments. First, the State has a legitimate 
interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and 
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stability. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926). 
The State therefore legitimately can decide to structure its 
tax system to discourage rapid turnover in ownership of 
homes and businesses, for example, in order to inhibit 
displacement of lower income families by the forces of 
gentrification or of established, "mom-and-pop" businesses 
by newer chain operations. By permitting older owners to 
pay progressively less in taxes than new owners of compa-
rable property, the Article XIIIA assessment scheme 
rationally furthers this interest. 
Second, the State legitimately can conclude that a new 
owner at the time of acquiring his property does not have 
the same reliance interest warranting protection against 
higher taxes as does an existing owner. The State may 
deny a new owner at the point of purchase the right to "lock 
in" to the same assessed value as is enjoyed by an existing 
owner of comparable property, because an existing owner 
rationally may be thought to have vested expectations in 
his property or home that are more deserving of protection 
than the anticipatory expectations of a new owner at the 
point of purchase. A new owner has full information about 
the scope of future tax Lability before acquiring the 
property, and if he thinks the future tax burden is too 
demanding, he can decide not to complete the purchase at 
all. By contrast, the existing owner, already saddled with 
his purchase, does not have the option of deciding not to 
buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high. To meet 
his tax obligations, he might be forced to sell his home or to 
divert his income away from the purchase of food, clothing, 
and other necessities. In short, the State may decide that 
it is worse to have owned and lost, than never to have 
owned at all. 
This Court previously has acknowledged that classifica-
tions serving to protect legitimate expectation and reliance 
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interests do not deny equal protection of the laws.4 "The 
protection of reasonable reliance interests is not only a 
legitimate governmental objective: it provides an exceeding-
ly persuasive justification. . . " (internal quotations omit-
ted). Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 746 (1984). For 
example, in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U. S. 
450 (1988), the Court determined that a prohibition on user 
fees for bus service in "reorganized" school districts but not 
in "nonreorganized" school districts does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause, because "the legislature could 
conceivably have believed that such a policy would serve 
the legitimate purpose of fulfilling the reasonable expecta-
tions of those residing in districts with free busing arrange-
ments imposed by reorganization plans." Id., at 465. 
Similarly, in United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 
supra, the Court determined that a denial of dual "windfall" 
retirement benefits to some railroad workers but not others 
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because 
"Congress could properly conclude that persons who had 
actually acquired statutory entitlement to windfall benefits 
while still employed in the railroad industry had a greater 
equitable claim to those benefits than the members of 
appellee's class who were no longer in railroad employment 
when they became eligible for dual benefits." 449 U. S., at 
4Outside the context of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has not 
hesitated to recognize the legitimacy of protecting reliance and expecta-
tional interests. See, e.g.y Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143 (1978) 
("protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the 
person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the invaded place"); Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978) (whether regulation 
of property constitutes a "taking* depends in part on "the extent to which 
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions"); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 601 (1972) (state law 
"property" interest for purpose of federal due process denotes "interests 
that are secured by existing rules or understandings") (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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178. Finally, in New Orleans v. Dukes, supra, the Court 
determined that an ordinance banning certain street-vendor 
operations, but grandfathering existing vendors who had 
been in operation for more than eight years, did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause because the "city could reason-
ably decide that newer businesses were less likely to have 
built up substantial reliance interests in continued opera-
tion." 427 U. S., at 305.6 
Petitioner argues that Article XIIIA cannot be distin-
guished from the tax assessment practice found to violate 
the Equal Protection Clause in Allegheny Pittsburgh. Like 
Article XIIIA, the practice at issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh 
resulted in dramatic disparities in taxation of properties of 
comparable value. But an obvious and critical factual 
difference between this case and Allegheny Pittsburgh is the 
absence of any indication in Allegheny Pittsburgh that the 
policies underlying an acquisition-value taxation scheme 
could conceivably have been the purpose for the Webster 
County tax assessor's unequal assessment scheme. In the 
first place, Webster County argued that "its assessment 
scheme is rationally related to its purpose of assessing 
properties at true current value" (emphasis added). Id., at 
488 U. S., at 343.6 Moreover, the West Virginia "Constitu-
5Because we conclude that Article XIIIA rationally furthers the State's 
interests in neighborhood stability and the protection of property owners' 
reliance interests, we need not consider whether it permissibly serves 
other interests discussed by the parties, including whether it taxes real 
property according to the taxpayers' ability to pay or whether it taxes 
real property in such a way as to promote stability of local tax revenues. 
*Webster County argued that the outdated assessments it used were 
consistent with current-value taxation, because periodic upward 
adjustments were made for inflation and it was not feasible to reassess 
individually each piece of property every year. Although the county 
obliquely referred in a footnote to the advantages of historical cost 
accounting, Brief for Respondent in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. 
Webster County, O.T. 1988, No. 87-1303, p. 30, n. 23, this was not an 
assertion of the general policies supporting acquisition-value taxation. 
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tion and laws provide that all property of the kind held by 
petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the 
State according to its estimated market valued and the 
Court found "no suggestion" that "the State may have 
adopted a different system in practice from that specified by 
statute." 7d,at345. 
To be sure, the Equal Protection Clause does not demand 
for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or 
governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the 
purpose or rationale supporting its classification. United 
States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S., at 179. 
See also McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chica-
go, 394 U. S. 802, 809 (1969) (legitimate state purpose may 
be ascertained even when the legislative or administrative 
history is silent). Nevertheless, this Court's review does 
require that a purpose may conceivably or "may reasonably 
have been the purpose and policy" of the relevant govern-
mental decisionmaker. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. 
Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 528-529 (1959). See also Schweiker 
v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 235 (1981) (classificatory scheme 
must "rationally advanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable 
governmental objective" (emphasis added)). Allegheny 
Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts precluded any 
plausible inference that the reason for the unequal assess-
ment practice was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-
value tax scheme.7 By contrast, Article XIIIA was enacted 
Even if acquisition-value policies had been asserted, the assertion would 
have been nonsensical given its inherent inconsistency with the county's 
principal argument that it was in fact trying to promote current-value 
taxation. 
7In Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959), the 
Court distinguished on similar grounds its decision in Wheeling Steel 
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 (1949), which invalidated a state 
statutory scheme exempting from taxation certain notes and accounts 
receivable owned by residents of the State but not notes and accounts 
receivable owned by nonresidents. 358 U. S., at 529. After the Court in 
Wheeling Steel determined that the statutory scheme's stated purpose 
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precisely to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value 
system. Allegheny Pittsburgh is not controlling here.8 
Finally, petitioner contends that the unfairness of Article 
XIIIA is made worse by its exemptions from reassessment 
for two special classes of new owners: persons aged 55 and 
older, who exchange principal residences, and children who 
acquire property from their parents. This Court previously 
has declined to hold that narrow exemptions from a general 
scheme of taxation necessarily render the overall scheme 
invidiously discriminatory. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation 
with Representation of Washington, 461 U. S. at 550-551 
(denial of tax exemption to nonprofit lobbying organizations, 
but with an exception for veterans' groups, does not violate 
equal protection). For purposes of rational-basis review, the 
"latitude of discretion is notably wide in . . . the granting of 
partial or total exemptions upon grounds of policy." F.S. 
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S., at 415. 
The two exemptions at issue here rationally further 
legitimate purposes. The people of California reasonably 
could have concluded that older persons in general should 
not be discouraged from moving to a residence more 
suitable to their changing family size or income. Similarly, 
was not legitimate, the other purposes did not need to be considered 
because *[h]aving themselves specifically declared their purpose, the Ohio 
statutes left no room to conceive of any other purpose for their existence." 
Id, at 530. 
*In finding Allegheny Pittsburgh distinguishable, we do not suggest 
that the protections of the Equal Protection Clause are any less when the 
classification is drawn by legislative mandate, as in this case, than by 
administrative action as in Allegheny Pittsburgh. See Sunday Lake Iron 
Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352 (1918). Nor do we suggest that the 
Equal Protection Clause constrains administrators, as in Allegheny 
Pittsburgh, from violating state law requiring uniformity of taxation of 
property. See Nashville, C. & St. L R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362, 
368-370 (1940); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. King County, 264 
U. S. 22, 27-28 (1924). See generally Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 
8-11 (1944). 
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the people of California reasonably could have concluded 
that the interests of family and neighborhood continuity 
and stability are furthered by and warrant an exemption for 
transfers between parents and children. Petitioner has not 
demonstrated that no rational bases lie for either of these 
exemptions. 
Ill 
Petitioner and amici argue with some appeal that Article 
XIIIA frustrates the "American dream" of home ownership 
for many younger and poorer California families. They 
argue that Article XIIIA places start-up businesses that 
depend on ownership of property at a severe disadvantage 
in competing with established businesses. They argue that 
Article XIIIA dampens demand for and construction of new 
housing and buildings. And they argue that Article XIIIA 
constricts local tax revenues at the expense of public 
education and vital services. 
Time and again, however, this Court has made clear in 
the rational-basis context that the "Constitution presumes 
that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvi-
dent decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic 
process and that judicial intervention is generally unwar-
ranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political 
branch has acted" (footnote omitted). Vance v. Bradley, 440 
U. S. 93, 97 (1979). Certainly, California's grand experi-
ment appears to vest benefits in a broad, powerful, and 
entrenched segment of society, and, as the Court of Appeal 
surmised, ordinary democratic processes may be unlikely to 
prompt its reconsideration or repeal. See 225 Cal. App. 3d, 
at 1282, n. 11, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 698, n. 11. Yet many wise 
and well-intentioned laws suffer from the same malady. 
Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, and we must decline 
petitioner's request to upset the will of the people of 
California. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment. 
In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission 
of Webster County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989), this Court struck 
down an assessment method used in Webster County, West 
Virginia, that operated precisely the same way as the 
California scheme being challenged today. I agree with the 
Court that Proposition 13 is constitutional. But I also agree 
with JUSTICE STEVENS that Allegheny Pittsburgh cannot be 
distinguished, see post, at 5. lb me Allegheny Pittsburgh 
represents a "needlessly intrusive judicial infringement on 
the State's legislative powers," New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 
U. S. 297, 306 (1976) (per curiam), and I write separately 
because I see no benefit, and much risk, in refusing to 
confront it directly. 
I 
Allegheny Pittsburgh involved a county assessment 
scheme indistinguishable in relevant respects from Proposi-
tion 13. As the Court explains, California taxes real 
property at 1% of "full cash value,* which means the 
"assessed value" as of 1975 (under the previous method) 
and after 1975-1976 the "appraised value of real property 
when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in value 
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has occurred after the 1975 assessment." The assessed 
value may be increased for inflation, but only at a maxi-
mum rate of 2% each year. See California Const., Art. 
XIIIA, §§ 1(a), 2(a); ante, at 2. The property tax system 
worked much the same way in Webster County, West 
Virginia. The tax assessor assigned real property an 
"appraised value," set the "assessed value" at half of the 
appraised value, then collected taxes by multiplying the 
assessed value by the relevant tax rate. For property that 
had been sold recently, the assessor set the appraised value 
at the most recent price of purchase. For property that had 
not been sold recently, she increased the appraised price by 
10%, first in 1976, then again in 1981 and 1983. 
The assessor's methods resulted in "dramatic differences 
in valuation between . . . recently transferred property and 
otherwise comparable surrounding land." 488 U. S., at 341; 
cf. Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 261, 269-270 (1990) (discussing the effects of 
Proposition 13); Cohen, State Law in Equality Clothing: A 
Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company v. County 
Commission, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 87, 91, and n. 29 (1990); 
Hellerstein & Peters, Recent Supreme Court Decisions 
Have Far-Reaching Implications, 70 J. Taxation 306, 
308-310 (1989). Several coal companies that owned 
property in Webster County sued the county assessor, 
alleging violations of both the West Virginia and the United 
States Constitutions. The Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia upheld the assessment against the compa-
nies, but this Court reversed. 
The Allegheny Pittsburgh Court asserted that with 
respect to taxation, the Equal Protection Clause constrains 
the States as follows. Although "[t]he use of a general 
adjustment as a transitional substitute for an individual 
reappraisal violates no constitutional command," the Clause 
requires that "general adjustments [be] accurate enough 
over a short period of time to equalize the differences in 
proportion between the assessments of a class of property 
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holders." 488 U. S., at 343. "[T]he constitutional require-
ment is the seasonable attainment of a rough equality in 
tax treatment of similarly situated property owners." Ibid. 
(citing Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 
526-527 (1959)). Moreover, the Court stated, the Constitu-
tion and laws of West Virginia "provide that all property of 
the kind held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform 
throughout the State according to its estimated market 
value," and "[t]here [was] no suggestion . . . that the State 
may have adopted a different system in practice from that 
specified by statute." 488 U. S., at 345. "Indeed, [the 
assessor's] practice seems contrary to that of the guide 
published by the West Virginia Tax Commission as an aid 
to local assessors in the assessment of real property." Ibid.; 
see also ibid. ("We are not advised of any West Virginia 
statute or practice which authorizes individual counties of 
the State to fashion their own substantive assessment 
policies independently of state statute"). The Court refused 
to decide "whether the Webster County assessment method 
would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a 
State, generally applied, instead of the aberrational 
enforcement policy it appears to be." Id., at 344, n. 4. 
Finally, the Court declared, "'[I]ntentional systematic 
undervaluation by state officials of other taxable property 
in the same class contravenes the constitutional right of one 
taxed upon the full value of his property/" Id., at 345 
(quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 
352-353 (1918), and citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota 
County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923), and Cumberland Coal Co. v. 
Board of Revision of Tax Assessments in Green County, Pa., 
284 U. S. 23 (1931)). The Court concluded that the assess-
ments for the coal companies' properties had failed these 
requisites of the Equal Protection Clause. 
II 
As the Court accurately states today, "this Court's cases" 
—Allegheny Pittsburgh aside—"are clear that, unless a 
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classification warrants some form of heightened review 
because it jeopardizes [the] exercise of a fundamental right 
or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect charac-
teristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the 
classification rationally further a legitimate state interest." 
Ante, at 7; see also Burlington N. R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U. S. 
, (1992); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 
410 U. S. 356, 359 (1973). The California tax system, like 
most, does not involve either suspect classes or fundamental 
rights, and the Court properly reviews California's classifi-
cation for a rational basis. Today's review, however, differs 
from the review in Allegheny Pittsburgh. 
The Court's analysis in Allegheny Pittsburgh is suscepti-
ble, I think, to at least three interpretations. The first is 
the one offered by petitioner. Under her reading of the 
case, properties are "similarly situated" or within the same 
"class" for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause 
when they are located in roughly the same types of neigh-
borhoods, for example, are roughly the same size, and are 
roughly the same in other, unspecified ways. According to 
petitioner, the Webster County assessor's plan violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because she had failed to achieve 
a "seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treat-
ment" of all the objectively comparable properties in 
Webster County, presumably those with about the same 
acreage and about the same amount of coal. Petitioner 
contends that Proposition 13 suffers from similar flaws. In 
1989, she points out, "the long-time owner of a stately 
7,800-square-foot, seven-bedroom mansion on a huge lot in 
Beverly Hills (among the most luxurious homes in one of 
the most expensive neighborhoods in Los Angeles County) 
. • . paid less property tax annually than the new homeown-
er of a tiny 980-square-foot home on a small lot in an 
extremely modest Venice neighborhood." Brief for Peti-
tioner 5; see also id., at 7 (Petitioner's "1988 property tax 
assessment on her unpretentious Baldwin Hills tract home 
is almost identical to that of a pre-1976 owner of a fabulous 
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beach-front Malibu residential property worth $2.1 million, 
even though her property is worth only l/12th as much as 
his"). Because California not only has not tried to repair 
this systematic, intentional, and gross disparity in taxation, 
but has enacted it into positive law, petitioner argues, 
Proposition 13 violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
This argument rests, in my view, on a basic misunder-
standing of Allegheny Pittsburgh. The Court there proceed-
ed on the assumption of law (assumed because the parties 
did not contest it) that the initial classification, by the 
State, was constitutional, and the assumption of fact 
(assumed because the parties had so stipulated) that the 
properties were comparable under the State's classification. 
But cf. Glennon, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 271-272 (noting 
that some of the properties contained coal and others did 
not). In referring to the tax treatment of a "class of 
property holders," or "similarly situated property owners," 
488 U. S., at 343, the Court did not purport to review the 
constitutionality of the initial classification, by market 
value, drawn by the State, as opposed to the further 
subclassification within the initial class, by acquisition 
value, drawn by the assessor. Instead, Allegheny Pitts-
burgh assumed that whether properties or persons are 
similarly situated depended on state law, and not, as 
petitioner argues, on some neutral criteria such as size or 
location that serve as proxies for market value. Under that 
theory, market value would be the only rational basis for 
classifying property But the Equal Protection Clause does 
not prescribe a single method of taxation. We have consis-
tently rejected petitioner's theory, see, e. g.y Ohio Oil Co. v. 
Conway, 281 U. S. 146 (1930); BelVs Gap R. Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890), and the Court properly rejects 
it today. 
Allegheny Pittsburgh, then, does not prevent the State of 
California from classifying properties on the basis of their 
value at acquisition, so long as the classification is support-
ed by a rational basis. I agree with the Court that it is, 
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both for the reasons given by this Court, see ante, at 9-12, 
and for the reasons given by the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia in Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. 
State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P. 2d 1281 
(1978). But the classification employed by the Webster 
County assessor, indistinguishable from California's, was 
rational for all those reasons as well. In answering 
petitioner's argument that Allegheny Pittsburgh controls 
here, respondents offer a second explanation for that case. 
JUSTICE STEVENS gives much the same explanation, see 
post, at 4-5, though he concludes in the end that Proposi-
tion 13, after Allegheny Pittsburgh, is unconstitutional. 
According to respondents, the Equal Protection Clause 
permits a State itself to determine which properties are 
similarly situated, as the State of California did here 
(classifying properties by acquisition value) and as the State 
of West Virginia did in Allegheny Pittsburgh (classifying 
properties by market value). But once a state does so, 
respondents suggest, the Equal Protection Clause requires 
after Allegheny Pittsburgh that properties in the same class 
be accorded seasonably equal treatment and not be inten-
tionally and systematically undervalued. Proposition 13 
provides for the assessment of properties in the same state-
determined class regularly and at roughly full value; this 
contrasts with the tax scheme in Webster County, where by 
dividing property in the same class (by market value) into 
a subclass (by acquisition value), the assessor regularly 
undervalued the property similarly situated. This, accord-
ing to respondents, made the Webster County scheme 
unconstitutional, and distinguishes Proposition 13. 
Respondents' reading of Allegheny Pittsburgh is, in my 
view, as misplaced as petitioner's; their test, for starters, 
comes with a dubious pedigree. In one of the cases cited in 
Allegheny Pittsburgh, Allied Stores, we upheld against 
an equal protection challenge a statute that exempted some 
corporations from ad valorem taxes imposed on others. Not 
only does Allied Stores not even hint that the Constitution 
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*require[s] . . . the seasonable attainment of a rough 
equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property 
owners,* 488 U. S., at 343, we took pains there to stress a 
very different proposition: 
The States have very wide discretion in the laying of 
their taxes. . . . Of course, the States, in the exercise of 
their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. But that clause imposes no iron rule of equality, 
prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropri-
ate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. The State 
. . . is not required to resort to close distinctions or to 
maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference 
to composition, use or value." Allied Stores, 358 U. S., 
at 526-527. 
Two of the other cases cited in Allegheny Pittsburgh, 
Sunday Lake Iron and Sioux City Bridge, also rejected 
equal protection challenges, see also Charleston Fed, 
Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182 (1945), 
and the case in which the words intentional, systematic, 
and undervaluation first appeared, Coulter v. Louisville & 
Nashville R. Co., 196 U. S. 599, 609 (1905), did not explain 
where the test came from or why. 
It is true that we applied the rule of Coulter to strike 
down a tax system in Cumberland Coal, also cited in 
Allegheny Pittsburgh. Cumberland Coal, however, reflects 
the most serious of the problems with respondents' reading 
of Allegheny Pittsburgh. As respondents understand these 
two cases, their rule is categorical: A tax scheme violates 
the Equal Protection Clause unless it provides for "the 
seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment" 
or if it results in " 'intentional systematic undervaluation' * 
of properties similarly situated by state law, 488 U. S., at 
343, 345. This would be so regardless of whether the 
inequality or the undervaluation, which may result (as in 
Webster County) from further classifications of properties 
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within a class, is supported by a rational basis. But not 
since the coming of modern equal protection jurisprudence 
has this Court supplanted the rational judgments of state 
representatives with its own notions of "rough equality," 
"undervaluation," or "fairness." Cumberland Coal, which 
fails even to mention rational-basis review, conflicts with 
our current caselaw. Allegheny Pittsburgh did not, in my 
view, mean to return us to the era when this Court some-
times second-guessed state tax officials. In rejecting today 
respondents' reading of Allegheny Pittsburgh, the Court, as 
I understand it, agrees. 
This brings me to the third explanation for Allegheny 
Pittsburgh, the one offered today by the Court. The Court 
proceeds in what purports to be our standard equal protec-
tion framework, though it reapplies an old, and to my mind 
discredited, gloss to rational-basis review. The Court 
concedes that the "Equal Protection Clause does not 
demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a 
legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate 
at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classifi-
cation." Ante, at 13 (citing United States Railroad Retire-
ment Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166,179 (1980)). This principle 
applies, the Court acknowledges, not only to an initial 
classification but to all further classifications within a class. 
"Nevertheless, this Court's review does require that a 
purpose may conceivably or 'may reasonably have been the 
purpose and policy* of the relevant governmental decision-
maker," the Court says, ante, at 13 (quoting Allied Stores, 
supra, at 528-529), and "Allegheny Pittsburgh was the rare 
case where the facts precluded any plausible inference that 
the reason for the unequal assessment practice was to 
achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax scheme," 
ante, at 13. Rather than obeying the "law of a State, 
generally applied," the county assessor had administered an 
"aberrational enforcement policy," 488 U. S., at 344, n. 4. 
See ante, at 13. According to the Court, therefore, the 
problem in Allegheny Pittsburgh was that the Webster 
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County scheme, though otherwise rational, was irrational 
because it was contrary to state law. Any rational bases 
underlying the acquisition-value scheme were "implausible* 
(or "unreasonable") because they were made so by the Con-
stitution and laws of the State of West Virginia. 
That explanation, like petitioner's and respondents', is in 
tension with settled case law. Even if the assessor did 
violate West Virginia law (and that she did is open to 
question, see In re 1975 Tax Assessments Against Oneida 
Coal Co., W. Va. , , 360 S. E. 2d 560, 564 
(1987)), she would not have violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. A violation of state law does not by itself constitute 
a violation of the Federal Constitution. We made that clear 
in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1 (1944), for instance, 
where a candidate for state office complained that members 
of the local canvassing board had refused to certify his 
name as a nominee to the Secretary of State, thus violating 
an Illinois statute. Because the plaintiff had not alleged, 
say, that the defendants had meant to discriminate against 
him on racial grounds, but merely that they had failed to 
comply with a statute, we rejected the argument that the 
defendants had thereby violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
"[N]ot every denial of a right conferred by state law 
involves a denial of the equal protection of the laws, 
even though the denial of the right to one person may 
operate to confer it on another. . . . [W]here the official 
action purports to be in conformity to the statutory 
classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of 
the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, 
is not without more a denial of the equal protection of 
the laws." 7d,at8. 
See also Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 
U. S. 362 (1940). 
The Court today promises not to have overruled Snowden, 
see ante, at 14, n. 8, but its disclaimer, I think, is in vain. 
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For if, as the Court suggests, what made the assessor's 
method unreasonable was her supposed violation of state 
law, the Court's interpretation of Allegheny Pittsburgh 
recasts in this case the proposition that we had earlier 
rejected. See Glennon, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 268-269; 
Cohen, 38 UCLA L. Rev., at 93-94; Ely, Another Spin on 
Allegheny Pittsburgh, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 107, 108-109 
(1990). In repudiating Snowden, moreover, the Court 
threatens settled principles not only of the Fourteenth 
Amendment but of the Eleventh. We have held that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from ordering 
state actors to conform to the dictates of state law. 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 
U. S. 89 (1984). After today, however, a plaintiff might be 
able invoke federal jurisdiction to have state actors obey 
state law, for a claim that the state actor has violated state 
law appears to have become a claim that he has violated 
the Constitution. See Cohen, supra, at 103; Ely, supra, at 
109-110 ("[B]y the Court's logic, all violations of state 
law—at least those violations that end (as most do) in the 
treatment of some people better than others—are theoreti-
cally convertible into violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause"). 
I understand that the Court prefers to distinguish 
Allegheny Pittsburgh, but in doing so, I think, the Court has 
left our equal protection jurisprudence in disarray. The 
analysis appropriate to this case is straightforward. Unless 
a classification involves suspect classes or fundamental 
rights, judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause 
demands only a conceivable rational basis for the chal-
lenged state distinction. See Fritz, supra; Kassel v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U. S. 662, 
702-706, and n. 13 (1981) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). This 
basis need not be one identified by the State itself; in fact, 
States need not articulate any reasons at all for their 
actions. See ibid. Proposition 13, I believe, satisfies this 
standard—but so, for the same reasons, did the scheme 
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employed in Webster County. See Brief for Pacific Legal 
Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 7, 9-10, Brief for Na-
tional Association of Counties et al. as Amici Curiae 9-13, 
Brief for Respondent 31-32, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal 
Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster County, O. T. 1988, Nos. 
87-1303, 87-1310; ante, at 9-12. Allegheny Pittsburgh 
appears to have survived today's decision. I wonder, 
though, about its legacy. 
* * * 
I concur in the judgment of the Court and join Part II-A 
of its opinion. 
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
Dining the two past decades, California property owners 
have enjoyed extraordinary prosperity. As the State's 
population has mushroomed, so has the value of its real 
estate. Between 1976 and 1986 alone, the total assessed 
value of California property subject to property taxation 
increased tenfold.1 Simply put, those who invested in 
California real estate in the 1970s are among the most 
fortunate capitalists in the world. 
Proposition 13 has provided these successful investors 
with a tremendous windfall and, in doing so, has created 
severe inequities in California's property tax scheme.2 
These property owners (hereinafter "the Squires'') are 
guaranteed that, so long as they retain their property and 
^lennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 261, 
270, n. 49 (1990). Tor the same period, [property values in] Hawaii rose 
approximately 450%; Washington, D.C. approximately 350%; and New 
York approximately 125%.* Ibid, (citing 2 U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 
Bureau of Census, Taxable Property Values 86-111, Table 12 (1987); 2 
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Taxable Property Values 
and Assessment/Sales Price Ratios 42, Table 2 (1977)). 
2Proposition 13 was codified as Article XIIIA of the California 
Constitution; for convenience sake, however, I refer to it by its colloquial 
name. 
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do not improve it, their taxes will not increase more than 
2% in any given year. As a direct result of this windfall for 
the Squires, later purchasers must pay far more than their 
fair share of property taxes. 
The specific disparity that prompted petitioner to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of Proposition 13 is the fact that 
her annual property tax bill is almost 5 times as large as 
that of her neighbors who own comparable homes: While 
her neighbors' 1989 taxes averaged less than $400, petition-
er was taxed $1,700. App. 18-20. This disparity is not 
unusual under Proposition 13. Indeed, some homeowners 
pay 17 times as much in taxes as their neighbors with 
comparable property. See id., at 76-77. For vacant land, 
the disparities may be as great as 500 to 1. App. to Pet. for 
Cert. A7. Moreover, as Proposition 13 controls the taxation 
of commercial property as well as residential property, the 
regime greatly favors the commercial enterprises of the 
Squires, placing new businesses at a substantial disadvan-
tage. 
As a result of Proposition 13, the Squires, who own 44% 
of the owner-occupied residences, paid only 25% of the total 
taxes collected from homeowners in 1989. Report of Senate 
Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue to the 
California State Senate 33 (1991) (Commission Report). 
These disparities are aggravated by § 2 of Proposition 13, 
which exempts from reappraisal a property owner's home 
and up to $1 million of other real property when that 
property is transferred to a child of the owner. This 
exemption can be invoked repeatedly and indefinitely, 
allowing the Proposition 13 windfall to be passed from 
generation to generation. As the California Senate Com-
mission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue observed: 
"The inequity is clear. One young family buys a new 
home and is assessed at full market value. Another 
young family inherits its home, but pays taxes based on 
their parents' date of acquisition even though both 
homes are of identical value. Not only does this 
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constitutional provision offend a policy of equal tax 
treatment for taxpayers in similar situations, it ap-
pears to favor the housing needs of children with home-
owner-parents over children with non-homeowner-
parents. With the repeal of the state's gift and inheri-
tance tax in 1982, the rationale for this exemption is 
negligible." Commission Report, at 9-10. 
The Commission was too generous. To my mind, the 
rationale for such disparity is not merely "negligible," it is 
nonexistent. Such a law establishes a privilege of a 
medieval character: Two families with equal needs and 
equal resources are treated differently solely because of 
their different heritage. 
In my opinion, such disparate treatment of similarly 
situated taxpayers is arbitrary and unreasonable. Although 
the Court today recognizes these gross inequities, see ante, 
at 4, n. 2, its analysis of the justification for those inequities 
consists largely of a restatement of the benefits that accrue 
to long-time property owners. That a law benefits those it 
benefits cannot be an adequate justification for severe 
inequalities such as those created by Proposition 13. 
I 
The standard by which we review equal protection 
challenges to state tax regimes is well-established and 
properly deferential. "Where taxation is concerned and no 
specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is 
imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classifi-
cations and drawing lines which in their judgment produce 
reasonable systems of taxation." Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore 
Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 359 (1973). Thus, as the 
Court today notes, the issue in this case is "whether the 
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difference in treatment between newer and older owners 
rationally furthers a legitimate state interest." Ante, at 8.3 
But deference is not abdication and "rational basis 
scrutiny" is still scrutiny. Thus we have, on several recent 
occasions, invalidated tax schemes under such a standard 
of review. See e. g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County 
Comm'n of Webster County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989); Hooper v. 
Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U. S. 612, 618 (1985); 
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14 (1985); Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U. S. 869 (1985); cf. Zobel v. Williams, 
457 U. S. 55, 60-61 (1982). 
Just three Terms ago, this Court unanimously invalidated 
Webster Coimty, West Virginia's assessment scheme under 
rational-basis scrutiny. Webster County employed a de 
facto Proposition 13 assessment system: The Coimty 
assessed recently purchased property on the basis of its 
purchase price but made only occasional adjustments 
(averaging 3-4% per year) to the assessments of other 
properties. Just as in this case, *[t]his approach systemati-
cally produced dramatic differences in valuation between 
. . . recently transferred property and otherwise comparable 
surrounding land." Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U. S., at 341. 
The u*[i]ntentional systematic undervaluation/" id., at 
345, found constitutionally infirm in Allegheny Pittsburgh 
has been codified in California by Proposition 13. That the 
discrimination in Allegheny Pittsburgh was de facto and the 
discrimination in this case de jure makes little difference. 
"The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is to secure every person within the 
'As the Court notes, ante, at 8, petitioner contends that Proposition 13 
infringes on the constitutional right to travel and that, accordingly, a 
more searching standard of review is appropriate. There is no need to 
address that issue because the gross disparities created by Proposition 
13 do not pass even the most deferential standard of review. Cf. Hooper 
v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U. S. 612, 618 (1985); Zobel v. 
Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 60-61 (1982). 
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State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a 
statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted 
agents" Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 
352-353 (1918) (emphasis added). If anything, the inequal-
ity created by Proposition 13 is constitutionally more 
problematic because it is the product of a state-wide policy 
rather than the result of an individual assessor's mal-
administration. 
Nor can Allegheny Pittsburgh be distinguished because 
West Virginia law established a market-value assessment 
regime. Webster County's scheme was constitutionally 
invalid not because it was a departure from state law, but 
because it involved the relative u 'systematic undervaluation 
. . . [of] property in the same class'* (as that class was 
defined by state law). Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U. S., at 
345 (emphasis added). Our decisions have established that 
the Equal Protection Clause is offended as much by the 
arbitrary delineation of classes of property (as in this case) 
as by the arbitrary treatment of properties within the same 
class (as in Allegheny Pittsburgh). See Brown-Forman Co. 
v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 573 (1910); Cumberland Coal 
Co. v. Board of Revision, 284 U. S. 23,2&-30 (1931). Thus, 
if our unanimous holding in Allegheny Pittsburgh was 
sound—and I remain convinced that it was—it follows 
inexorably that Proposition 13, like Webster County's 
assessment scheme, violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
Indeed, in my opinion, state-wide discrimination is far more 
invidious than a local aberration that creates a tax dis-
parity. 
The States, of course, have broad power to classify 
property in their taxing schemes and if the "classification is 
neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some 
reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no 
denial of the equal protection of the law." Brown-Forman 
Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U: S., at 573. As we stated in Alleghe-
ny Pittsburgh, a "State may divide different kinds of 
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property into classes and assign to each class a different tax 
burden so long as those divisions and burdens are reason-
able." 488 U. S., at 344. 
Consistent with this standard, the Court has long upheld 
tax classes based on the taxpayer's ability to pay, see, e.g., 
Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U. S. 87, 101 
(1935); the nature (tangible or intangible) of the property, 
see, e.g., Klein v. Jefferson County Board of Tax Supervi-
sors, 282 U. S. 19, 23-24 (1930); the use of the property, 
see, e.g., Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114 (1900); and 
the status (corporate or individual) of the property owner, 
see, e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 
U. S. 356 (1973). Proposition 13 employs none of these 
familiar classifications. Instead it classifies property based 
on its nominal purchase price: All property purchased for 
the same price is taxed the same amount (leaving aside the 
2% annual adjustment). That this scheme can be named 
(an "acquisition value" system) does not render it any less 
arbitrary or unreasonable. Under Proposition 13, a 
majestic estate purchased for $150,000 in 1975 (and now 
worth more than $2 million) is placed in the same tax class 
as a humble cottage purchased today for $150,000. The 
only feature those two properties have in common is that 
somewhere, sometime a sale contract for each was executed 
that contained the price "$150,000." Particularly in an 
environment of phenomenal real property appreciation, to 
classify property based on its purchase price is "palpably 
arbitrary." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 
522,530(1959). 
II 
Under contemporary equal protection doctrine, the test of 
whether a classification is arbitrary is "whether the 
difference in treatment between [earlier and later purchas-
ers] rationally furthers a legitimate state interest." Ante, 
at 8. The adjectives and adverbs in this standard are more 
important than the nouns and verbs. 
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A legitimate state interest must encompass the interests 
of members of the disadvantaged class and the community 
at large as well as the direct interests of the members of 
the favored class. It must have a purpose or goal indepen-
dent of the direct effect of the legislation and one "'that we 
may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial 
legislature.'" Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 
U. S. 432,452, n. 4 (1985) (STEVENS, J., concurring) (quoting 
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 
166,180-181 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment)). 
That a classification must find justification outside itself 
saves judicial review of such classifications from becoming 
an exercise in tautological reasoning. 
"A State cannot deflect an equal protection challenge by 
observing that in light of the statutory classification all 
those within the burdened class are similarly situated. 
The classification must reflect pre-existing differences; 
it cannot create new ones that are supported by only 
their own bootstraps. The Equal Protection Clause 
requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory 
application within the class it establishes/ Rinaldi v. 
Yeager, 384 U. S. 305, 308 (1966).* Williams v. Ver-
mont, 472 U. S. 14, 27 (1985). 
If the goal of the discriminatory classification is not 
independent from the policy itself, "each choice [of classifi-
cation] will import its own goal, each goal will count as 
acceptable, and the requirement of a 'rational' choice-goal 
relation will be satisfied by the very making of the choice." 
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205, 1247 (1970). 
A classification rationally furthers a state interest when 
there is some fit between the disparate treatment and the 
legislative purpose. As noted above, in the review of tax 
statutes we have allowed such fit to be generous and 
approximate, recognizing that "rational distinctions may be 
made with substantially less than mathematical exacti-
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tude." New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). 
Nonetheless, in some cases the underinclusiveness or the 
overinclusiveness of a classification will be so severe that it 
cannot be said that the legislative distinction "rationally 
furthers" the posited state interest.4 See, e.g., Jimenez v. 
Weinberger, All U. S. 628, 636-638 (1974). 
The Court's cursory analysis of Proposition 13 pays little 
attention to either of these aspects of the controlling 
standard of review. The first state interest identified by the 
Court is California's "interest in local neighborhood preser-
vation, continuity, and stability." Ante, at 9 (citing Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926)). It is beyond 
question that "inhibiting the] displacement of lower income 
families by the forces of gentrification," ante, at 9-10, is a 
legitimate state interest; the central issue is whether the 
disparate treatment of earlier and later purchasers ratio-
nally furthers this goal. Here the Court offers not an 
analysis, but only a conclusion: "By permitting older owners 
to pay progressively less in taxes than new owners of 
comparable property, [Proposition 13] rationally furthers 
this interest." Ante, at 10. 
I disagree. In my opinion, Proposition 13 sweeps too 
broadly and operates too indiscriminately to "rationally 
further" the State's interest in neighborhood preservation. 
No doubt there are some early purchasers Uving on fixed or 
limited incomes who could not afford to pay higher taxes 
and still maintain their homes. California has enacted 
special legislation to respond to their plight.5 Those 
4
 "Herod, ordering the death of all male children born on a particular 
day because one of them would some day bring about his downfall, 
employed such a[n overinclusive] classification!, as did t]he wartime 
treatment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry [which imposed] 
burdens upon a large class of individuals because some of them were 
believed to be disloyal." Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of 
the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 351 (1949). 
8
 As pointed out in the Commission Report, California has addressed 
this specific problem with specific legislation. The State has established 
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concerns cannot provide an adequate justification for 
Proposition 13. A state-wide, across-the-board tax windfall 
for all property owners and their descendants is no more a 
"rational" means for protecting this small subgroup than a 
blanket tax exemption for all taxpayers named Smith would 
be a rational means to protect a particular taxpayer named 
Smith who demonstrated difficulty paying her tax bill. 
Even within densely populated Los Angeles County, 
residential property comprises less than half of the market 
value of the property tax roll. App. 45. It cannot be said 
that the legitimate state interest in preserving neighbor-
hood character is "rationally furthered" by tax benefits for 
owners of commercial, industrial, vacant, and other nonresi-
dential properties.6 It is just short of absurd to conclude 
that the legitimate state interest in protecting a relatively 
small number of economically vulnerable families is 
"rationally furthered" by a tax windfall for all 9,787,887 
property owners7 in California. 
two programs: 
"Senior Citizens Property Tax Assistance. Provides refunds of up to 
ninety-six percent of property taxes to low income homeowners over age 
62. 
"Senior Citizens Property Tax Postponement. Allows senior citizens with 
incomes under $20,000 to postpone all or part of the taxes on their homes 
until an ownership change occurs.* Commission Report 23. 
6
 The Courts rationale for upholding Proposition 13 does not even 
arguably apply to vacant property. That, as the Court recognizes, 
Proposition 13 discourages changes of ownership means that the law 
creates an impediment to the transfer and development of such property 
no matter now socially desirable its improvement might be. It is equally 
plain that the competitive advantage enjoyed by the Squires who own 
commercial property is wholly unjustified. There is no rational state 
interest in providing those entrepreneurs with a special privilege that 
tends to discourage otherwise desirable transfers of income-producing 
property. In a free economy, the entry of new competitors should be 
encouraged, not arbitrarily hampered by unfavorable tax treatment. 
7Brief for California Assessors' Association as Amicus Curiae 2. 
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The Court's conclusion is unsound not only because of the 
lack of numerical fit between the posited state interest and 
Proposition 13's inequities but also because of the lack of 
logical fit between ends and means. Although the State 
may have a valid interest in preserving some neighbor-
hoods,8 Proposition 13 not only "inhibits the] displace-
ment" of settled families, it also inhibits the transfer of 
unimproved land, abandoned buildings, and substandard 
uses. Thus, contrary to the Court's suggestion, Proposition 
13 is not like a zoning system. A zoning system functions 
by recognizing different uses of property and treating those 
different uses differently. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U. S., at 388-390. Proposition 13 treats all property 
alike, giving all owners tax breaks, and discouraging the 
transfer or improvement of all property—the developed and 
the dilapidated, the neighborly and the nuisance. 
In short, although I agree with the Court that "neighbor-
hood preservation" is a legitimate state interest, I cannot 
agree that a tax windfall for all persons who purchased 
property before 1978 rationally furthers that interest. To 
my mind, Proposition 13 is too blunt a tool to accomplish 
such a specialized goal. The severe inequalities created by 
Proposition 13 cannot be justified by such an interest.9 
8
 The ambiguous character of this interest is illustrated by the options 
faced by a married couple that owns a three- or four-bedroom home that 
suited their family needs while their children lived at home. After the 
children have moved out, increased taxes and maintenance expenses 
would—absent Proposition 13—tend to motivate the sale of the home to 
a younger family needing a home of that size, or perhaps the rental of a 
room or two to generate the income necessary to pay taxes. Proposition 
13, however, subsidizes the wasteful retention of unused housing 
capacity, making the sale of the home unwise and the rental of the extra 
space unnecessary. 
•Respondent contends that the inequities created by Proposition 13 are 
justified by the State's interest in protecting property owners from 
taxation on unrealized appreciation. The California Supreme Court 
relied on a similar state interest. See Amador Valley Joint Union High 
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The second state interest identified by the Court is the 
"reliance interests" of the earlier purchasers. Here I find 
the Court's reasoning difficult to follow. Although the 
protection of reasonable reliance interests is a legitimate 
governmental purpose, see Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 
728, 746 (1984), this case does not implicate such interests. 
A reliance interest is created when an individual justifiably 
acts under the assumption that an existing legal condition 
will persist; thus reliance interests are most often implicat-
ed when the government provides some benefit and then 
acts to eliminate the benefit. See, e.g., New Orleans v. 
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297 (1976). In this case, those who 
purchased property before Proposition 13 was enacted 
received no assurances that assessments would only 
increase at a limited rate; indeed, to the contrary, many 
purchased property in the hope that property values (and 
assessments) would appreciate substantially and quickly. 
It cannot be said, therefore, that the earlier purchasers of 
property somehow have a reliance interest in limited tax 
increases. 
Perhaps what the Court means is that post-Proposition 
13 purchasers have less reliance interests than pre-Proposi-
tion 13 purchasers. The Court reasons that the State may 
tax earlier and later purchasers differently because 
"an existing owner rationally may be thought to have 
vested expectations in his property or home that are 
School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.3d 208, 236-238, 583 
P. 2d 1281, 1309-1311 (1978). This argument is closely related to the 
Court's reasoning concerning "neighborhood preservation*; respondent 
claims the State has an interest in preventing the situation in which 
"skyrocketing real estate prices . . . drivfe] property taxes beyond some 
taxpayers* ability to pay." Brief for Respondent 19. As demonstrated 
above, whatever the connection between acquisition price and "ability to 
pay,* a blanket tax windfall for all early purchasers of property (and 
their descendants) is simply too overinclusive to "rationally further* the 
State's posited interest in protecting vulnerable taxpayers. 
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more deserving of protection than the anticipatory 
expectations of a new owner at the point of purchase. 
A new owner has full information about the scope of 
future tax liability before acquiring the property, and 
if he thinks the future tax burden is too demanding, he 
can decide not to complete the purchase at all. By 
contrast, the existing owner, already saddled with his 
purchase, does not have the option of deciding not to 
buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high." Ante, 
at 10.10 
This simply restates the effects of Proposition 13. A pre-
Proposition 13 owner has "vested expectations" in reduced 
taxes only because Proposition 13 gave her such expecta-
tions; a later purchaser has no such expectations because 
Proposition 13 does not provide her such expectations. But 
the same can be said of any arbitrary protection for an 
existing class of taxpayers. Consider a law that establishes 
that homes with even street numbers would be taxed at 
twice the rate of homes with odd street numbers. It is 
certainly true that the even-numbered homeowners could 
not decide to "unpurchase" their homes and that those 
considering buying an even-numbered home would know 
that it came with an extra tax burden, but certainly that 
would not justify the arbitrary imposition of disparate tax 
burdens based on house numbers. So it is in this case. 
Proposition 13 provides a benefit for earlier purchasers and 
imposes a burden on later purchasers. To say that the later 
purchasers know what they are getting into does not 
answer the critical question: Is it reasonable and constitu-
tional to tax early purchasers less than late purchasers 
10The Court's sympathetic reference to "existing ownertsl already 
saddled" with their property should not obscure the fact that these early 
purchasers have already seen their property increase in value more than 
tenfold. 
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when at the time of taxation their properties are compara-
ble? This question the Court does not answer. 
Distilled to its essence, the Court seems to be saying that 
earlier purchasers can benefit under Proposition 13 because 
earlier purchasers benefit under Proposition 13. If, howev-
er, a law creates a disparity, the State's interest preserving 
that disparity cannot be a "legitimate state interest" 
justifying that inequity. As noted above, a statute's 
disparate treatment must be justified by a purpose distinct 
from the very effects created by that statute. Thus, I 
disagree with the Court that the severe inequities wrought 
by Proposition 13 can be justified by what the Court calls 
the "reliance interests" of those who benefit from that 
scheme.11 
In my opinion, it is irrational to treat similarly situated 
persons differently on the basis of the date they joined the 
class of property owners. Until today, I would have thought 
this proposition far from controversial. In Zobel v. Wil-
liams, 457 U. S. 55 (1982), we ruled that Alaska's program 
of distributing cash dividends on the basis of the recipient's 
years of residency in the State violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. The Court wrote: 
"If the states can make the amount of a cash divi-
dend depend on length of residence, what would 
preclude varying university tuition on a sliding scale 
based on years of residence—or even limiting access of 
11
 Respondent, drawing on the analysis of the California Supreme 
Court, contends that the inequities created by Proposition 13 are also 
justified by the State's interest in "permitting the taxpayer to make more 
careful and accurate predictions of future tax liability.* Amador Valley, 
22 Cal.3d, at 239, 583 P. 2d, at 1312. This analysis suffers from the 
same infirmity as the Court's "reliance* analysis. I agree that Proposi-
tion 13 permits greater predictability of tax liability; the relevant 
question, however, is whether the inequities between earlier and later 
purchasers created by Proposition 13 can be justified by something other 
than the benefit to the early purchasers. I do not believe that they can. 
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finite public facilities, eligibility for student loans, for 
civil service jobs, or for government contracts by length 
of domicile? Could states impose different taxes based 
on length of residence? Alaska's reasoning could open 
the door to state apportionment of other rights, bene-
fits, and services according to length of residency. It 
would permit the states to divide citizens into expand-
ing numbers of permanent classes. Such a result 
would be clearly impermissible." Id., at 64 (emphasis 
added) (footnotes omitted). 
Similarly, the Court invalidated on equal protection 
grounds New Mexico's policy of providing a permanent tax 
exemption for Vietnam veterans who had been state 
residents before May 8, 1976, but not to more recent 
arrivals. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U. S. 
612 (1985). The Court expressly rejected the State's claim 
that it had a legitimate interest in providing special 
rewards to veterans who lived in the State before 1976 and 
concluded that *[n]either the Equal Protection Clause, nor 
this Court's precedents, permit the State to prefer estab-
lished resident veterans over newcomers in the retroactive 
apportionment of an economic benefit." Id, at 623. 
As these decisions demonstrate, the selective provision of 
benefits based on the timing of one's membership in a class 
(whether that class be the class of residents or the class of 
property owners) is rarely a "legitimate state interest." 
Similarly situated neighbors have an equal right to share 
in the benefits of local government. It would obviously be 
unconstitutional to provide one with more or better fire or 
police protection than the other; it is just as plainly 
unconstitutional to require one to pay five times as much in 
property taxes as the other for the same government 
services. In my opinion, the severe inequalities created by 
Proposition 13 are arbitrary and unreasonable and do not 
rationally further a legitimate state interest. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
ADDENDUM D 
FEDERAL EXP. CORP 
Cttcas7!7S.W.2<! 
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP., Appellee, 
v. 
TENNESSEE STATE BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION and Tennessee As-
sessment Appeals Commission, Appel-
lants. 
Supreme Court of Tennessee, 
at Nashville. 
Oct. 6, 1986. 
Operator of interstate door-to-door 
package delivery service challenged ad va-
lorem taxation of its personal property. 
The Equity Court, Davidson County, Irvin 
H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor, dismissed, 
and Court of Appeals reversed. The Su-
preme Court, Cooper, J., held that: (1) op-
erator of interstate door-to-door package 
delivery service, which used its own inte-
grated air-ground transportation system of 
aircraft and delivery vans, was an "express 
company" subject to ad valorem taxation 
under statute based on an assessment of 
55% of value of its personal property, and 
(2) assessing property of operator of pack-
age facility service at 55% of its value, 
while assessing property of railroads at 
industrial and commercial rate of 30% of 
value, did not violate equal protection 
clause or State Constitution, where original 
state assessment of railroads at 55% of 
value of their properties had been preempt-
ed by Federal Railroad Revitalization and 
Regulatory Reform Act. 
Court of Appeals reversed. 
1. Taxation *»142 
Operator of interstate door-to-door 
package delivery service, which used its 
own integrated air-ground transportation 
system of aircraft and delivery vans, was 
an "express company" within classification 
of "public utility" subject to ad valorem 
taxation under statute based on an assess-
. v. TENN. STATE BD. Tenn. 873 
873 (Tenn. 19S6) 
ment of 55% of value of its personal prop-
erty. T.C.A. § 67-5-50M8XF). 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Constitutional Law 4=229(3) 
Taxation 4=42(2) 
Assessing property of operator of in-
terstate door-to-door package facility ser-
vice at 55% of its value for ad valorem 
taxation purposes, while assessing proper-
ty of railroads at industrial and commercial 
rate of 30% of value, did not violate equal 
protection clause or State Constitution, 
where original state assessment of rail-
roads at 55% of value of their properties 
had been preempted by Federal Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act. 
T.C.A. § 67-5-501; Revised Interstate 
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 11503; 
Const. Art. 2, § 28; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
14. 
Joe C. Peel, Ass't Atty. Gen., WJ. Mi-
chael Cody, Atty. Gen., Nashville, for ap-
pellants. 
Waring Cox, Saul C. Belz and Earl J. 
Achwarz, Memphis, for appellee. 
OPINION 
COOPER, Justice. 
The application for permission to appeal 
was granted to review the holding of the 
Court of Appeals that Federal Express Cor-
poration was not a "public utility" within 
the definition set forth in T.C.A. § 67-5-
501(8), and the concomittant holding that 
personal property of Federal Express was 
to be assessed at the 30% commercial and 
industrial rate rather than the 55% public 
utility rate. 
In 1979, the tax period in question, Fed-
eral operated an interstate door-to-door 
package delivery service, mainly using its 
own integrated air-ground transportation 
system of some 80 to 90 aircraft and ap-
proximately 1,500 delivery vans. Federal's 
aircraft were operated over a hub-and-
spoke pattern with its facilities at the Mem-
phis International Airport as the hub. Fed-
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era! would pick up documents and pack-
ages, weighing no more than 70 pounds, 
from customers in various cities and trans-
port them by air to Memphis. In Memphis, 
the documents and packages were sorted 
by destination, reloaded into the aircraft, 
flown to their destination cities by early 
morning, and were delivered by Federal's 
couriers if the consignee was within the air 
terminal zone. Under regulations in effect 
at the time, Federal could not pickup or 
deliver outside the air terminal zone. If 
package pickups and deliveries were re-
quired beyond the zone, the packages were 
either received from or tendered to an ICC 
certificated motor carrier. 
Beginning in 1974, the Shelby County 
Tax Assessor assessed Federal Express's 
personal property as public utility property. 
In challenging the 1979 tax assessment, 
Federal initially questioned only the rate of 
y depreciation applied to its fleet of 727 air-
r (£ craft. The public utility classification issue 
< g evolved as the case progressed through the 
t g administrative review process and the low-
T 3 er courts. Most of the controversy cen-
\ y tered on whether Federal Express, operat-
t i ing its aircraft under an All Cargo Certifi-
^ ^ cate, could be considered to be a "commer-
cial air carrier holding a certificate of con-
venience and necessity," which would bring 
it within the definition of a public utility. 
See § 67-&-50K8XM). The assessor also 
argued that Federal is an "express compa-
ny" and thus is within the classification of 
a public utility set forth in T.C.A. § 67-5-
50K8KF). 
The Court of Appeals concluded that 
Federal's operation did not come within 
either classification, and that its property 
was not subject to being assessed at the 
public utility rate. We disagree. As we 
view the record, Federal Express's opera-
tion was that of an "express company" 
and, as such, was subject to an ad valorem 
tax based on an assessment of 55% of the 
value of its personal property. 
Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee 
Constitution, as amended in 1973, specifi-
cally authorized classification of property 
for ad valorem tax purposes according to 
use. General American Transportation 
Corporation v. Tennessee State Board of 
Equalization, 536 S.W.2d 212 (Tenn.1976). 
It expressly authorized the classification of 
tangible personal property into three classi-
fications: (1) public utility property to be 
assessed at 55% of its value; (2) industrial 
and commercial property to be assessed at 
30% of its value and (3) all other tangible 
personal property to be assessed at 5% of 
its value. Article II, Section 28 of the 
Constitution of Tennessee. The definition 
of property in each class was left to be 
determined by the legislature. 
For the tax year 1979, T.C.A. § 67-601, 
now § 67-5-501, provided, in pertinent 
part, that: 
Definitions —For purposes of classifica-
tion of property: 
(8) "Public utility property" is hereby de-
fined to include all property of every 
kind, whether owned or leased, and use 
or held for use, directly or indirectly in 
the operation of a public utility, which 
shall include but not necessarily be limit-
ed to the following business entities, 
whether corporate or otherwise: 
(F) Express companies: 
"The primary purpose of statutory con-
struction is to ascertain and give effect, if 
possible, to the intention of purpose of the 
legislature as expressed in the statute." 
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. King, 678 
S.W.2d 19 (Tenn.1984). Legislative intent 
is derived from construing the statute in its 
entirety, and it should be assumed the leg-
islature used each word purposefully and 
that those words convey some intent and 
have a meaning and a purpose. Tennessee 
Growers, Inc. v. King, 682 S.W.2d 203, 205 
(Tenn.1984). "While it is well settled that 
revenue statutes are to be liberally con-
strued in favor of the taxpayer and strictly 
construed against the taxing authority [ci-
tation omitted], it is equally clear that the 
plain import of the language of the act is to 
be given effect [citation omitted], and that 
the legislative intent to tax must not be 
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thwarted by the strict construction rule." 
International Harvester Company v. 
Carr, 225 Tenn. 244, 259-260, 466 S.W.2d 
207, 214 (1971) quoted with approval in 
Oliver v. King, 612 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tenn. 
1981). 
The legislature's purpose in promulgat-
ing T.C.A. § 67-5-501(8) was to define 
"public utility property" by its use. The 
precise issue is whether Federal Express's 
use of its property is that of an "express 
company," a term which is not specifically 
defined in the statute. 
Federal Express asserted in the Court of 
Appeals that it was not an "express compa-
ny" because it collects and ships packages 
from the public via modes of transportation 
which it owns. According to Federal Ex-
press "[t]he term 'express company' is a 
term of art which dates to the latter part of 
the 19th Century. It was typically applied 
to a shipper who collected packages from 
the public and shipped those packages to 
the destination city via modes of transpor-
tation which it did not own." The cases 
relied upon in support of this contention do 
not define the term "express company;" 
they merely describe the operations of the 
particular express company that was in-
volved in that litigation. 
In American Railway Express Co. v. 
Wright, 128 Miss. 593, 91 So. 342 (1922) the 
Mississippi Supreme Court determined that 
the following was "a very good definition 
of an express company:" 
A firm or corporation (usually a corpora-
tion) engaged in the business of trans-
porting parcels or other moveable prop-
erty, in the capacity of common carriers, 
and especially undertaking the safe car-
riage and speedy delivery of small but 
valuable packages of goods and money. 
91 So. at pp. 343-344 See Alsop v. South-
ern Express Co., 104 N.C. 278, 10 S.E. 
297 (1899). 
"An express company is a common carri-
er." Express Company v. Johnson, 92 
Tenn. 326, 21 S.W. 666 (1893); Railway 
Express Company v. Kessler, 189 Va. 301, 
52 S.E.2d 102 (1949). "A common carrier is 
one who, by virtue of his calling under-
v. TENN. STATE BD. Tenn. 875 
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takes for compensation to transport per-
sonal property from one place to another 
for all such as may choose to employ him; 
and everyone who undertakes to carry for 
compensation the goods of all people indif-
ferently, is as to liability, to be deemed a 
common carrier." Jackson Architectural 
Iron Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N.Y. 34, 52 
N.E. 665 (1899) quoted with approval by 
Greyhound Corporation v. Michigan Pub-
lic Service Commission, 360 Mich. 578, 
104 N.W.2d 395 (Mich.1960). "It is well 
known and understood that its, [an express 
company's], business is the transmission 
and delivery of packages, for which it re-
ceives a compensation." American Rail-
way Express Co. v. Wright, supra, 91 So. 
at 343-344. 
[1] In our opinion the activities of Fed-
eral Express comes within the ordinary and 
plain meaning of the term "express compa-
ny." While it is true that 19th century 
express companies transported packages 
via railroads and steamships owned by oth-
ers, see Memphis & Little Rock Railway 
Co. v. Southern Express Co., 117 U.S. 1, 6 
S.Ct. 542, 628, 29 L.Ed. 791 (1886), we have 
been unable to find any case which has 
defined express companies in such terms. 
There seems to be no policy reason to dif-
ferentiate between companies which pick 
up, transport, and deliver small packages 
via modes of transportation owned by oth-
ers and companies which perform this ser-
vice primarily using modes of transporta-
tion which that company owns. Both types 
of companies are common carriers owing 
similar duties to the general public. "All 
common carriers are public utilities, but all 
public utilities are not common carriers." 
Aberdeen Cable TV Service, Inc. v. City of 
Aberdeen, 176 N.W. 738 (S.D.1970). Thus 
a company transporting packages on an 
expedited basis as a common carrier must 
be deemed to be an express company which 
falls within the definition of a "public utili-
ty" for purposes of T.C.A. § 67-5-501. 
[2] Federal Express also argues that to 
assess its property for ad valorem tax pur-
poses at 55% of its value, while assessing 
the property of railroads at the industrial 
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and commercial rate of 30% of value, vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution and Article II, 
Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution, 
which requires "the ratio of assessment to 
value of property in each class or subclass 
shall be equal and uniform throughout the 
state. The legislature classified railroads 
as public utilities and assessed them for ad 
valorem tax purposes at 55% of the value 
of their properties. However, the Con-
gress of the United States, by Section 306 
of the Railroad Revitalization and Regula-
tory Reform Act of 1976, 49 U.S.C. § 11503 
("4-R Act"), preempted the state classifica-
tion of railroads and provided that they 
should be taxed as industrial and commer-
cial property are taxed. The Act, having 
as its purpose the revitalization of rail-
roads, affected only that business. Thus 
leaving in effect the state classification of 
other businesses as public utilities. The 
assessment of each of the businesses 
classed as public utilities is at the same 
ratio to value as the assessment of Federal 
Express property; consequently, we find 
no violation of either Article II, Section 28 
of the Tennessee Constitution or the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed. The judgment of the Chancery 
Court dismissing the cause is affirmed. 
Costs are adjudged against Federal Ex-
press Corporation and its surety. 
BROCK, CJ., and FONES, HARBISON, 
and DROWOTA, JJ., concur. 
fo f cft«u«ift srsTiM> 
Teresa Ann LENTZ, Appellee, 
v. 
Gary Benton LENTZ, Appellant 
Supreme Court of Tennessee, 
at Knoxville. 
Oct. 6, 1986. 
Rehearing Denied Nov. 10,1986. 
In divorce and custody action, the 
Chancery Court, Anderson County, Allen 
Kidwell, Chancellor, granted custody of 
two oldest children to former husband and 
of youngest child to former wife. Former 
husband appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Cooper, J., held that: (1) grant of custody 
of youngest child to former wife was in 
that child's best interest, and (2) order that 
former wife pay $25 per week in support 
was reasonable under circumstances. 
Affirmed. 
1. Parent and Child *=>2(3.1) 
While parentage of child is major, and 
often determinative, factor in deciding who 
shall have custody of that child, overriding 
issue is what is in child's best interest. 
2. Divorce *»298(4) 
Grant of custody in divorce action to 
former wife, who was natural mother and 
had had custody since birth, was in child's 
best interests, where former husband had 
demanded blood-grouping test to determine 
if he were father of child, despite former 
wife's admission that child was product of 
adulterous affair with her pastor. 
3. Divorce *=>308 
Determination that former wife should 
contribute $25 per week toward support of 
two children in former husband's custody 
was reasonable under circumstances, in 
view of parties' relative earning capacity 
and fact that former wife had responsibili-
ty of supporting third child. 
A. Thomas Monceret, William C. Cre-
mins, Knoxville, for appellant. 
